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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Dylan Patrick Brady 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Geography 
 
June 2020 
 
Title: Navigating Chinese-ness: Infrastructure, Community and the More-Than-Human 
Nation 
 
 
The Chinese rail system is among the largest, densest, and most heavily used rail 
networks in the world, playing a central role in the circulation of migrant workers, 
students, professionals and tourists within China’s domestic sphere. Research has 
examined the rail system’s role in China’s political economy and its use as a tool of 
statecraft, yet little research has been conducted on the rail system as a social space. How 
does rail travel contribute to the formation of community and place at the national scale? 
This dissertation argues that reconceptualizing the nation as a more-than-human 
assemblage illuminates how rail travel weaves together people, things and infrastructure 
to form a coherent but heterogeneous whole. 
Drawing on more-than-human methodologies, fieldwork was conducted over 
seven months in 2016 and 2017. Spanning the geographic extent of the Chinese rail 
system, from its core to its far-flung peripheries, participant-observation gathered data on 
how the practices of rail skillfully assemble material things and spaces to produce a 
coherent system. Semi-structured interviews with passengers from a range of regional, 
generational, and socio-economic backgrounds gathered data on how the things and 
spaces of rail travel are perceived and how their use has evolved. This account of rail’s 
v 
more-than-human dimensions informs the analysis of mainland Chinese discourses 
around the 2018 opening of the first high-speed rail (HSR) line to Hong Kong.  
This project finds a system standardized over remarkable distances, characterized 
by a distinctively Chinese assemblage of infrastructures, objects and practices. This 
assemblage plays a vital role in knitting together China’s diverse regions and 
communities into an integrated national territory and community. Practices reflect 
national conceptions of class, and ticketing interpolates national citizens. Yet it is also a 
system riven with fractures. A two-tiered system is emerging which mirrors, roughly, a 
divided ridership: poor migrants depend on the cheaper conventional services, while the 
better off tend towards the speed and comfort of HSR. In the Pearl River Delta, 
centralized national standards produce fractures at the regional scale. The more-than-
human environment of Chinese rail re-inscribes and realizes underlying tensions and 
contradictions within Chinese nation-ness.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Research Problem and Context 
On board high-speed trains between Beijing and Shanghai, Lanzhou and Urumqi, 
and countless other cities, a LED display at the front of the carriage relays to passengers 
the speed of the train, its number, the current time and the next stop. This information 
enables passengers to orient themselves, ensuring they have boarded the right train 
among the otherwise indistinguishable fleet and tracking their progress across the speed-
blurred landscape outside their windows. The display also cycles through other messages: 
directing passengers toward electrical sockets, or warning passengers of the strict ban on 
smoking. Then, at the end of the loop, appears this slogan: “safe and top quality, build 
railways and strengthen the nation” (安全优质、兴路强国 anquan youzhi, xinglu 
qiangguo; see Figure 1.1). In just eight characters, this slogan captures the role that rail 
infrastructure plays in the PRC’s nationalist self-narration. By providing safe 
transportation and top notch service, the rail system “realizes the Chinese dream of a 
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Liu Z. and Zeng 2014).* 
These eight characters appear throughout the rail system; they are on billboards 
and big character banners on station platforms and in waiting rooms, as well as in 
                                               
* This phrase brings together a number of core terms in China’s nationalist discourse. The 
“Chinese nation” (中华民族 Zhonghua minzu) is a neologism from the early days of nationalist 
debate, coined to transcend the limitations of Han chauvinism and produce a broader 
conception of who can be Chinese (Leibold 2007; Mullaney 2011). “Rejuvenation” (复兴 
fuxing) has taken on renewed prominence as the name for China’s latest high-speed rail set. The 
“China Dream” (中国梦 Zhongguo meng) is a vague ideal which has been central to Xi’s 
project of nationalist cultural governance (Callahan 2017). 
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carriages. Just as train numbers and stop names orient passengers within the rail network, 
these slogans orient the passengers and the network within discourses of China. The 
connection between rail infrastructure and nation-building was well-appreciated by early 
nationalists: Sun Yat-sen, the founding figure of Chinese nationalism, spent the first 
decades of the Republic of China planning an elaborate rail network to spur the economy 
and unite the Chinese polity (Edmonds 1987; Y. Sun 1922). It remains central to China’s 
political economy as both a driver of development and a symbol of national progress. Yet 
the rail system is not necessarily a transparent medium for the exercise of state power. 
Safety was at the forefront of railway discourse in 2014 in part due to the disastrous and 
deadly 2011 Wenzhou train crash, a disaster that played a large part in the 2013 breakup 
of the powerful Ministry of Railways. The Wenzhou crash, moreover, became a 
flashpoint for popular grievances, sparking a wave of nationalist protest that was deeply 
critical of the state even as it took ownership of rail (Bondes and Schucher 2014). Rail is 
a mechanism through which the state shapes the national community, but it does not 
grant the state an authorial monopoly on what it means. 
 
Figure 1.1. A nationalist slogan scrolls by on the LED display in high-speed rail 
carriages: the first half on a train between Chengdu and Chongqing, the second half on a 
train from Wuhan to Guangzhou. All photographs by author unless noted. 
 
 
3 
This dissertation locates the power of rail at a remove from the state: while the 
intent of the state in building rail and state discourses around rail cannot be dismissed, its 
impact is at a slant, mediated through the concrete specificities of rail infrastructure. In 
this dissertation I seek to supplement the sustained attention to the role of the state and to 
discourse within studies of Chinese nationalism with an examination of how more-than-
human infrastructures articulate between state and nation, linking the two together and 
holding them apart.  
This dissertation also locates the power of rail outside the realm of discourse. As 
neatly as the omnipresent eight character slogan captures rail’s nation-building role, the 
slogan itself goes largely unnoticed: few of my respondents could recall having ever seen 
it, no matter how frequently they traveled by rail. As with rail travel, rail slogans tend to 
fade from conscious awareness, becoming part of the backdrop of everyday life. As noted 
by Billig (1995)’s turn to the banal, maps, stamps and license plates, shape perceptions of 
the nation far from the spectacle of marches and celebration. Moreover, scholars of 
nationalism have begun to examine how the nation takes shape in everyday practices (J. 
E. Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Skey and Antonsich 2017), from driving a car (Edensor 
2002; 2004) to washing the dishes (Linde-Laursen 1993) make nation-ness manifest. 
Some have begun to explore how material things come to play a vital constitutive role 
within the nation, not merely as material bearers of social meaning but as productive of it 
(R. Jones and Merriman 2012; Merriman and Jones 2016; Verstraete 2002). In this 
dissertation, I synthesize studies of everyday nation-ness and work on the ontology of the 
more-than-human to show how a conception of a more-than-human nation can weave 
together investigations of practice, affect, and materiality within the national community.  
4 
A renewed attention to the things of the material world has percolated out from 
philosophy and science and technology studies (hereafter: STS) into the wider social 
sciences. The material turn situates social construction of meaning within an equally 
meaningful material world. Contrary to anthropocentric conceptions of agency, 
materialists examine the forces exerted by non-human things both natural and 
technological. The investigation of the assemblages formed by these human and non-
human agents reveals them as heterogenous and contingent, coherent only insofar as they 
are constantly reproduced as such. Yet if nationalism studies and Chinese studies have 
paid little attention to materiality, materialist thinkers skillfully disassemble everything 
from microbes to global warming but all too often take the national unit for granted 
(exceptions include Jasanoff 2004; Jasanoff and Kim 2015). 
Infrastructure serves as a point of contact for all these bodies of thinking. 
Infrastructure has drawn attention from philosophers, STS scholars, and geographers for 
its intransigent materiality—even as it subtends massive projects of state-making and 
nation-building, forming the invisible medium for social life, it never does precisely what 
it is intended to and no more (Star 1999; Kaika 2005). In contemporary China, rail 
infrastructure has become a ubiquitous element of everyday life, enabling the smooth 
flow of passengers in search of work, education, and leisure.  
This dissertation investigates this flow, and the infrastructure of stations and 
carriages which it animates, as vital processes within the production of nation-ness. 
Passengers rely on skill to navigate their journey; these practices in turn depend upon the 
infrastructure of the rail system, forming a socio-technological assemblage. Rail is 
increasingly interwoven with other Chinese infrastructures from the national 
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identification cards which certify passengers’ identities to the WeChat small apps they 
use to buy tickets, linking rail travel into a larger social assemblage. Rail travel is a 
central means through which people come to know China as a coherent territory and 
themselves as residents within it. Rail also lays bare China’s fractures. Nation-building is 
far from a straightforward process of homogenization: it is a dynamic process, with new 
social divisions constantly emerging and old ones stubbornly lingering on. If rail is a site 
where nation-building takes place, it is also a site where fracture lines between regions, 
ethnicities and classes may manifest—or where they are produced. Social standards take 
on material form in rail infrastructure, giving rise to both integration and exclusion; social 
analysis must therefore also analyze the more-than-human environments which societies 
make for themselves. 
My research is guided by these questions:  
1. How has the state used the railway system to promote territorial integration 
through media discourse and in material reality? 
2. How do the practices of passengers work with the more-than-human elements 
of rail infrastructure to produce space and community at the scale of the nation? 
3. What social and spatial fractures are produced through and manifested in rail 
space? What disjunctures between nation and state are produced and manifested in rail 
space? 
This dissertation is based on fieldwork conducted across China in 2016 and 2017, 
and discourse analysis conducted in 2019. As the nation-ness of rail is precisely what is 
under investigation, my research site is not any single line or station but “rail space” as a 
whole. Multi-sited ethnographies trade an intensive single-site focus for a topological 
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tracing of the object of study through the world system (Marcus 1995); my research 
borrows these methodological insights to follow flows of people and things as they 
circulate at the national scale. Drawing on affective, materialist and more-than-human 
methodologies (Dewsbury 2010; Nimmo 2011; N. J. Fox and Alldred 2015; Pitt 2015), I 
investigated practices of passengers and personnel and the design and use of station and 
carriage spaces. This research produced an ethnography of rail space as a more-than-
human assemblage, highlighting how everyday practice builds national communities. The 
subsequent discourse analysis of media narratives concerning the opening of the new 
high-speed rail line into Hong Kong and the assembly of a Greater Bay Area generated 
an account of infrastructure’s role articulating imaginaries of region and nation. The 
practices and things of rail space figured prominently: the ongoing infrastructural 
integration of Hong Kong residents into China’s citizenship-based ticketing system and 
the debate around the joint checkpoint in West Kowloon bring together the practices of 
rail travel and the discourses of nation-building. 
2. Theoretical Engagements 
In conceptualizing this dissertation’s object of research, I theorize the nation as a 
more-than-human thing. In doing so, I draw upon and contribute to the burgeoning 
literature on materialist ontology in science and technology studies (hereafter: STS), 
geography, and the wider social sciences. STS approaches have emphasized the 
constitutive role of matter in social reality, both as ligament of social order and as a 
source of chaotic excess. Since the nineties, an interdisciplinary body of scholarship has 
reconceptualized the state through an examination of how the materiality of non-human, 
technological infrastructure subtends the more visible elements of human social life. In 
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contrast, a sustained engagement with the more-than-human dimensions of the nation has 
only recently emerged. 
This dissertation uses the term “nation-ness” to mark a distinction between the 
object of study in this dissertation and “nationalism.” Nationalism, the normative political 
principle that nations ought to be the sole or primary unit of political life (Gellner 1983, 
1), has been the more typical object of scholarly inquiry, a framework which has directed 
inquiry towards questions of discourse and social imaginaries. Rather than treating the 
nation as a solely social or discursive entity, I conceptualize it as a sociotechnical, 
material-discursive object composed of a multitude of human and non-human things. 
Accordingly, the conception of “nation-ness” employed in this dissertation is relational 
and materialist: I do not imply the existence of some sort of national essence. Nation-
ness, rather, is a relation masquerading as a qualia: practices, people, and places are 
realized as national as they are knit into a nation. The rail system in China is not Chinese 
because it possesses a unique quality of Chinese-ness utterly unlike rail systems 
elsewhere, but because of the innumerable concrete relations which knit it into a 
particular assemblage of places, people and things collectively constituting the People’s 
Republic of China. The nation is not a timeless ideal or discursive construct; rather it is 
nothing more or less that the people and things out of which it is constituted. 
Centering infrastructure allows us to bridge a number of troublesome analytical, 
empirical and temporal divides in the study of China as well. The literature on the 
Chinese state and Chinese nation-ness has largely developed in isolation from the 
materialist approaches employed within this dissertation. While Chinese studies has 
encountered the same empirical issues concerning contradictory accounts of coherence 
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and fracture as the scholars of state and nation discussed below, there has been a relative 
dearth of theorization in Chinese studies. Bringing the insights from materialist theories 
sheds a critical light on the role of infrastructure in the Chinese state, conflicts between 
the local state and the center, and the imbrication of ethnic and national identity in China. 
2.1. More-Than-Human Ontologies 
In thinking through how rail infrastructure shapes Chinese nation-ness, I draw 
upon the broad theoretical re-engagement with materiality across the social sciences 
sometimes termed the material turn or new materialisms (Coole and Frost 2010a; Bennet 
and Joyce 2010; Kirsch 2013). This re-engagement with materiality has rippled out of 
philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Bennett 2009) and science and technology 
studies (Latour 1987; 1999; Barad 2007) through the broader social sciences, re-orienting 
investigation towards matter’s co-constitutive role in human endeavor. Within human 
geography, the effects of this re-engagement can be seen within cultural geography 
(Kirsch 2013; Whatmore 2006) and, more recently, within political geography (Barry 
2013; Dittmer 2017; Meehan, Shaw, and Marston 2013; Müller 2015; Squire 2015).  
Though diverse in their interests and commitments, these approaches share a 
general skepticism of classic positivist dichotomies between society and nature, society 
and technology, words and things. Most centrally, these approaches argue we have 
radically misunderstood what it means to exist. Drawing on Spinozan ontology (2002; 
Deleuze 1988), Deleuze and Guattari (1987) propose to rethink things as “assemblages”: 
wholes which are only contingently and partially so. Assemblages differ from the 
common sensical conception of things firstly in that they are processual: their forms are 
stabilized through a constant happening rather than any intrinsic solidity. Secondly, 
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assemblages are heterogeneous: the actants out of which they are assembled have their 
own relations that are not defined by their function within the assemblage. Thinking 
things as assemblages, therefore, functions to avoid assuming stability and totality and 
instead examine the processes through which things are produced as contingently “co-
functioning.” As suggested by the term “actants,” assemblage thinking decenters humans 
from questions of agency. Bennett (2009) argues for vitality of not just living things but 
all matter: every thing has the capacity to exert force on other things, often in ways that 
exceed any pre-existing conception of their character. Callon (1986) shows how social 
systems are shaped to their core by the actions of animal life, but the inorganic, from 
trash to the electricity grid, also compose society and retain the capacity to exceed and 
disrupt it (Bennett 2009). 
This re-conceptualization is not simply a matter of matter, but of meaning as well. 
Materialist ontologies seek not to discard the critical tools of the cultural turn’s discourse 
analysis but to re-situate them within a simultaneously discursive and material world 
(Haraway 1988; Coole and Frost 2010a). This requires applying the analysis of meaning 
to materiality, and re-evaluating of how discourse is itself material. Deleuze and Guattari 
speak of processes of coding, material forms which express and thereby stabilize the 
identity of an assemblage through genes or constitutions (1987; see DeLanda 2006, 14–
19). Latour’s actor-network theory examines the process by which facts emerge from 
scientific endeavor, arguing that they are not discovered so much as manufactured (1987; 
1999; 2005). This is not, as Latour has spent decades attempting to make clear, an 
attempt to undermine the validity of science but rather an attempt to situate these 
discursive claims within the social and the natural, rather than fundamentally apart. 
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Latour argues that facts become more true the more they become entangled in networks 
of instruments, scientists, allies and publics (Latour 1999, 99). Similarly, technology 
becomes more efficacious the better it enlists the capacities of nature rather than by 
exerting greater control “over” it. Scallops (Callon 1986) and microbes (Latour 1999, Ch 
4) are as central a part of politics and science as fisherman and microbiologists. These 
networks are not defined by a leap from things to words, from nature to science or from 
science to society but rather by their mutual “co-production” (Jasanoff 2004).  
Barad (2007)’s theory of agential realism employs the concept of apparatus—
simultaneously the experimental set up of physicists and Foucault’s dispositif—to 
conceptualize how things emerge. Barad holds that agential realism is coterminous with 
quantum reality: equally applicable at every scale from the sub-atomic to the galactic, to 
social meaning as well as physical matter. If the assemblage foregrounds the transient and 
partial coming together of things, and an actor-network emphasizes the stability that 
emerges through co-production, Barad is concerned with the very moment of realization: 
the “cut” by which contingent possibility becomes determinate, a definite reality. Rather 
than locating boundaries at the edges of things, Barad argues that what seem to be 
relations of exclusion—ability and disability, light and darkness, the national and the 
foreigner—are distinctions within an emergent whole (2007, 158). Barad examines the 
reality of social categories without losing sight of their contingency, their existence 
always complicated by internal others and external selves. 
Materialist thinking offers an alternative ontological framework for the re-
examination of a set of prominent empirical debates within Chinese studies. 
Contradictory empirical findings concerning the balance of power between the central 
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state, local government and local communities in China (Shue 1990; Remick 2004; D. S. 
G. Goodman 2009; Shue and Thornton 2017) implicitly assume a zero-sum game 
between local and centralized power. Assemblage theory and actor-network theory 
introduce a framework in which it is possible that these social assemblages can “co-
function” in ways that might empower—or undermine—both. Similarly, I argue the 
growing literature on the complex relations of interdependence between China’s Han 
majority and minority nationalities (Gladney 1994; 2004), as well as on the hidden 
diversity within the Han (Mullaney 2012; Joniak-Lüthi 2015) stands to benefit from 
Barad’s theorization of the co-production of self-other relations. 
In this dissertation, I employ assemblage thinking to examine the relationship 
between rail infrastructure and the production of the Chinese national community. The 
Chinese rail system is assembled out of a vast assortment of things, from the engines that 
move its carriages to the tickets that identify its passengers—but none of these things are 
solely or wholly part of this assemblage. I argue that the rail assemblage, both its 
technological and social dimensions, plays a vital role in assembling the Chinese nation. 
It is unique in that no other assemblage plays precisely the same role, but not alone: 
assemblages of print and audiovisual media, of roads and cars, of classrooms and 
textbooks play similarly vital roles. While all these assemblages co-function within a 
national assemblage, materialist thinking remains keenly aware that this role is contingent 
and partial: as a Baradian apparatus rail also enacts cuts, realizing internal others within 
the national community to which it lends determinacy. The material role of rail and other 
infrastructures in the production of nation has only recently attracted scholarly attention; 
the role of infrastructure in another sort of assemblage—the state—has been the subject 
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of a richer literature. In China, the rail system has been an explicit part of the state 
assemblage. While it has played a central role in the rhetoric and practice of nation-
building, it has been a locus for anti-state sentiment as well (Bondes and Schucher 2014; 
Chu 2014; Xia 2016). I turn to the literature on state and infrastructure to better 
understand how infrastructure functions as a potent but unpredictable element within 
larger social structures. 
2.2. Infrastructure and the More-Than-Human State 
The investigation of materiality, particularly infrastructure, has emerged across a 
wide range of disciplines as a productive lens for the analysis of the state. Within STS, 
this area has been examined by those interested in the role of the state in the development 
of science and technology (Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Jasanoff 1990; 2004; Hecht 2009; 
Jasanoff and Kim 2015; Rowland and Passoth 2015). In other disciplines, materiality has 
proven a productive site for the study of how the state generates such effects as a 
monopoly on legitimate violence through concrete mechanisms in particular spaces—and 
how it fails. 
Building on a strand of scholarship skeptical of classical Weberian conceptions of 
the state as a unitary whole (Abrams 1988; Mitchell 1991), scholars of the state are 
excavating the material dimensions of the state assemblage (Bennet and Joyce 2010; 
Dittmer 2014; Joyce and Mukerji 2017). Joyce (2010) and Dittmer (2017) examine how 
the physical form and literal weight of the government documents contributed to and 
overbalanced the British state. For some (Joyce and Mukerji 2017; Painter 2006; 2010), a 
materialist perspective wholly destabilizes the concept of the state as anything more than 
a reification: while passports and post offices are real, no agglomeration of such things 
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ever adds up to the State. For others (Dittmer 2014; 2017), a materialist approach simply 
places the state on the same ontological ground as any other assemblage: contingent and 
partial, but no less real. 
Infrastructure, particularly in the form of large-scale state projects, has proven a 
productive middle ground: large enough to have effects at the scale of the state, while 
concrete enough to offer material for analysis. Geographers, particularly those studying 
the political ecology of water, have looked to infrastructure to examine the social 
metabolism: how “nature” is taken up and consumed by society (Swyngedouw 2004). 
This literature shows mastering hydrology through dams, sanitation and hydroelectric 
projects was central to state-making during modernity (Kaika 2005; Swyngedouw 2007; 
2014; Carse 2012; Meehan 2014). In anthropology, water, heating and transportation 
infrastructures have proven both a valuable site for examining the hidden dimensions of 
neoliberal politics (Collier 2011; Anand 2011; Harvey 2010; Dalakoglou and Harvey 
2012) and as “concrete semiotic and aesthetic vehicles” (Larkin 2013, 329) of desire and 
fantasy (Mrázek 2002; Bear 2007). 
Both of these literatures draw heavily on work on infrastructure from within STS. 
Hughes’ (1983) examination of electrification spurred the study of the social construction 
of novel infrastructure systems (Bijker and Law 1992; van der Vleuten 2004; Bijker et al. 
2012). The work of Susan Leigh has traveled especially far. Star’s examination of 
infrastructure is attentive to the role of community and practice as well as material things. 
Star attends to the peculiar visual qualities of infrastructure: the more it is used, the less 
visible it becomes—until breakdown disrupts routines, and except for those users whom 
its design excludes. “For the person in a wheelchair, the stairs and doorjamb in front of a 
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building are not seamless subtenders of use, but barriers (Star 1990)” (Star 1999, 380). 
Central to Star’s thinking is the “boundary object”: things which articulate together 
distinct communities for whom those objects hold different meanings (Star and 
Griesemer 1989). Processes of standardization give rise to “boundary infrastructures,” 
which simultaneously serve multiple communities of practice (Bowker and Star 1999).  
Star’s conception of infrastructure mediating between distinct communities 
without collapsing their distinctions helps makes sense of a broader literature within 
which large-scale infrastructure projects like dams, roads, and railways are alternately 
essential to state-making (Lefebvre 1991) and a deeply imperfect medium for state power 
(Scott 1998). Carroll (2012) draws on the concept of boundary object to examine how 
“water” sutured together the scientific establishment and government into a particular 
technoscientific state formation in California. Guldi (2012) argues that road-building was 
a key mechanism for the emergence of a strong central state. Harvey (2010; 2012) 
theorizes the role of concrete in realizing the state’s presence in rural Peru far from the 
centers of power. Yet an equally crucial insight emerging out of infrastructural studies is 
infrastructure’s capacity to undermine the state and subvert its intended impact. Scott’s 
Seeing Like a State (1998) is a touchstone in this literature: his account of how a series of 
schemes intended to render people and territories legible to the state went wrong offers a 
powerful case for the limitations of state power. Others examine how infrastructure can 
be generative of alternative conceptions of state. Mukerji (2010a) shows how managing 
infrastructure projects instilled a series of royal French engineers with a conception of the 
state quite at odds with Louis XIV’s. Goswami (2004) argues that the Indian railways 
built by the British to realize their imperial power were a key site for the production of 
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Indian anti-colonial nationalism. In the post-colonial context, Akhter (2015) argues that 
the Pakistani government’s Tarbela Dam mega-project resulted in the fracture of state 
territory and an emerging regionalism. 
This literature shows infrastructure to be a potent but unpredictable element 
within the state assemblage: it can be productive of considerable power over extensive 
territories, but imperfectly and unevenly. Moreover, infrastructure, particularly but not 
solely transport infrastructure, centers questions of state spatiality. Brenner and Elden 
(2009)’s critique of Lefebvre’s state space theory emphasizes that while the production of 
a transparent, calculable space is the goal of state territorialization, it “is not 
homogeneous; it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its sense, its ‘objective’... in itself it 
is multi-form” (Lefebvre 1991, 287). While Lefebvre spends little time on the specifics, it 
is clear that infrastructure—electricity, air traffic, railroads—is key (2009, 237–40). 
While infrastructure subtends the illusion of homogeneity which the state strives towards, 
the concrete specificities of that infrastructure shape fractures and hierarchies which 
disrupt that seeming homogeneity. 
While I argue that theories like Mitchell’s “state effect” (1999) and Joyce and 
Mukerji’s “logistical state” (2017) go too far in dispensing with a concept of a real state, 
their approach to the state from the vantage of the practices and infrastructures from 
which they are assembled is a useful addition to Chinese studies’ engagement with the 
state. Starting from the assumption that the state is heterogeneous and multi-sited makes 
sense of empirical case studies that alternatively find the local state subjugated by and 
autonomous from centralized power structures. The coordination of actors across scales 
into a coherent state is an empirical question, not a logical necessity. An infrastructural 
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approach further highlights tensions inherent in China’s state-led development. As 
Lefebvre suggests, infrastructure may be a pillar of state legitimization discourse, but it 
constitutes a much messier reality on the ground (Chu 2014; Bach 2016; Oakes 2019). 
These deep engagements with infrastructure as a state-maker and as a community 
builder offer a model for a parallel engagement with the question of nation-ness—how 
infrastructure brings together communities at the scale of the state. While the role of 
infrastructure in nation-building has begun to draw attention (Goswami 2004; Kezer 
2009; Merriman and Jones 2016), nation-ness has largely remained a lacuna within 
investigations of the material. Much as infrastructures assemble and also challenge the 
coherence of the state, I investigate the rail system as realizing an overarching coherence 
within Chinese territory, but also realizing fractures. Old divisions are reproduced within 
rail space, and new ones are generated. Secondly, examining state and nation through an 
infrastructural lens suggests a new way of resolving the long-acknowledged tension 
within the nation-state form. While clearly not synonymous, neither can state and nation 
be easily disentangled. This dissertation suggests that infrastructural assemblages can 
play constitutive roles in both state and nation, parallel but distinct. 
2.3. The More-Than-Human Nation 
The question of how infrastructure is materially implicated in nation-ness is new. 
Until quite recently, nationalism has been the central object of study for both macro-
historical accounts of the origins of nations as well as discursive analyses of nationalist 
sentiment. Yet the nation shapes and is shaped by routine practices of everyday life far 
removed from overt, self-conscious displays of nationalism. In the past decades, the study 
of “everyday nationhood” or “nation-ness” has developed the fine-grained investigation 
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of how contemporary nations are reproduced from the bottom-up, complementing 
accounts of nationalism’s origins as an elite-driven project of the state (J. E. Fox and 
Miller-Idriss 2008; Surak 2012; Skey and Antonsich 2017). These everyday practices, 
however, are in turn entangled with the infrastructures of the built environment. While 
the study of nationalism has delved deeply into how states shape nationalism through 
language and performance, the ways in which material infrastructures contribute to the 
production of national communities and territories has not received equal attention. By 
investigating the ways that nation-ness subtends and relies upon infrastructure, this 
dissertation sheds light on how materiality and non-human agency also make essential 
contributions to the realization of the nation, arguing that the nation is more properly 
understood as a more-than-human thing. Centering infrastructure allows us to synthesize 
insights from a number of theories of nationalism: infrastructures make clear the 
connections between modern nation-building, nationalist discourses, and everyday life. 
The academic study of nations and nationalism blossomed quite late. In Özkırımlı 
(2010)’s introduction to theories of nationalism, he argues that it was only in the wake of 
the Second World War that nationalism became a central problematic within social 
science. During the post-war period, theories of nationalism were divided by the 
question: when is the nation? “Primordialist” theories, holding that nationalism is a 
universal, or at least recurrent, feature of human history were forced to repeatedly 
moderate their position in the face of “modernist” critiques which argued that nations 
originated within the economic, political, and cultural transformations of the modern era 
(Özkırımlı 2010). For modernist thinkers like Ernest Gellner, the emergence of 
nationalism was a necessary albeit unintentional consequence of industrialization (1983). 
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Industrial labor requires a mobile and homogenized workforce, capable of moving 
quickly between tasks and industries. In order to facilitate cooperation and retraining, 
workers must be literate and conversant in a shared language and culture (Gellner 1983, 
27–28). Managing the mass education infrastructure necessary to train an entire 
population in a common culture is a task too large for any entity but the state, which 
thereby comes to exercise a monopoly on legitimate education (Gellner 1983, 34).  
This, Gellner stresses, is quite incidental to the state’s intentions, and even to the 
intentions of nationalists: nationalism arises because it is a necessary and inevitable 
byproduct of modernity. Commenting on Karl Deutsch (1953)’s focus on the role of mass 
media in spreading nationalism, Gellner argued that “it matters precious little what has 
been fed into them: it is the media…which itself automatically engenders the core idea of 
nationalism” (1983, 127). Once a standardized national culture is established as the 
“minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone the members of the society can breathe 
and survive and produce” (1983, 38) under the control of the state, then the nationalist 
principle will emerge. 
Gellner exemplifies a curious blind spot in modernist theories: while they lend 
great explanatory weight to modernity’s grand societal transformations, their accounts are 
curiously disinterested in the specific technologies in question. Moreover, the 
transformations are seen as essentially binary: before work, education, media and 
mobility were artisanal, specialized, slow and limited, and now they are industrial, 
generic, rapid and wide-spread. The actual historical progress of these transformations—
their stops and starts, uneven spatial development, and fractious politics—are abstracted 
away. 
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Benedict Anderson (1983) is a partial exception: he accords mass communication 
a key role in nationalism, but he attends more closely to how its nationalizing force 
emerged through the technologies through which it is transmitted. Anderson examines 
how “print-capitalism” creates a new population of voracious readers, united by an 
“extraordinary mass ceremony: the almost precisely simultaneous consumption 
('imagining')” (1983, 35) of a mass-produced, vernacular print culture. Anderson’s 
account exceeds Gellner’s in two respects. First, and more influentially, Anderson’s 
attention to the perceptual dimensions of the nation opens an avenue to examine 
nationalism not simply as an “objective” sociohistorical process but as a profoundly 
subjective experience of belonging and identity (Goswami 2002). Second, where Gellner 
posits language as a standardized medium allowing fluid exchange of ideas, Anderson is 
much more attentive to the material realities that condition such flows. Gellner speaks of 
mobility in the social sense; Anderson is concerned with how geographic mobility 
produces or undermines the hold of state territories on the imagination of residents. While 
he uses the word “imagined,” Anderson’s attention to the material context of where and 
with what communities are imagined is less an account of subjectivity than of Spinozan 
affect (Deleuze 1988). 
Anderson traces how the relative friction of distance between the circulation of 
words and people shifts as the printing press is followed by technologies like steam 
power, radio and television (Anderson 1983, 34–35, 113–14, 135, 188). While mobility is 
accorded a considerable explanatory power within Anderson’s typology of nationalisms, 
the technological infrastructures which enable this mobility are given perfunctory 
acknowledgement and scant analysis. Yet Anderson’s engagement with the 
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infrastructural dimensions of print-capitalism is something of a high-water mark. Rather, 
it was Anderson’s analysis of the subjective experience of the “imagined community” 
that took root among scholars of nationalism. By the late eighties, Anderson’s work had 
come to signify a wide-spread shift from the investigation of the nation’s “objective” 
origins to a focus on the nation’s “subjective and discursive contours” (Goswami 2002, 
773; cf. Eley and Suny 1996). Centering subjective experience revealed the nation to be a 
far less stable entity than it had appeared through the macro-historical lens: for scholars 
examining complex heterogeneities along lines of race, gender and class within national 
communities, the homogenous national unit was not an objective entity but a hegemonic 
fiction (Bhabha 1990; Chatterjee 1993; Hall 1997; Yuval-Davis 1997). For some, the 
nation has become “imaginary” to the point that it becomes solely a discursive 
representation, shorn of any corresponding reality (Brubaker 2004; Calhoun 1997; 
2007).† If modernist’s concern with origins neglects the on-going dynamics of national 
reproduction, then discursive approaches take hold of the other side of the same binary. 
By severing nationalist fictions from material conditions, subjective accounts cannot 
investigate how material conditions enable, hinder, or shape the reproduction of the 
nation. 
In the past few decades, several strands of scholarship have attempted to situate 
subjective accounts of national experience alongside macro-historical accounts of nation-
building at the state scale. One productive approach to the nation was inaugurated by 
Billig’s Banal Nationalism (1995). The “banal nationalism” framework examines how 
                                               
† For a more in-depth critique of this conception of nations as “imagined,” see Chapter VI. 
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national symbols, in the form of flags, coins and weather maps, circulate not as elements 
of “hot,” emotionally-charged and rhetorically salient nationalism but as unremarkable 
features of everyday life (R. Jones and Merriman 2009). Banal nationalism drew 
scholarly attention to the existence of entire realms of national experience heretofore 
rarely examined. Moreover, by attending to ubiquitous representations of the nation, it 
refocused the study of national culture away from individual experience out towards the 
built environment. Banal nationalism’s analysis of how national culture embedded within 
the landscape revealed a way to reconcile the homogeneity of macro-historical accounts 
and the heterogeneity of micro-analytical accounts: everyone moves through the same 
communal spaces but may interpret it in divergent ways.  
Another strand of scholarship has coalesced around the how the nation takes 
shape in everyday life (J. E. Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Skey and Antonsich 2017; 
Edensor and Sumartojo 2018). Rather than taking for granted Gellner’s “minimal shared 
atmosphere” of national culture, this scholarship examines how particular practices and 
routines shape a national habitus and national landscape in concert (Edensor 2002). Skey 
and Antonisch (2017) argue that “everyday nationhood” emphasizes bottom-up, agency-
centered conceptions of nation-ness rather than top-down, state-centric conceptions, 
while Surak (2012) argues the micro-analytical investigation of nation-ness in everyday 
life refocuses scholarly attention on the contemporary rather than historical, the practices 
and embodiments rather than discourse and performance. Everyday nationhood expands 
banal nationalism’s focus on representation to engage with the nation’s affective 
dimensions, examining how particular contexts and environments generate feelings of 
belonging and alienation (Closs Stephens 2016; Militz and Schurr 2016; Militz 2017; 
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Sumartojo 2016; 2017). The notion of affect, in the Spinozan sense (2002), encompasses 
both the emotive force of nationalist discourse as well as the material force of corporeal 
embodiment (Militz 2017; Lapiņa 2018). 
A small group of scholars draws on materialist thinking concerning the agency of 
non-human things (Bennett 2009; Coole and Frost 2010b) to examine how infrastructure 
contributes to nation-building (R. Jones and Merriman 2012; Merriman and Jones 2016). 
Arguing for a conception of nation and national territories as sociomaterial constructions, 
they explore the ways that infrastructures like road and bridges shape identity, culture and 
space at the national scale. Materiality enables roads and road signs alike to accomplish 
nation-building effects—and also enables objects to fracture the very communities they 
are intended to build (R. Jones and Merriman 2009; 2012). 
A more-than-human approach to nation-ness that centers the role of infrastructure 
makes several interventions in the study of China. Introducing material, affective and 
more-than-human perspectives on the nation to Chinese studies answers Carlson (2009)’s 
call to examine the “mixed cauldron of identity-shaping influences within contemporary 
China” (2009, 29) outside the context of “hot” nationalism. Whether framed as a state 
construction or a populist uprising, the bulk of the literature concerning the contemporary 
Chinese national community analyses it as a discursive phenomenon (Gries 2004; Guo 
2004; S. Zhao 2004; Z. Wang 2012; Callahan 2010; 2017). An infrastructural approach 
incorporates the considerable role of the state without reducing nation-ness to its role in 
narratives of state legitimacy and popular protest. The more-than-human nation 
complements and extends work on online Chinese nationalism (Leibold 2010; 2016; 
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Schneider 2018) and the emerging Chinese surveillance state (Leibold 2019) that takes 
seriously the role of technological structures in society. 
Rail infrastructure in particular bridges the chronological and theoretical gap 
between early modern to contemporary Chinese nation-building. Geographical and 
economic analysis shows that between 1949 and 1978 was a period of substantial 
consolidation of China’s transportation network (Comtois 1990; C.-K. Leung 1980). This 
construction also played a formative role in PRC state-making, illustrating both its 
continuities with Nationalist policies and its differences (Köll 2019; Meyskens 2015; 
Naughton 1988). Synthesizing the literature on early modern nation-building brings to 
bear a sensitivity to heterogeneity and contingency that is often lacking in analyses of 
contemporary nationalism; conversely it situates ongoing innovations like the advent of 
HSR as both a continuation and an intensification of historical nation-building processes. 
This dissertation argues for fully incorporating materiality and the non-human into our 
conception of the nation, in China and beyond.  
3. Summary of Findings 
This dissertation makes an empirical contribution to the understanding of the 
Chinese rail system as not just a state project of territorial integration, but as a 
constitutive more-than-human element of the contemporary Chinese national community. 
This dissertation examines how rail space reflects social and spatial fractures within 
China’s body politic, but moreover how it is a site where such fractures are manifested 
and transformed. My fieldwork found that the rail system promotes territorial integration 
by propagating standardized practices and spaces across China’s diverse regions. Rail 
space is substantially homogenized across the overwhelming majority of the Chinese rail 
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system: stations, carriages, and practices of rail personnel are more-or-less identical 
across most of China. This material transformation is marshalled within state propaganda 
to construct a discourse of party, nation, and territory as indivisible elements of a unified 
China. This discourse does not deny the distinctiveness of regions like the Pearl River 
Delta in Guangdong, but positions them neatly within the nation-state rather than apart 
from it or in opposition. Yet the national narrative does not itself neatly encompass 
regional discourses: apparently straightforward processes of national standardization and 
homogenization have a more complicated trajectory at the local scale. In the Pearl River 
Delta, the emergence of national infrastructural standards has causes fractures at the 
regional scale. Regional concerns about travel documents and online ticketing exist 
alongside national narratives, showing a continued disjuncture between national and 
regional imaginaries of rail. 
Adopting a passenger-level perspective highlights the role of more-than-human 
elements of rail travel in shaping space and community. Rail space is assembled out of 
bodies and luggages, identification cards and smartphones, as much as from concrete and 
steel, and these material elements are continuously re-assembled through the skillful 
practices of passengers and personnel. The standardized infrastructure of the Chinese rail 
system allows those practiced in navigating it the ability to circulate freely through the 
network’s considerable extent. Yet at the same time, that standardized environment has 
become a backdrop against which a novel set of social distinctions snap into focus. Even 
within a single carriage, distinct traveling practices make use of rail space in different and 
incompatible ways, realizing social distinctions through even how basic needs for 
sustenance are met. These distinctions have taken on concrete spatial form as high-speed 
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rail (HSR) and the cheaper conventional services have become starkly differentiated, 
segregating well-off urbanites and poor rural migrants. The conventional rail system, 
long synonymous with the floating population of migrant laborers who have driven 
China’s economic transformation, is increasingly seen as a second-tier option, too dirty 
and loud for China’s emerging middle class. HSR, on the other hand, borrows personnel 
training and affordances from air travel to cultivate a different, more comfortable milieu. 
Increasingly conventional trains and the HSR trains function as entirely separate 
networks, with different practices among passengers and personnel, offering different 
affordances within stations and carriages. The social disjuncture is manifest even in gross 
physical space: in many cities HSR trains and standard trains service different stations, 
and even stations which serve both have divided waiting areas.  
This dissertation’s more-than-human analysis of rail space produces an account 
that decenters the state: the state is only one actor among the many human and non-
human agents who collectively produce rail space. The shape of the rail network owes a 
great deal to the Chinese state; it is nonetheless not wholly under its power and does not 
produce perfect homogeneity. While the rail system shortens travel times and accelerates 
circulations, it does so unevenly, deepening and redistributing inequalities of access 
across different regions and social groups. Decisions about where new lines and stations 
are opened and old ones are closed, who is able to travel freely and who finds themselves 
excluded, realize social and spatial inequalities at an immediate, visceral level. At the 
scale of the nation, new fractures have emerged between regions and cities, carving 
deeper contours into national space. The rail system is national in scale but not 
homogenous: its network topology connects cities and regions within a hierarchical 
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relationship where some are more connected than others. Rail’s bias towards population 
centers in the heartland of China is intensified in the case of the HSR network. Not only 
are first- and second-tier cities like Shanghai or Shijiazhuang junctions of multiple HSR 
routes, they also receive more frequent service. Even near the heart of the network, third-
tier stations in smaller cities are functionally isolated by the infrequency of stops. For 
wealthy urbanites shuttling between major cities, HSR allows for a seamless, 
uninterrupted flow: for those outside major cities, HSR service might run once a day or 
not at all. The presence or lack of HSR becomes a way that suzhi manifests at the urban 
level, marking a distinct line between the participants in China’s development and those 
being left behind. This perspective illuminates the struggle of some cities in China over 
inclusion in HSR construction such as the city-wide protests in Linshui in 2015 (Allen-
Ebrahimian 2015). Examining how patterns of social fracture propagate within what is an 
integrating and homogenizing infrastructure provides insight into how the growing force 
of the Chinese state can at times perversely generate new dissension among the 
peripheral and the marginalized. 
4. Explanation of the Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation combines elements of the monograph and article style 
dissertation formats: four initial chapters lay out the research as a whole, followed by 
four chapters intended to function as stand-alone journal articles. This dissertation utilizes 
the more-than-human nation to examine how the spaces of the Chinese rail network 
articulate together national communities, infrastructure, and the state. Chapter II reviews 
the literature on nation and state in China, contextualizes the development of the Chinese 
rail network within modern Chinese history, and describes the dissertation’s research 
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methodology. The Chinese rail network has a long and fraught association with nation-
building, and the geography of the country poses several challenges—and 
opportunities—for rail development. Chapter III goes into detail on the methodological 
challenges posed in applying ethnographic research techniques to a subject like the 
Chinese rail system. I also describe my approach to questions of positionality, and detail 
the process of data collection and analysis.  
Chapter IV constitutes the empirical heart of the dissertation, giving a detailed 
account of the process of undertaking a rail journey in contemporary China. Adopting a 
passenger-eye view of the Chinese rail system, this chapter highlights how passenger 
practices, traveling accessories and the spaces of the rail system interlock to form the rail 
assemblage. I use Tim Ingold (2002; 2011)’s thinking on environment and skill to frame 
a holistic and textured account of rail travel from the moment when planning begins to 
after the journey is completed, with attention to how each step is realized through 
interactions with things like tickets, water bottles and luggage, and how each is shaped by 
and shapes perceptions of self and environment. I extend Ingold’s analysis of skill to 
include a fifth step: the stage when the skill lies fallow, but nonetheless shapes how once-
and-future passengers imagine their relation to space. This chapter shows how 
standardization of spaces and skills takes the particular experiences of specific journeys 
and transform them into a sense of unhindered mobility within a space of circulation—
even while that mobility remains bounded by space, economics and class. This chapter 
provides a comprehensive overview of the nation-building dimensions of rail 
infrastructure in China; the following chapters delve into particular elements of rail. 
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Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII are written as stand-alone manuscripts. Having 
developed an analysis of the national scale in Chapter IV, Chapter V examines how 
mainland media discursively mobilizes rail infrastructure in a case where the regional 
scale offers a contrasting narrative. This article examines newspaper coverage of the new 
Express Railway Link (XRL) to Hong Kong to trace how the concrete specificities of 
ticketing and boundary control procedures are mobilized to produce national and regional 
scalar imaginaries. The XRL is a key infrastructural component in multiple distinct place-
making projects. Regionally, it furthers the integration of Hong Kong within the Pearl 
River Delta, long the economic and financial heart of China. At the same time, the XRL 
connects Hong Kong directly into China’s national high-speed railway grid for the first 
time—a change that thrusts old cross-boundary geopolitical tensions to the fore. 
Connecting Hong Kong to the regional inter-city network and the national grid has 
entailed a complex process of negotiation between Hong Kong, Guangdong, and Beijing 
states to develop not just technological inter-compatibility, but legal and administrative 
standardizations as well. These banal yet politically-charged changes to boundary control 
and ticketing systems illustrate how infrastructure is deployed to construct spatial 
imaginaries at different scales. State media positions these changes as discursively 
integrating Hong Kong into a cross-boundary Greater Bay Area and politically 
integrating the city into mainland China. Yet the process of centralizing rail 
imaginaries—and centralizing border control—has disrupted the strategic ambiguity 
between regional and national integration. This article contributes to the dissertation by 
highlighting the regional scale, exploring how nation-building processes intended to 
produce coherence at the national scale can also generate unanticipated fractures within 
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regions, examining state discourses of rail development, juxtaposing their narratives of 
national rejuvenation against the more complex emergent meanings of travel documents 
and border procedures. This article complements the dissertation’s overall focus on the 
more-than-human by examining these dimensions of rail travel as they are deployed 
discursively. The XRL is interpreted both through state discourses of rail development, 
and through popular discourses emerging from everyday experiences of managing travel 
documents and navigating border procedures. Avoiding a naïve materialism that 
dismisses discourse, this chapter’s analysis of matter within rail discourse rounds out the 
analysis of discourse within rail materiality in Chapters IV and VI. 
Chapter VI focuses on theoretical issues concerning the scholarship on nation and 
state and the role of infrastructure. This article proposes a theoretical approach to nation 
and state that uses infrastructure to investigate their simultaneously coherent and 
fractured reality. In recent decades, research on nation and state has generated substantive 
evidence of their ambiguity, heterogeneity, and porosity. Contemporary theories 
characterize their appearance of homogeneity and integrity as just that: an appearance. 
Most precisely theorized as reifications, this tendency directs attention away from the 
real, albeit limited, ways in which nation and state transform social and spatial relations. 
This article proposes an alternative approach to the reality of nation and state that 
balances recognition of empirical findings of heterogeneity and porosity alongside a 
recognition of their material coherence. Boundary objects are a conceptual tool that 
emerged from investigations of relational ontology within science and technology 
studies. Boundary objects knit together diverse communities of practice within a shared 
infrastructural system, and offer a way of theorizing coherent entities that are nonetheless 
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shot through with discursive and material fractures. Hot water taps, a ubiquitous facility 
within the Chinese rail system, serve to illustrate how boundary objects participate in 
state-making and nation-building as well as articulating the relation between them. The 
case study illustrates how infrastructures capture not only the processes through which 
these entities cohere, but the fractured communities of practice which inhabit them. This 
article contributes to the dissertation as a whole by situating the dissertation research vis-
à-vis the broad social science literature concerning nation and state and by presenting 
research findings concerning drinking water infrastructure and practices in contemporary 
China. Chapter VI is under revisions with Environment and Planning C: Politics and 
Space. 
Chapter VII examines how distinctively Chinese conceptions of social difference 
are realized through the skilled practice of rail travel. Drawing on recent work in cultural 
geography and anthropology, I argue that the practices of rail travel are skillful and 
situated (Ingold 2002; 2011). In China, rail space is a site where an unusually broad 
cross-section of educational, class, and regional populations cross paths. It is 
consequently a site where the ‘qualities’ of those populations are put into direct and 
material conflict. Debates over social distinctions such as ‘suzhi/quality’ and 
‘wenming/civilization’ loom large in Chinese discourses of individual and national 
development. Drawing on findings from fieldwork, I argue that practices of rail travel 
become laden with social distinction: how people navigate through and dwell within rail 
space, how they pass time, socialize, and even how they eat all mark different degrees of 
social class. Moreover, the social qualities of passengers become entangled with the built 
environment of rail space, which consequently takes on the social qualities of its 
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passengers. I use this analysis to formulate a new account of the advent of HSR in the 
mid-2000s: HSR successfully fended off the competition from air and car travel as much 
by transforming the social quality of rail travel as by increasing speed. This article 
contributes to the overall project of the dissertation by examining in depth the skills 
which link communities of practice with an infrastructural environment, fleshing out the 
relation between sociotechnological systems and national cultures—both their cohesion 
and their internal tensions. Skilled practice articulates people and the built environment; 
if the environment is standardized at the scale of national territory, then that is the place 
to which the people feel belonging (Edensor 2002; Ingold 2002). Chapter VII has been 
submitted to the journal cultural geographies. 
Chapter VIII traces the flows of tickets and ID cards to investigate the 
constitution of the Chinese rail system as a circulatory panopticon: a Foucauldian 
“apparatus of security” which functions not through discipline but through harnessing the 
“natural” inclinations of the population to regulate itself. The introduction of the real 
name system has transformed the rail system from a site opaque to the state to one where 
the identity and movements of individual passengers are fully legible. Insofar as rail 
infrastructure has become a kind of panopticon, however, it is one quite unlike the classic 
Benthamite conception. Karen Barad’s notion of “the apparatus” builds on Foucault’s 
dispositif to conceptualize an ontological mechanism which, in making measurements, 
generates determinate realities. Read through a Baradian lens, Foucault’s later work 
shows a similar interest in the emergent realities conceptualized and produced via the 
apparatuses of governance. This article proposes the “circulatory panopticon” model to 
advance two claims. First, Chinese rail infrastructure does not render people legible by 
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fixing them in place but rather, people become visible to the state apparatus through 
movement. Second, the centrality of mobility to the design of the circulatory panopticon 
indicates a wholly novel conception of population: not as a fixed collection of definite 
individuals to be disciplined, but as a “natural” phenomenon to be regulated through its 
inherent inclinations. Even as rail induces travelers to produce themselves as legible state 
subjects, however, their movements also realize unintended complications, diffracting 
clean lines between citizen and non-citizen. This cutting-together apart, in Barad’s terms, 
produces a citizenry which is heterogeneous from its first moment. Moreover, this same 
apparatus cuts together-apart space, producing complex diffractions of secured and 
unsecured spaces. Passengers must constantly produce themselves as legible subjects in 
order to enter and navigate through stations and carriages, and they do so through two 
things in particular: the ticket and the Chinese national ID card. In 2012, China Rail 
rolled out a new computerized ticketing system which allowed online purchase, but 
attached each ticket to a specific individual through their national identification card. 
Even as ticketing has become increasingly virtual, however, the materiality of the ticket 
remains central to the securitization of rail space. In 2014, a terror attack on the Kunming 
railway station triggered a new wave of securitization, cutting rail space apart from public 
space and greatly restricting flows. Both the ticket and the ID play a key role in this new 
regulation. A close reading of ticket and ID sheds light on how "more-than-human" 
things articulate together vast infrastructural assemblages like the Chinese rail system, 
juxtaposing the intimate scale of everyday life against the "macro" scales of nation and 
state. This article contributes to the dissertation by showing how state conceptions of 
citizenship are realized through the flows of material things through the rail system. This 
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article also contributes to this dissertation’s theorization of materiality: Barad’s realism 
offers an interesting counterpoint to the reconciliation of matter and discourse forwarded 
by the literature on affect. Chapter VIII is written for submission to Political Geography. 
Chapter IX summarizes the dissertation, highlights key findings, and suggests 
some directions for continued scholarly engagement with the more-than-human nation in 
China and beyond. 
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CHAPTER II  
THE CHINESE CONTEXT 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the central questions examined by this 
dissertation and, drawing on materialist theories of more-than-human state, developed my 
conception of the more-than-human nation. This chapter connects these theoretical 
concerns to the particular context of China. The specific path through which the state and 
nation have come together in China is unique as is the role that rail has played in these 
processes. An account of this process illustrates the arguments of this dissertation 
concerning the more-than-human, and provides necessary context to its contemporary 
development. This chapter situates the Chinese rail system not just within its historical 
and geographic context, but within its scholarly context as well.  
Contrary to popular—and some academic—portrayals of China as a monolithic 
whole, Chinese studies scholars have identified a multitude of tensions within governance 
between central and local states and myriad, interlocking processes of ethnicization and 
nation-building in early modern and contemporary China. While written in isolation from 
the theories of more-than-human analyzed in the previous chapter, this body of work 
highlights similar questions of coherence and fracture within seemingly unitary social 
structures. In section two of this chapter, I review this literature in order to identify the 
points of contact between Chinese studies and more-than-human studies of state and 
nation.  
This analytical review sets the stage for third section of this chapter, which 
situates rail infrastructure within the history of state-making and nation-building in 
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modern China. As noted by Köll (2019), rail provides a line of continuity through the 
dramatic turns of modern Chinese history. Rail contributed prominently to the fractured 
semi-colonial landscape of the late Qing, and loomed large in Chiang Kai-shek’s nation-
building Nanjing decade; it was central to Mao’s Third Front and to Xi Jinping’s China 
Dream. Tracing rail development thus sheds light on the shifting trajectories of national 
politics and the reshaping of economic and social geography.  
In concluding, I show how this geographic and historical context sets the stage for 
the close examination of rail’s contemporary state-making and nation-building 
dimensions, which constitutes the bulk of this dissertation. While rail infrastructure has to 
a large extent become a transparent medium for everyday life in China, its role is no less 
consequential simply because it fades from view. As rail infrastructure continues to 
evolve and expand through the introduction of new technologies and new requirements, 
the transparency of rail is constantly disrupted, forcing renegotiations of the practices of 
rail travel. Chinese rail infrastructure is thus both a text through which other dimensions 
of society can be read and also an actor in the production of that society. 
2. State and Nation in Chinese Studies 
2.1. The State 
Narratives of China’s rise often employ infrastructure as synecdoche for the 
triumph of the developmental state: whether the Three Gorges Dam, the high-speed rail 
network, or the Hong Kong-Macau Bridge, infrastructure has come to symbolize China 
for audiences at home and abroad (Bach 2016). As Oakes (2019) notes, however, the 
widespread recognition of the centrality of infrastructure to the contemporary Chinese 
state has not been accompanied by a sustained attention to the specificities of that 
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infrastructure. Infrastructure offers a rich text not only for inquiries like Bach (2016)’s 
analysis of how it fixes large-scale political economic contradictions, but also for the 
analysis of what Joe Painter terms “prosaic stateness”, “the mundane practices through 
which something which we label ‘the state’ become present in everyday life” (2006, 
753). A lacuna around infrastructure is unfortunate in the case of China because 
examined up close, Chinese infrastructure embodies the tension between apparent 
solidity and underlying fragmentation that has long been a dominant theme within studies 
of the Chinese state. In contrast to a still prevalent narrative of China as a monolith, some 
Chinese studies scholars have examined the interplay between powerful ministries 
(Strauss 1998; Köll 2019) and local states (Shue 1990; Remick 2004) at different periods 
in the history of modern China. This body of scholarship has grown dramatically since 
reform and opening, both because of increased access to data (Lieberthal 1992) and 
because of the highly visible policies of devolution put into place since 1978. 
The coherence, or lack thereof, of the Chinese state has been interrogated with 
particular vigor within the scholarship of the local state. This body of work has examined 
the complex and constantly evolving balance of power between center and locality 
(Baum and Shevchenko 1999; Saich 2002; D. S. G. Goodman 2009; Q. Wang 2011). The 
“local” state covers quite a range in China, including every level of governance from the 
province down (Remick 2004, 5). While a number of scholars have examined the 
provincial state (D. Goodman 1997; Hendrischke and Feng 1999; Fitzgerald 2002), most 
work on the local state has focused on smaller scales: counties, townships and villages. 
Central-local tensions has proven an enduring framework across modern Chinese history. 
Remick (2004) intriguingly juxtaposes local states in two distinct regions before and after 
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the Maoist period, showing a striking degree of continuity at the local level. Shue (1990) 
shows that even at the height of Maoism, the rural peasantry exercised more autonomy in 
their relation to the central state than previously suspected, and argues prophetically that 
reform era decentralization may work to strengthen the state in the end. Studies of local 
state under reform and opening examined how newly empowered local states pursued a 
variety of development strategies (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1995; F. Wu 2002; 
Zhu 2004). Since the turn of the millennium, however, the central state’s ability to 
discipline local states and regather devolved power has loomed larger (Chien and Gordon 
2008; Y. Li and Wu 2012). 
Geographers have contributed to the understanding of the state in China through a 
theoretical attention to questions of scale. Political geographers have long argued that 
scale is not a pre-given natural attribute, but itself an object of political struggle (Smith 
1992; Jessop 2002; Marston, Jones, and Woodward 2005). The Pearl River Delta has 
provided an illustrative case study for examining the politics of scale, as struggles 
between China’s richest and most powerful provincial states runs into some of the 
country’s richest and most powerful municipalities as well as central ministries 
competing within Beijing (X. Jiang 2008; X. Jiang and Yeh 2013; Z. Li, Jiang, and Yeh 
2014; Chung and Jiang 2016; X. Jiang 2017). Li and Wu (2012) show how rescaling is a 
core mechanism for the central state to undermine local states: by creating new regional 
initiatives, the central state can work around recalcitrant provincial governments. 
Goodman (2009) argues that despite the many studies of the local state, what is 
meant by “the state” remains insufficiently conceptualized in Chinese studies. Baum and 
Shevchenko liken the problem to the parable of the blind men and the elephant: “analysts 
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probing different parts of China’s reforming political anatomy often produce substantially 
dissimilar sketches of the body politic” (1999, 334). Local variation combines with 
constant change and a lack of conceptual vocabulary to render coherent analyses of the 
Chinese state difficult. In order to make sense of these cross-cutting processes of change, 
Shue and Thornton (2017) prioritize the analysis of repertoires of governing practices 
over the analysis of state institutions. Their conception of Chinese governance as always 
in the making, a braided river of governance constantly meandering as new obstacles 
emerge, follows Sigley (2006) in drawing on Foucauldian theories of governmentality 
and “technologies of the self” to understand how both officials and citizens are being 
shaped by contemporary governance in China. This approach bears more than a passing 
resemblance to the scholarship of the disaggregation of the state discussed in Chapter I 
(Abrams 1988; Mitchell 1999; Painter 2006; Joyce and Mukerji 2017). Yet Shue and 
Thornton appear to have conceived their approach in isolation.  
Shue and Thornton’s practice-centered conception of the state problematizes its 
unity, but their theory remains anthropocentric. Where materialist approaches to the state 
attend to how the concrete specificities of non-human things have been put to work by 
state-makers, as well as to how matter has undermined their efforts, Chinese studies 
approaches to the state have only rarely asked these sorts of questions (Rogaski 2004; 
Chu 2014; Oakes 2019). Rogaski (2004)’s examination of “hygienic modernity” comes 
closest to this dissertation’s approach to rail infrastructure. Rogaski argues that with 
concepts like hygienic modernity, her gloss of the term weisheng (卫生), East Asian 
modernizers captured “what Foucault termed ‘bio-power,’ a series of techniques through 
which the state undertakes the administration of life, and ‘governmentality,’ the idea that 
39 
individuals internalize disciplinary regimes and thus harmonize their own behaviors with 
the goals of the state” (2004, 16).* Rogaski’s work pushes beyond other analyses of 
Republican state-making by bringing into the analytical frame the social and technical 
infrastructures of water pipes and sanitary systems which made such transformations of 
subjectivity possible. Chu shows how the (dis)repair and (re)development of 
infrastructure in urban China connects the spectacular and the mundane, operating “not 
only to support state projects of legibility” but also the cultivation of “a certain tacit 
‘common sense’ of the world” (2014, 353). Synthesizing Chu’s infrastructure with 
Foucault’s technologies of the self, I reconceptualize the process of state-making as 
equally social and technological, the production of an assemblage composed of words 
and things. Complementing the work of Remick and Shue, I use infrastructure to 
disaggregate the Chinese state along a novel dimension: not along ministerial or scalar 
lines, but by tracing the socio-technological processes through which a central state is 
assembled out of disparate parts. These parts contribute certain capacities to the emergent 
state, but bring along resistances and contradictions as well. Leibold’s (2019) analysis of 
the “surveillant assemblage” emerging in Xinjiang conceptualizes it as a “weed” with 
roots embedded in various state organs at different scales. The concrete specificities of its 
socio-technological infrastructure shape both its sophistication and vulnerabilities and set 
it apart from the larger state assemblage. 
                                               
* Lei (2009) examines alternative Republican-era conceptions of weisheng that, contra Rogaski, 
did not center on a European-derived modernity but promoted an equally novel but indigenous 
reading of “guarding life.” 
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This dissertation’s investigation of rail infrastructure takes seriously rail’s power 
to realize the state in everyday life without assuming that infrastructure is in reality a 
transparent medium. Crucially, rail is not a microcosm of the Chinese state: rather, rail 
functions as a unique mechanism within a larger state assemblage. Rail’s unique role is to 
centralize: to connect localities to a network within which each is both made 
interchangeable and fixed in a topological hierarchy of peripherality and centrality. This 
shows two ways in which the reality of the state comes to be common sense in local 
everyday life: on the one hand, this institutes the standards of rail infrastructure as a 
pervasive norm. On the other, topological relations turns the center into a standard 
against which local variations are cast in stark relief. The state is made real not through 
rendering every locality homogeneous, but by defining each in terms of its deviation from 
a centralized standard. 
The ways in which rail infrastructure makes evident the limitations of and 
countervailing tendencies within large-scale state-making projects is particularly valuable 
in light of the resurgent central state. As Oakes writes, centralized infrastructure 
powerfully shapes the everyday lives of the people who come into contact with them, but 
is equally shaped by them in turn (2019, 67). While rail development has radically 
reworked the Chinese landscape according to Beijing’s vision, it has also been a site 
where local states and popular communities exert claims and critiques of their own. 
Infrastructural approaches thus examine the power of the central Chinese state without 
becoming trapped by it.  
As the historical development of Chinese rail discussed below demonstrates, it 
has long played a pivotal role in modern Chinese state-society relations. In the past two 
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decades, the advent of HSR has accompanied a dramatic reconsolidation within the 
Ministry of Railways (Tjia 2015); the subsequent fall of the powerful Minister of 
Railways has curtailed the once-autonomous ministry, moderating its autonomy vis a vis 
the central state. Rail development has also contributed to a concurrent effort to sculpt the 
Chinese population into a novel kind of national citizenry. Under Republican and 
socialist governance, the spaces of rail were understood as potent sites for such nation-
building projects. As this dissertation shows, rail serves as a core component of 
contemporary nation-building as well.  
2.2. The Nation 
The Chinese studies scholarship on nationalism exhibits a discontinuity: a rich 
literature on the production of a Chinese national identity in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century comes to an end with the start of the People’s Republic, and with a few 
key exceptions (Mullaney 2011; Köll 2019), does not pick up until reform and opening, 
or arguably even after the Tiananmen protests of 1989. The temporal divide is echoed by 
a conceptual divide: where the work on early modern Chinese nationalism is sensitive to 
the contingent and pluralistic nature of nation-building (i.e. Duara 1995), the literature on 
contemporary nationalism has tended towards simplistic typologies and a singular 
attention to overt state-led nationalism. A second discontinuity in Chinese studies of post-
reform era nationalism is the analytic and disciplinary divide between studies of minority 
nationalities and Han ethnic relations and a prolific political science literature on the 
“rise” of Chinese nationalism. In more recent work, however, both of these distinctions 
are breaking down and a richer understanding of the multiple dimensions of Chinese 
national identity has begun to emerge. New calls to engage with a broader range of 
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nation-building processes beyond their manifestation in state campaigns or nationalist 
protest, coupled with a growing interest in the infrastructural underpinnings of the nation 
have begun to intersect. 
2.2.1. Contingency and Plurality in Early Modern Chinese Nationalism  
Duara’s (1995) influential volume Rescuing History from the Nation was 
instrumental in reframing the study of nationalism away from teleology and towards a 
greater consideration of the contingency and multi-vocality of national formation. Duara 
investigates the different representations of the national community which were at the 
heart of elite and nationalist struggles to define the boundaries of the nascent Chinese 
population and territory. Duara argues that the nation, far from a cohesive subject of 
Hegelian History, always contains countless “others”, both historical and in the process 
of emergence (1995, 55). Duara’s framework is notable for encompassing both inter-
ethnic struggles and the “sub-ethnic” others of regional and provincial mobilization, 
revealing tension and differentiation within the supposed monolith of Chinese society 
(1995, 69). Contrary to Gellner and Anderson, Duara finds that in China nationalism is 
not a novel form of consciousness but employs the same “cultural practices”—language, 
religion, political tradition—as identity formation in pre-national China. For Duara, “the 
relevant community is formed not primarily by the creation of new cultural forms—or 
even the invention of tradition—but by transforming the perception of the boundaries of 
the community” (1995, 66). While a useful corrective to theories of nationalism in which 
all that came before is consigned to the dustbin of history in favor of a homogenized 
whole, Duara’s framework underemphasizes the degree to which nation-building does 
indeed involve the transformation of cultural practice at an essential level. Duara 
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highlights language; as scholars like Jing Tsu (2010; 2016) and Thomas Mullaney (2017; 
2014) have shown, making written and spoken Chinese into a national language entailed 
a massive and ongoing transformation of the social and technological infrastructure of 
education, media and communications.  
In the wider and more nebulous realm of “cultural practice”, scholars have shown 
that Chinese nation-building entailed a mass restructuring of everyday life, both as a 
corollary of economic and societal change and as a self-conscious project of 
modernization. Harrison examines how a new national culture in the early Republican 
period manifested through “the clothes one wore, the calendar one used, the holidays one 
celebrated, even the day on which one took a bath” (2000a, 5). Morris (2004) argues that 
national physical culture constituted an intimate rejection of the portrayals of China as 
the Sick Man of Asia, as essential to modernizing the Chinese national body as queue-
cutting. Chiang Kai-Shek’s New Life Movement, which exhorted individuals to better 
themselves, is a particularly visible example of how the early modern state attempted to 
rework everyday life and personal comportment at the most intimate levels (Fukamachi 
2010; Wennan Liu 2013). Köll’s work on Chinese rail traces how these novel spaces 
functioned both as a laboratory for new performances of gender (2019, 159–60, 249–50) 
as well as a site for propagandizing state conceptions of civilized citizenry (2019, 187–
90, 247–52) under the Republic and the PRC. Rail highlights the lacuna within Duara’s 
account of nationalism: it is a novel environment, navigated via a novel set of practices. 
Yet Duara’s insight into the ever-present poly-vocality of nations remains key: as this 
dissertation attempts to show, rail is as open to appropriation by divergent narratives of 
nation as any “traditional” cultural practice. 
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2.2.2. Nation and Ethnicity in Modern China 
Other scholars have focused on the role of ethnicity. Harrison (2000a) notes the 
question of “what it means to be Chinese” has been divided awkwardly between the study 
of nationalism and the study of ethnicity; a growing scholarship examines not just how 
ethnicity plays an increasing role in national consciousness among China’s many 
minority nationalities and among the Han majority, but how ethnicity and nationality 
have constituted each other through China’s history. 
For example, in Chinese studies, an extensive literature addresses the complex 
dynamic by which the Chinese state assembled and maintains hegemony over myriad 
minority ethnicities (Schein 2000; Bovingdon 2010; Harrell 2011). Leibold (2007) 
examines how Republicans and communists developed the concept of the multi-national 
state in order to discursively integrate the frontiers of the Qing empire (see also Duara 
2011). Mullaney (2011) examines the politico-scientific enterprise by which the official 
55 minority ethnicities were defined and bounded within the container of China. Han 
(2013) and Zang (2015) engage in cross-comparative contemporary studies of the 
multiple peripheral ethnicities to theorize why Tibetans and Uyghurs have exhibited more 
resistance to the central state than minority groups like the Mongols or Dai. Gladney’s 
(1991; 2004) studies of China’s Muslim groups suggest that the Uyghur and Hui define 
themselves both by and against the Han-dominated central state; he also shows how their 
increasing access to Chinese infrastructure like rail connects them to not just domestic 
circulations but transnational circulations as well. Yeh’s (2013) account of China’s 
development project in Tibet details how a narrative of an empty frontier was used to 
legitimize a process of internal colonization.  
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Studies of China’s minority nationalities argue that, while officially integral parts 
of China’s national community, in practice they constitute an internal other against which 
a fully Chinese self is defined (Gladney 1994; Schein 2000; Yeh 2013). Gladney (1994) 
furthermore argues that this internal dichotomy is used to impute to the Han majority a 
monolithic homogeneity it does not in fact possess. The Han ethnicity has drawn an 
increased level of scrutiny in recent years as it has come to play a larger role in official 
(Guo 2004) and populist narrations of Chinese-ness (Leibold 2010; Carrico 2017). The 
volume Critical Han Studies probes at the simplistic equation of “Han” and “Chinese” 
from a number of angles (Mullaney et al. 2012). Joniak-Lüthi (2015) argues that not only 
does Han-ness bear little resemblance to pre-national identity formation in China, it 
remains highly fluid between contexts today. 
As the name Critical Han Studies suggests, the gap between Han-ness and 
Chinese-ness identified by this body of scholarship has been employed as a method to 
interrogate Han-ness. However, this dissertation inverts this to pursue a parallel inquiry: 
how can better delineating the contours of Han-ness help us better understand Chinese-
ness? As Mullaney observes, the categories of both Non-Han and Han are peculiarly 
bounded to the historical geo-body of China (2012, 9). What can be said of the whole? 
Narratives of Sinification prevalent within accounts of Han-minority relations presuppose 
the pre-existence of a coherent, clearly delineated Han culture. Yet studies of Republican 
era nation-building suggest that the cultural practices of modern Chinese-ness were 
themselves a novel invention assembled out of, but much altered from earlier cultural 
practices. Chinese-ness, in the form of “Zhonghua minzu” (中华民族) was formulated in 
rejection of the “Bad” Han-ness of Han chauvinism (Bulag 2012). While contemporary 
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conceptions of Chinese modernity defined against the Four Olds are hard to come by, the 
Other of traditional culture is prevalent in the form of the backward, un-civilized, low 
suzhi peasant (Murphy 2004; Sigley 2009; Y. Lin 2011).  
As Sigley (2009) shows, suzhi discourse is a continuation of a distinctly Chinese 
lineage of modernist thinking. Suzhi discourse parallels and in some cases overlaps with 
portrayals of minority nationalities as China’s internal other (J. Wu 2012). As Chapter 
VII of this dissertation shows, the spaces of rail are a site where the politics of suzhi and 
everyday life come into sharp relief. The investigation of how cultural practices have 
developed alongside the development of rail infrastructure complements ongoing 
scholarly engagements with national and ethnic identity, illuminating how internal others 
are constituted between and within ethnic lines.  
2.2.3. The “Rise” of Chinese Nationalism 
Another strand of scholarship follows the “rise” of Chinese nationalism since 
reform and opening. The study of contemporary Chinese nationalism writ large has until 
recently assumed the party-state plays a hegemonic role in determining the contours of an 
essentially monolithic national community. As nationalism has loomed ever larger in 
Chinese politics and culture, scholars have widened the scope of study beyond the party-
state and found nationalism emerging from a bewildering variety of places, generating an 
ever-growing array of nationalist typologies. A consensus is now emerging around an 
understanding of nation-building as multi-layered processes of continuity and change 
(Carlson et al. 2016; Duara 2018). 
Inquiry into contemporary Chinese nationalism began in the early nineties with 
the question of why Chinese nationalism is weak or nonexistent. Pye argues China’s 
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experience of colonialism set up an impermeable binary between the modernized, and 
therefore nationalized, port cities and a traditional, and therefore a-national interior 
(1993, 111–13). This dichotomy meant that the Maoist rejection of the coastal culture as 
corrupted—both capitalist and foreign—was also a rejection of modern nationalism. 
Consequently, Pye argues, China remains an “inchoate and incoherent” nation, really just 
“a civilization pretending to be a nation-state” (Pye 1993, 108, 130). Fitzgerald describes 
China as a “nationless state,” a progression of state-dominated nation-building projects: 
“the state set out to create a nation after its own likeness and selected only those national 
attributes which happened to suit” (1995, 78).  
One strand of scholarship focused on the sustained and deliberate education 
campaigns of the post-Tiananmen period as the primary form of Chinese nation-building. 
The Patriotic Education Campaign and its curriculum of National Humiliation, according 
to this strand of analysis, had produced a bespoke nationalism precisely suited to the 
purposes of the party-state (S. Zhao 2004; Callahan 2006; 2010; Z. Wang 2012). Yet for 
all its flair and dramatic emotion, patriotic education captures only one dynamic within 
China’s national identity formation. The overt ideological work of the party-state has 
kept “hot” nationalism at the center of the analytical frame within Chinese studies, even 
as scholars of nationalism elsewhere have undertaken a radical reconceptualization of 
nationhood. Employed as an analytical frame, study of party propaganda perforce implies 
a unidirectional process of instilling certain notions of national identity, territory and 
history where the party-state plays the role of the teacher and the Chinese people play the 
role of passive students.  
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Gries (2004; 2005), observing the chaotic nationalist demonstrations of the late 
nineties, argues that a populist nationalism is rising against, or at least outside the control 
of, the state. The rise of a Han chauvinism antagonistic to the party-state Leibold 
(Leibold 2016; Carrico 2017) similarly implies a more complex and dynamic relation 
between state action and nationalist sentiment than a straightforward “nation-state by 
construction.” Guo (2004) couches the struggle in terms of competing state, civic and 
cultural nationalisms. As Carlson notes, the proliferation of typologies of Chinese 
nationalism grew rather absurd: “A partial inventory includes the following: defensive, 
confident, face, pragmatic, anti-foreign, official, popular, assertive, Han, patriotic, nation-
less, Confucian, democratic, avant-garde, transnational, and anti-imperialist” (2009, 24–
25). As Guo readily concedes, these distinctions are analytic rather than practical: “In 
both theory and in practice, there is enough overlap between cultural nationalism and 
state nationalism to make a clear-cut distinction unfeasible” (Guo 2004, 18–19). This 
menagerie of nationalisms offers an oblique validation of Duara’s argument that 
nationalism always contains a multitude; following Tsing (2005), I argue this 
indeterminacy is a big part of what gives the nation its political clout. Capable of being 
different things to different people, it thereby connects them.  
Much of the scholarship on the rise of nationalism in China, has, implicitly or 
explicitly (Brittingham 2007), framed the question around its impact on China’s 
international relations (Carlson 2009; Guang 2005; cf. Guo 2004, 11). Framing Chinese 
nationalism in terms of global politics emphasizes processes of exclusionary identity 
formation against an external Other. Events such as the 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing, 
the recurring Diaoyudao/Senkaku Islands dispute, and the 2008 Olympic Games have 
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played eye-catching roles in the development of “hot” Chinese nationalism (Downs and 
Saunders 1998; Deans 2000; Gries 2004; Callahan 2010). Even domestically, the 
establishment of holidays like National Humiliation Day has emphasized the external 
other (Callahan 2006; Z. Wang 2012). 
Carlson (2009)’s critique of the scholarship of Chinese nationalism highlights its 
isolation from the larger literature on nationalism as a particular problem, leading to and 
a dearth of comparative referents and undertheorization of the influence of technological 
innovation on nation-building. A sense that China is a land apart is pervasive within 
Chinese studies (Pye 1993, 107; cf. Costa 2014’s critique of Gries 2004; Duara 2018, 31). 
As Costa (2014) argues, while all nations are unique, China’s case is not incomparable; a 
powerful state led nation-building in countries ranging from Japan to Italy. The tense 
conflation of Han ethnicity and Chinese national identity discussed above has 
considerable resonance with the tension between Englishness and Britishness discussed 
by scholars of nationalism in the United Kingdom (Colley 1992; Langlands 1999).  
Carlson’s observation of the dearth of engagement with the role of technological 
development, coupled with his call for greater engagement with the “mixed cauldron of 
identity-shaping influences within contemporary China” (2009, 29) resonates strongly 
with the aim of this dissertation. The connection between infrastructure and nationalism 
has been broached in discussions of the Chinese internet and cyber-nationalism. This 
literature analyses the Chinese internet as constituting a new sort of terrain on which 
state-society relationships play out (Xu Wu 2007; Leibold 2010; 2016; Schneider 2018). 
It is not simply a new iteration of an essentially identical medium, but a wholly novel 
space where different—more democratic or more volatile—possibilities exist. Leibold 
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examines how the architecture of internet infrastructure, alongside language, culture and 
regulation, plays a constitutive role in shaping the geography of Han cyber-nationalism 
(2016, 16–17). Schneider argues that political concepts like nation and state need to be 
rethought as technologies in their own right (2018, 6). This literature indicates the 
importance of attending to the medium of nationalism, as well as the content. 
Analyzing the medium of nation-building usefully reframes our understanding of 
even seemingly straightforward state-led nationalism. The nation-building accomplished 
by, for example, the military training required of students in Chinese universities might 
perhaps have more to do with the shared experience it provides than its power to force a 
particular interpretation of that experience. Students may come out if it radicalized or 
alienated, pro- or anti-military, but regardless the experience becomes a shared point of 
reference for all who go through it. An infrastructural approach thus incorporates the 
wider range of nation-building processes, expanding the investigation of Chinese nation-
ness in its banal and everyday manifestations. 
Even in contemporary China, the reach of nationalizing forces such as education, 
media, is short of absolute. The sudden and dramatic advent of HSR has made the nation-
building and state-making dimensions of rail infrastructure evident in a manner they have 
not been for many decades. While central in the early, fractured days of rail development, 
the ways in which rail infrastructure integrates national territory, unifies a national polity 
and instills state-approved senses of discipline in its passengers slip out of the analytical 
frame. Yet the impact of rail infrastructure—along with communications infrastructure in 
the form of smartphones and internet access—on the character of everyday life is greater 
today than ever before. Approaching Chinese nationalism through infrastructure offers a 
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perspective that complements and expands existing engagements with the production of 
Chinese-ness, narrowing the distance between Chinese studies and the broader study of 
nationalism. 
3. Rail and the Assembly of Modern China 
The role of the Chinese rail system in shaping nation-ness is inextricable from the 
physical and social landscape within which it operates. From the perspective of a nation-
builder like Sun Yat-sen, this physical and social topography perfectly captures the 
challenge of building a comprehensive national rail network, but also the potential of 
such a network to transform the Chinese landscape at an essential level (Y. Sun 1922). 
However arduous the construction of rail lines into the interior, once built the rail 
network would smooth the stark differentials between the friction of distance in the east 
and west, creating a space of frictionless circulation within a newly integrated national 
territory. 
In 1935, the Chinese geographer Hu Huanyong drew a line from Tengchong in 
the Southwest to Aihui in the Northeast (Figure 2.1). He noted that the south-east of this 
line had only a third of China’s area but 96% percent of the population: in 2002, this 
population distribution was nearly unchanged (Naughton 2006, 18–19). This line 
approximates the course of the 380-millimeter isohyet across China, 380 millimeters of 
precipitation being roughly the amount of rainfall necessary to support agriculture. This 
line describes a central, though by no means the only, fault line within China’s cultural 
and political geography.  
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Figure 2.1. The Tengchong-Aihui line and the population distribution of China in 2002. 
Source: (Naughton 2006, 19) 
The physical geography of China is highly varied. The topography of the 
northeast is low-lying and flat, while south of the Yangzi the terrain rugged, though 
relatively low altitude. To the west, altitudes climb dramatically towards the Tibetan 
plateau and the deserts and steppes of Central Asia, the terrain becoming a rugged series 
of mountains and valleys. China’s cultural geography is marked by some of the same 
divides: the area around the densely populated North China Plain, north to Harbin and 
south to the Yangtze river, is densely settled by Mandarin-speaking Han people. Southern 
China is far more linguistically and ethnically diverse, significant populations of non-Han 
minorities; in the South even the Han majority has historically spoken multiple mutually 
divides the area of China in half. But only 6% of the population lives in the
dry, mountainous west; 94% of the population lives in the eastern half of the
country. The area west-northwest of the Aihui–Tengchong line has a popula-
tion density of only 11 people per square kilometer, about one-quarter the
world’s average. Within this vast area, the Tibetan Plateau contains a quarter
of the land area of China but less than 1% of the population. The northwest
region supports about 4.5% of the population, mostly in a few basins and scat-
tered oases. Shortage of available water sharply limits the population poten-
tial of the western regions. East-southeast of the Aihui–Tengchong line, the
country is lower in elevation, and water is comparatively abundant. This half
is considered “monsoon China,” receiving abundant watering by the summer
rains. The population density in this area is 260 people p r square kil met r,
about six times the world’s average population density.
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Figure 1.1
Population distribution representing 10,000 people and the Aihui–Tengchong line
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unintelligible regional dialects. To the west, the proportion of minority ethnicity, non-
Mandarin speaking populations rises: Tibetan in Tibet, Uighur in Xinjiang, Mongolian in 
Inner Mongolia, and a diverse array of minority ethnicities in Yunnan and Guizhou. 
Today, traces of these underlying geographic characteristics are still evident from the 
railway carriage. Traveling over the North China Plain between Beijing and Shanghai, 
the track glides over nearly flat land for a thousand kilometers; between Chengdu, 
Sichuan and Chongqing, the train passes through an unbroken series of tunnels and 
bridges for hours. 
Today, Sun’s rail system has been realized, in broad outline if not concrete detail 
(cf. Edmonds 1987). Yet its impact has not been quite as homogenizing as early nation-
builders might have hoped. Yes, the rail system has realized, in infrastructural form, the 
nationalization of language and cultural practices, and propagated state apparatuses of 
citizenship and population governance. Nonetheless, long-abiding differences between 
regions and communities endure and even intensify with the arrival of rail. Moreover, the 
spaces of the rail system give rise to wholly new fractures within the national community. 
3.1. Railways at the End of the Qing  
Rail entered China as a tool of colonialism. The Woosung Line in Shanghai, 
operated for less than a year in 1876, was built illegally by a British company. After it 
struck and killed a pedestrian, Chinese officials were able to negotiate to purchase the 
line, and disassembled it and shipped it to Taiwan to rust. Yet as Leung Chi-Keung notes, 
it would be wrong to interpret this as Chinese opposition to rail per se, but to foreign 
control (C.-K. Leung 1980, 22). Rail’s advantages in matters of statecraft, particularly for 
military mobilization, were evident to Qing reformers. The priority for officials like Li 
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Hongzhang, who in 1976 was already working to establish an industrial base for domestic 
rail development, was to maintain control (C.-K. Leung 1980, 23). What hindered rail 
development in the late eighteen hundreds was a stalemate between the Qing, sovereign 
but drained of cash by a series of punishing wars, and the foreign powers, knowledgeable 
and wealthy, but shut out of Chinese territory.  
Qing reformers sought to break the stalemate in their favor by developing 
industrial capacity and freeing up financial resources. Late Qing governmental reform 
accomplished these goals by devolving substantial responsibilities to the provincial level. 
The Taiping Rebellion marked a decisive shift, empowering local gentry and the 
provincial state to play an active role in militarization, a sphere of governance previously 
jealously guarded by the Qing state (Platt 2007; Rankin 1986; McCord 1993). The dire 
financial straits of the post-Taiping empire not only prevented the Qing from 
recentralizing the military but led to further devolution. Provinces were saddled with 
responsibility for modernizing reforms of education and industry (Platt 2007, 75–78) as 
well as for traditional state responsibilities for hydraulic infrastructure (Pomeranz 1993). 
Ultimately, the stalemate tipped in the opposite direction: the Qing Empire’s 
devastating defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895 forced the Qing to compromise its 
sovereignty and grant territorial concessions to the colonial powers. A scramble for 
concessions quickly followed: between 1895 and 1911, British, French, German, 
Russian, and Japanese governments pressured a beleaguered Qing government to grant 
concessions of mining rights, treaty ports and of course, rights to fund, build and operate 
railways throughout the country (C.-K. Leung 1980, Appendix A). Of these, the 
concessions in Manchuria proved the most significant: Russian rail was seized by Japan 
55 
in 1905, laying the groundwork for Japan’s railway empire (Young 1998; Elleman and 
Kotkin 2010). These concessions were pivotal in the development of Chinese 
nationalism: as a locus of nationalist sentiment, the concession redemption movements 
were uniquely capable of mobilizing local elites, provincial officials, merchants, students 
and even peasants around a common cause (Rankin 2002; Wei Liu 1999; Zheng 2009; 
Thompson 2011). Moreover, these movements structured nascent Chinese nationalism 
around the provincial scale, establishing a tension between province and nation that 
defined the politics of the early Republican era. 
Contrary to the easy continuity suggested in phrases like “China has five thousand 
years of history,” nationalism in China struggled from the first with an essential 
mismatch between the scope of the existing state and the scope of its potential nations 
(Ge 2018). At the end of the Qing dynasty, pioneering nationalists drew on a tradition of 
anti-Manchu sentiment to formulate a Han ethnonationalism (Platt 2007; Leibold 2007), a 
formulation that quickly absorbed newly introduced concepts of race (Dikötter 2015; 
Rhoads 2000). Yet as the basis for a Chinese nation, Han ethnonationalism suffered from 
two critical flaws. On one hand, it was too small: the Han majority dominated a relatively 
small area, and therefore a Han nation-state would lose vast stretches of resource-rich 
Qing territory (Anderson 1983, 35–34, 113–14, 135, 188)(Fitzgerald 1995; Leibold 
2007). On the other hand, it was too large: despite a nucleus of shared cultural identity 
dating back centuries, the diverse peoples identified as Han had neither a shared language 
nor any tradition of political solidarity (Mullaney et al. 2012; Joniak-Lüthi 2015). Rather 
than along national or racial lines, common identity was historically understood along the 
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lines of lineage, county, or native place (Cole 1986; Schoppa 1992; Rankin 1986; Duara 
1995; B. Goodman 1995a; Cole 1996; Belsky 2005; Platt 2007).  
Both nation and province were novel constructions, and in the decades before the 
fall of the Qing, it was by no means self-evident which was a superior scale for the 
formation of a modern nation-state. In the apparent absence of a national state, a number 
of local elites and populist reformers latched onto the province as the most suitable site 
for politics (Duara 1995; Platt 2007; Rankin 1986; Schoppa 1977). Liu Wei (1999) 
argues that three factors are crucial to the rise of provincial consciousness in the first 
decades of the 1900s: the devolution of state functions to provincial governors, the 
administration of mining and rail concessions at the provincial level, and the widespread 
perception of the Qing as unwilling or unable to defend its sovereignty. Schoppa (1977) 
and Rankin (1986) highlight the rescaling of elite power: not only down from the 
imperial court as the exam system ended, but up from the county or prefecture. Platt 
(2007) shows how a regional solidarity lingering from Taiping-era military mobilizations 
and traditions of anti-Manchu revanchism formed the building blocks of Hunan’s fervent 
provincialist movement. 
The provincialization of state functions meant that nation-building processes like 
vernacularization (Tsu 2010) and printing (Judge 1997; Harrison 2000b; Reed 2011) took 
place simultaneously at national and provincial scales. Rail and mining concessions, 
however, were administered at the provincial level and concession redemption 
movements took on the same spatial form. In the first decade of the twentieth century, a 
substantial part of popular politics was organized around raising funds and lobbying 
provincial governments to reclaim the lost mining and railway concessions (E. Lee 1977). 
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Concessions proved to be unusually capable of unifying officials, agitators, merchants 
and gentry across such diverse provinces as Sichuan (D. Li 2004; Zheng 2009; Rankin 
2002), Shanxi (Thompson 2011), and Zhejiang (Chi 1973; Rankin 2002). Provincial 
railway companies emerged under the leadership of merchants, officials, or gentry, with 
widely varying degrees of success (Jin 1977). Despite their general popularity, due to 
lack of technical knowledge and corrupt or speculative finances, very few domestically 
funded lines ever became going concerns. In Sichuan, for example, the government-back 
provincial company raised significant sums yet by 1911 had completed only 30 
kilometers of track (C.-K. Leung 1980, 38–39). In Guangdong, in contrast the Canton-
Hankou line was redeemed from an American company in 1905, opening an initial and 
profitable section to Shaoguan in 1915 (Jin 1977, 93; Tsin 2002).  
By 1911, some twenty-six provincial companies had built a total of about 650 
kilometers of private and provincial-owned lines, out of a national total of roughly 9,000 
kilometers; foreign companies directly owned another 3,760 kilometers of line and held 
the loans for vast majority of the rest (C.-K. Leung 1980, 36–38, 47). The inconclusive 
contest between Qing, provinces and colonial powers was reflected in the geography of 
the rail network itself: railways connected Beijing to its immediate periphery; a scattered 
handful of provincial lines were operating around Shanghai and Guangzhou; colonial 
lines reached into Yunnan from Indochina and into the Northeast from Russia and 
Japanese-controlled Korea. The geography of rail realized, in material form, the fractured 
political landscape of semi-colonial China. 
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3.2. Rail Under the Republic 
In 1911, the Qing court announced their intention to recentralize domestic rail 
administration under imperial control. From the perspective of the provincial right 
recovery movements, this was an attempt to seize control as illegitimate as the initial 
concessions. The wide-spread backlash turned ongoing activism for recovering railway 
rights concessions into outright revolt. In Sichuan the unrest was particularly wide-
spread, and turning to outright violence by summer (Rankin 2002, 348; Zheng 2009). 
Troops stationed in Wuchang march to aid the Sichuanese governor suppress the 
insurrection; on October 10 Republican revolutionaries in Wuchang launched an uprising 
which led ultimately to the fall of the Qing.  
By the mid-1920s, a consensus about the contours of modern “Chinese-ness” was 
emerging. First, it would be defined not by language, ethnicity or any other social 
characteristic, but solely by the contours of the state. In place of a Han-based national 
community, Liang Qichao’s “Zhonghua minzu” (中华民族) was adopted by Sun Yat-sen 
as the basis for a unifying pan-ethnic nationalism, and became the default national 
community within Nationalist and Communist rhetoric. This is not to say there was no 
variation: Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists advocated assimilation of non-Han peoples, 
and the Communists advocated a multi-ethnic national identity (Leibold 2007 Ch 2 & 3 ). 
Second, argument over the balance of autonomy between province and nation was 
brought to a conclusive end by the “betrayal” of Sun Yat-sen by Cantonese warlord Chen 
Jiongming in 1922. Both Nationalists and Communists alike understood Chen’s split as a 
betrayal of Chinese nationalism in the name of regional separatism (Duara 1995, 193–
204). This nucleus of agreement on the spatial and demographic contours of the China 
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they sought to realize defined the future nation-state as contiguous with the Qing, 
governed from the center.  
For Sun Yat-sen, rail played a central role in realizing this imaginary. Forced 
from the presidency and appointed national railway planner, Sun instead spent the 1910s 
assembling an elaborate five-part development plan for China, largely via the 
construction of railways (Edmonds 1987, 424; Y. Sun 1922). Sun argued this rail 
network, along with new ports, roads, and industrial works, would unify the Chinese 
national community, integrate Chinese national territory and spur its industrial 
development in one stroke. Sun’s explication of “railway economic law” held that 
reducing the friction of distance between the resource-rich interior and the population-
rich “China Proper” would realize profit far beyond its expense: not least, as Part III of 
his plan made explicit, by driving the colonization of the former Qing frontier (Y. Sun 
1922). 
While Sun’s vision of modernizing infrastructure and internal colonialism was 
certainly in line with Nationalist imaginaries of a modernized China, Sun’s proposal was 
beyond its capacity to realize (C.-K. Leung 1980, 88). Constant strife inside the 
Republican government and beyond, between competing cliques and regionally-based 
warlords diverted government resources from rail development at best; at worst it led to 
the appropriation and destruction of railway materiel (Köll 2019, 69–71; C.-K. Leung 
1980, 81). The question of rail was less salient in the early Republic than in the last 
decade of the Qing. The newly established Republican state implemented with little 
objection the same centralization of rail administration that ended the Qing, although in 
practice the rise of warlordism stymied substantive centralization through the 1930s. In 
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the place of a cohering national network, the Republican period saw a deepening and 
reorganization of divisions between national, provincial, and colonial networks. Even as 
control of rail was core to the regionalizing strategies of warlords like Yan Xishan, 
however, its symbolic function as a marker of the modern Chinese nation-state grew. Rail 
stations were a site where discourses of nation-building were promulgated and the 
behaviors of modern civilization were put into practice. 
From the vantage of Beiping or Nanjing, the period between 1911 and 1937 was 
an arduous but steady movement towards centralization and standardization under 
Republican control (Köll 2019). Privately-owned Chinese lines and foreign owned lines 
were being integrated into a single railway administration: the Ministry of Post and 
Communications, or after 1928, the Ministry of Railways, oversaw the development of 
standard practices of accounting, management, education within rail administration (Köll 
2019), as well as enduring work regimes (Morgan 2001). This period of institution-
building was pivotal for the long-term development of the system: the railway bureau, the 
basic unit of railway administration, formed during this time and endures to this day 
(Köll 2019, 59). 
In Shanxi, military governor Yan Xishan built his own provincial rail network at a 
deliberately different gauge than that of the rest of China; it was only converted to 
standard gauge by the invading Japanese (D. S. G. Goodman 1999, 219; Jing 1993). 
Meanwhile, in the Northeast, the South Manchuria Railway was the centerpiece for 
Japan’s wide-ranging colonial ambitions (Young 1998), reshaping industry and 
agriculture, education and culture in the form of an emerging global empire (Duara 2003; 
Gottschang 1987; McDonald 2015; Rodgers 1948). To counter Japanese influence, the 
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Nationalist government expanded lines from Tianjin to the northeast, a project that came 
to naught when Japanese forces invaded Manchuria in 1931. As a result, by 1937 
Japanese-controlled track in Manchuria constituted over 40% of total track length in all 
of China (Jiaoe Wang et al. 2009, 768). In a strange paradox, between 1911 and 1937, the 
Chinese rail network became more centralized under the Nationalist government, 
developed more isolated provincial networks under the warlords, and took on a more 
pronounced colonial character under the Japanese. 
Despite its incoherent and contradictory development, railways nonetheless had 
significant impacts on economic and social life in pre-war China. Railways both served 
as a conduit for the transmission of new practices, consumer goods, and market relations 
into the regions alongside the tracks, and constituted a novel social environment which 
demanded the development of, for example, new gender relations. Early modern Chinese 
rail had a profound impact on the economic geography of central China (Jiang and Xiong 
2005; Zhancai Li 1996a; H. Liu 2008; Pomeranz 1993). Pomeranz describes the 
disintegration of the once vibrant Huang-Yun region, on the Grand Canal between 
Beijing and the Yangzi, into a disparate collection of peripheries to new economic cores 
defined by railways (1993, 5, 147). In contrast, cities like Zhengzhou were revitalized, 
and cities like Shijiazhuang were built from scratch by their location at the intersection of 
two rail lines (Jiang and Xiong 2005; H. Liu 2008). Beyond economics, proximity to rail 
affected the transformation of social life as well: stations spread new conceptions of time 
discipline, gender interactions, and personal comportment. Not far, however: even 
counties adjacent to counties with a railway station saw far fewer changes to clothes and 
gender relations than the county the line passed through (Zhancai Li 1996b, 57).  
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Railway stations and carriages were wholly novel, and required a multi-level 
educational effort. Railways printed guidebooks which both introduced the stops to 
passengers and also taught them how to visualize the topology of rail space (Köll 2019, 
Ch 4; cf. Schivelbusch 1986; Löfgren 2008). Station architecture gave pride of place to 
large clocks, enabling if not enforcing a stricter degree of time discipline. Carriages, 
segregated by ticket class rather than gender, they forced a renegotiation of behavioral 
norms: these too took the form of guidebooks and railway rules (Köll 2019, 147; J. Zhang 
2010). The pedagogical effort extended to the actual classroom as well. Textbooks for 
primary students taught children to read clocks and how to queue in front of ticket 
windows, and encouraged them to “play train” (zuo huoche) (Köll 2019, 147, 159). The 
purpose of this education was not simply about properly socializing future train 
passengers but teaching them to become better-disciplined citizens, linked through the 
practice of train travel into a larger political nation-building project (Köll 2019, 158–61). 
During the Nanjing decade, the New Life Movement attempted to rework the daily habits 
and practices of individuals with remarkable specificity; along with instructions on how 
to eat, how to dress, how to sleep and how to move, New Life publications also instructed 
Republican citizens on how to queue (Fukamachi 2010). 
Political intent aside, how did the actual experience of rail travel affect 
perceptions of territorial belonging? Madeleine Yue Dong provides a glimpse from the 
view from Shanghai (2011). The China Travel Service was a project of the Shanghai 
Commercial and Savings Bank to promote tourism in China and abroad. Despite an 
avowedly cosmopolitan perspective, the articles published by its in-house magazine 
China Traveler “in effect proffered a geography of Shanghai’s China from the late 1920s 
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through the 1940s.” The itineraries described give a sense of the extent to which rail did, 
and did not, serve to integrate a Chinese territory. During the Republican period, Chinese 
rail connected Shanghai comfortably to—the lower Yangzi (Dong 2011, 203). These 
accounts also give a sense of the visceral alienation of traveling one’s own country by 
way of foreign infrastructure. Travel to the Northeast was by Japanese ferries and 
railways, and travel to the Southwest was best accomplished by sailing to Vietnam and 
taking the French-owned railway north. Only in 1937, on the eve of the Japanese invasion 
did China Traveler publish a guide to all thirteen of the newly unified Nationalist rail 
lines (Dong 2011, 211). 
3.3. Integration and Expansion in the People’s Republic 
During the Anti-Japanese War, as the Chinese front in World War II is known in 
China, the Chinese network was a target for both sides. What little repair work the 
Nationalists managed after 1945 was undone in the civil war that followed (Köll 2019, 
226). Consequently, after 1949 the PRC took possession of a damaged, inchoate and 
unbalanced rail network of some 21,000 kilometers in eleven unconnected networks, of 
which only 17,000 kilometers was usable (C.-K. Leung 1980, 96, 133). This shaped the 
PRC’s initial rail construction objectives. In order to rebuild capacity, integrate the 
network, and extend into the interior, the new Ministry of Railways was well-funded and 
given wide reign by the central state (Comtois 1990). For Mao, as with Sun Yat-sen, rail 
was to be a primary mechanism for the production of a modern Chinese nation. 
In producing heretofore unimaginable levels of connectivity within the former 
Qing territory, however, the expansive new network also revealed and heightened 
tensions between the center and the periphery. Communist ideals of a harmonious, multi-
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ethnic Zhonghua minzu were put to the test. Mullaney (2011) examines how the PRC 
handled the question of ethnicity that had stymied early nationalist thinkers. After 1949, 
social scientists working on behalf of the new People’s Republic of China created a new 
framework for ethnicity in China cleanly detaching it from national identity. The 
resulting 56 categories were, despite some historical antecedent, radically new, collapsing 
and “rationalizing” what had been a far more heterogeneous and ambiguous system of 
ethnic difference. This system realized “the idea of China as a ‘unified, multinational 
country’ (tongyi de duo minzu goujia)” by fitting China’s ethnic diversity neatly within 
national borders (Mullaney 2011, 1). This transformed China’s ethnic diversity from a 
threat to national integrity to an ideological strength. 
This project proceeded alongside rail development bringing peripheral, minority-
majority regions into the national transportation network for the first time. Major 
expansions of the rail network into the interior, such as lines to Chengdu and Lanzhou, 
began before the first Five Year Plan, though they were not completed for many years 
(C.-K. Leung 1980, 98–99). Between 1949 and 1978, total track length more than 
doubled from 21,800 km to 48,600 km (Jiaoe Wang et al. 2009, 767). In addition to 
expansion, doubling track and otherwise improving existing lines in the densely utilized 
core were also major goals during the First and Second Five Year plans. By the end of the 
Third Five-Year Plan, 1966-1970, all the railways in China had been integrated into a 
single network (C.-K. Leung 1980, 105–6).  
The Third Front plan, between 1964 and 1971, saw a massive wave of state 
infrastructure development in China’s still poorly connected and unindustrialized interior: 
steel and chemicals factories, but also railroads to connect them to the national 
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transportation grid (Meyskens 2015; Naughton 1988). The most challenging routes were 
handled by the railway army corps (铁道兵 tiedaobing), soldiers reassigned to rail 
construction in the 1950s (Köll 2019, 240–47). Railway construction took soldiers to 
distant and inaccessible regions of China, where they labored side by side with locals in 
relentless, back-breaking work. While the Third Front may have been economic 
inefficient (Naughton 1988), it was for many regions the closest and most sustained 
contact with the central state locals had ever had. While the Ministry of Railways thus 
exemplifies the power of the central state under Mao to reshape local communities, that 
power was far from absolute, as scholars such as Vivienne Shue (1990) have shown. 
As the example of the Third Front suggests, rail construction prior to the reform 
period was driven by industrial and defense considerations rather than a desire to 
facilitate passenger travel. After a brief period of free movement in the early fifties (Köll 
2019, 257–59), migration within China was strictly limited through the hukou household 
registration system, which tied access to social services to location (K. W. Chan 2009; 
Xiaogang Wu and Treiman 2004). The notable exception was the Red Guards, who took 
to the rails to spread permanent revolution to the masses. Travel to China’s peripheries, 
populated by ethnic minorities, reshaped the perspectives of young travelers: “national 
ethnic harmony mediated by the rail system become part of the ideology of the Cultural 
Revolution” (Köll 2019, 256). For most Chinese, however, China’s frontier territories 
remained out of grasp, accessible only through its portrayals in cinema and art. 
Rail’s expanding coverage and social role after 1949 lends credence to 
Townshend’s thesis that Mao-era China underwent a nationalist revolution in 
infrastructure (1992, 119). Köll (2019)’s excellent survey of China’s rail development 
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sheds light on how the tumult of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution 
impacted the operation of railways. The rail system was not wholly immune to the lack of 
resources and political instability that affected the rest of China. The Great Leap Forward 
placed heavy demand on freight transport and vilified the technical expertise of railway 
workers, and during the Cultural Revolution passenger trains carried Red Guards and 
urban youth into the countryside. In some stations, the Cultural Revolution took root in 
among railway personnel. The strains placed on the railways caused a steady climb in 
accident rates and clogged rail lines and developed into chronic inefficiencies that lasted 
into the 1980s. Xuzhou Railway Bureau became infamous not only for the intensity of its 
revolutionary struggle but also for the spiraling impact of its chaos: a central hub, it 
hobbled the national transportation network to the extent that Deng Xiaoping was 
deputized to intervene in the mid-seventies; an experience that served as a model for his 
later economic reforms (Köll 2019, 275–79).  
3.4. Reform and Opening 
Questions of state-making and nation-building took on new urgency in the years 
after 1978. The processes of reform and opening entailed a dramatic decentralization of 
power out from the state to the market (F. Wu 2002; D. L. Yang 2004), and down from 
the center to the local state (Zhu 2004; Hillman 2010; Chien 2013). Despite this 
devolution, the central state has also strategically reclaimed power when local 
governments deviate too far from national guidance (F. Wu 2002; Chien and Gordon 
2008). New work suggests that the “local developmental state” (Zhu 2004) or “Chinese-
style federalism” (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1995) paradigms of the eighties and 
nineties is yielding to a resurgent central state that employs a shifting scalar politics to 
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undermine local states (Y. Li and Wu 2012; Chien 2013). Discussions of nation and 
nationalism have also developed rapidly. In the early nineties, the scholarship of Chinese 
nationalism was concerned with explaining its absence (Pye 1993; Fitzgerald 1995); a 
series of dramatic nationalist protests in the mid and late nineties shifted the discourse 
towards an attempt to characterize the nature of Chinese nationalism (Guo 2004; Gries 
2004).  
Held in check during the Mao era by the hukou system, after 1978 the rail 
system’s potential to transform China’s population distribution was at long last realized. 
The wave of economic migrants from poor rural areas in China’s interior to the coast’s 
export-oriented industrial zones, commonly termed the “floating population,” became the 
engine of China’s economic development in the eighties and nineties (Fan 2008; 
Naughton 2006). Rapid economic development of coastal China exacerbated the spatial 
mismatch between energy resources and industries: industry was on the coast, but the 
necessary coal to power those industries was inland (Mou and Li 2012; Nojiri and Jiang 
2007; Todd and Jin 1997). In 2004, half of all rail freight was coal or coke (Luger 2008, 
5). Not all of the circulations enabled by rail were neatly contained within the national 
geo-body: Gladney argues the railway into Central Asia contributed to the 
transnationalization of Uighur identity, while the railway to Chengdu led to greater 
conflict and non-identification with the Han majority (Gladney 1991). 
Even as it was shouldering a heavier burden each year, the Ministry of Railways 
received less support from the central state. In the era of marketization, even the rail 
system was expected to fund itself (Bullock, Sondhi, and Amos 2009; Tjia 2015). A 
series of measures during the eighties pushed the Ministry to spin off its extensive social 
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welfare system and seek profit at the bureau and branch bureau scale; by 1986, the MOR 
was fully dependent on its own income to fund expansion and upgrading (Tjia 2015, 86). 
The Ministry’s workforce shrank by nearly one million jobs between 1978 and 2000 (Tjia 
2015, 48, 54). However, the core transport operations remained unaltered until the system 
began to operate in the red, failing to post any profit between 1993 and 1997 (Tjia 2015, 
68, 86). Reforms, however, took a surprising turn: rather than further decentralization and 
privatization as advocated by the World Bank, instead the Ministry recentralized 
operations and construction in preparation for its own modern Great Leap Forward. 
While rail was quietly rearranging the Chinese landscape (see Figure 2.2), 
scholars of Chinese nationalism were concerned with questions concerning how the 
party-state instills its particular vision of the nation into the population. In the late 
nineties, China was rocked with massive nationalist mobilizations in response to a series 
of perceived international indignities (Gries 2004; Wallace and Weiss 2015). Many 
Chinese studies scholars link this “rise” of Chinese nationalism to active state 
intervention: post-Tiananmen, the state introduced new patriotic education in public 
schools (Z. Wang 2012; S. Zhao 2004), pushed nationalism through propaganda 
campaigns and new holidays (Callahan 2006; 2010; Jiayu Wang 2017), and even 
sponsored video games (Nie 2013). Much of Patriotic Education revolves around the 
remembrance of China’s history of “national humiliation” at the hands of foreign powers. 
This frames the party as the savior of China, directing popular discontent outwards. It 
seems to have also focused scholarly attention on international dynamics at the expense 
of attending to domestic dynamics. Arguing against state-led theories, other scholars 
conceive of China’s contemporary nationalist movements as driven from below, via 
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popular media (Guo 2004; Gries 2004), with a particular attention to online spaces (Xu 
Wu 2007; Leibold 2016; Schneider 2018). While patriotic education is an obvious feature 
of contemporary China, empirical investigation has failed to show that it has an impact 
on the beliefs of students and citizens (Fairbrother 2008; Qian, Xu, and Chen 2017).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. The accessibility coefficient of the Chinese railway network in 1911, 1949, 
1965 and 2000. Source: (Jiaoe Wang et al. 2009) 
 
2000, as more nodes were connected. On the other hand, the D value among the same nodes decreased gradually. For exam-
ple, the sum of transportation distance among the 62 nodes in 1911 was 4.82 ! 106 km, and then declined to 4.00 ! 106 km
in 2000, a reduction of 0.82 ! 106 km or 17%. The reasons are more alternatives and shorter routes became available for trav-
eling from one node to another in the network, which is commonly referred to as the ‘‘Temporal-Spatial Convergence”
phenomenon.
The most significant increase of railway lengths occurred in the periods of 1925–1937, 1957–1974 and 1988–2000, when
the number of new nodes increased noticeably. During 1965–1981, the largest drop in D among the same nodes occurred
with a 5.13% decline. The change was minimal during 1981–1988 and became noteworthy again with a 2.75% drop during
1988–2000.
4.2. Spatial structure of accessibility
Based on Eq. (4), the nodal accessibility coefficient Ai is computed in this study. The index Ai reflects a node’s accessibility
relative to the others. Figs. 1a–1d show the contours of nodal accessibility coefficients of China’s railway network in 1911,
1949, 1965 and 2000, respectively. The findings are summarized as follows.
(1) The area coverage of the railway network consistently expanded over time. As shown by the contours from 1906 to
2000, the railway network stretched along the direction of Northeast China ? East China ? South China ? Southwest
China ? Northwest China. Also, th contour lines of accessibility co fficient became smoother gradually, and thus
formed a more compact network. The number of provincial units (including provinces, municipalities under the cen-
tral government and autonomous regions) covered by railways increased from 9 to 29.
(2) Accessibility improvement spread to more areas. Areas with accessibility above the national average increasingly
expanded fr m North China to East China and South China. In 1906, only Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, and parts of Liaoning,
Inner Mongolia and Henan, had accessibility over the average. In 1949, Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Hubei and Shanxi
Provinces joined the list and in 2000, Guangxi, Sichuan and Gansu Provinces also joined.
(3) Accessibility contours showed a concentric pattern around North China. Zhengzhou, the capital city of Henan Province,
located almost in the geometric center of China’s railway network, has been the top ranked city in accessibility since
1957. Interestingly, Zhengzhou was also the geometric center of China’s urban systems (Ye et al., 2001). In 2000, there
was a major gap between Eastern and Western Regions in railway accessibility. Most places in the Eastern Region had
accessibility above the average, but conversely the Western Region was mostly below it, except for Sichuan, Gansu and
Shanxi Provinces. Lhasa is the latest capital city connected to the railway network with the operation of Qinghai–Tibet
Route in 2006.
Fig. 1a. The accessibility coefficient of railway network in China, 1911.
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(4) Since the early stages of Economic Reform in the mid-1980s, China emphasized the development of the Eastern
Region, leading to considerable regional disparity. With the railway investment focus shifting from north to south,
the node with the best accessibility gradually migrated from Tianjin to Zhengzhou. In 1906, Tianjin’s accessibility coef-
ficient ranked at the top with Ai = 0.75. In 1937, Xinxiang in Henan Province and Jining in Shandong Province had the
Fig. 1b. The accessibility coefficient of railway network in China, 1949.
Fig. 1c. The accessibility coefficient of railway network in China, 1965.
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(4) Since the early stages of Economic Reform in the mid-1980s, China emphasized the development of the Eastern
Region, leading to considerable regional disparity. With the railway investment focus shifting from north to south,
the node with the best accessibility gradually migrated from Tianjin to Zhengzhou. In 1906, Tianjin’s accessibility coef-
ficient ranked at the top with Ai = 0.75. In 1937, Xinxiang in Henan Province and Jining in Shandong Province had the
Fig. 1b. The accessibility coefficient of railway network in China, 1949.
Fig. 1c. The accessibility coefficient of railway network in China, 1965.
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best (lowest) accessibility coefficient ith Ai = 0.70. In 1949, Dezhou and Tai’an in Shandong Province and Shijiazhu-
ang in Hebei Province shared the best value with Ai = 0.69. Zhengzhou became the most easily accessible city with
Ai = 0.66 in 1957 and kept the status ever since. Therefore, the Ai of the easiest accessible node declined slightly, which
means the aggregation of the railway network was increasing. Meanwhile, areas with accessibility above the average
were still in the Northern Region, but moved clearly towards the Central Region.
(5) After the 1970s, areas with greater improvement in accessibility shifted gradually from the Central Region to the East-
ern Region. Figs. 2a and 2b show that the percentage of transportation distance declined across various nodes in the
past few decades. During 1974–1981, the areas located in the Central Region extending towards the Southwestern
Region, where the ‘‘Third-Line Development” was concentrated, and transportation distances among the nodes
(excluding newly connected nodes) in Hubei, Hunan, and Guizhou Provinces were shortened remarkably. During
1981–2000, the areas transferred towards the Southeastern Region (Fig. 2b). In the latter case, when the Beijing–Jiuji-
ang Line became operational in 1996, the accessibility for cities along this line was greatly improved, with a decline of
transportation distances to each other by over 10%.
5. Impacts on economic development and urban systems
5.1. Parallel development between railway and economy
Over the past 100 years, China’s railway network expanded bit by bit, and the process paralleled closely with economic
development in spatial patterns. In the first half of the 20th century, railway development may be described as ‘‘the North-
ern-Northeastern period” to reflect its relatively fast expansion in these areas. During that time, China built 35 major railway
lines, with 22 of them located in North China and Northeast China, accounting for 70% of the total length. Since the 1911
Revolution War, railways in North China and Northeast China already formed a primitive network, and then developed into
an integral network step by step in the following 30 years. Railways provided much needed infrastructure and helped to ex-
ploit natural resources, cultivate major heavy industries, and impel economic development in these areas (Li, 1990). For
example, economic agglomeration began to occur around the center of Liaoning Province, the Beijing–Tianjin–Tangshan
area, the Shangdong Peninsula, etc. All of these revealed the interaction between railway network expansion and economic
development. In the second half of the 20th century, the railway network steadily extended to the Southeastern, Southwest-
ern, and Northwestern Regions to shift economic center toward south, confirmed by the two areas with the fastest economic
growth: the Yangtze River Delta around Shanghai and the Pearl River Delta around Guangzhou.
Fig. 1d. The accessibility coefficient of railway network in China, 2000.
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3.5. The Rise of High-Speed Rail and the Resurgent Central State 
In the mid-nineties, the trend towards decentralization and devolution slowed, and 
reversed. Central state expenditures as a percentage of GDP reached a nadir in 1995, at 
ten percent, before climbing to nearly a quarter by 2012 (Naughton 2014). As central 
state coffers have filled, local states’ have emptied, forcing local government to 
increasingly rely on complicated land transactions employing so-called Local 
Government Finance Vehicles (LGFVs) to fund the economic development under which 
they are evaluated (M. Y. S. Zhang and Barnett 2014). While provincial and urban 
governments are not easily yielding the power they have accumulated, the central state 
has undertaken a process of reconsolidation (Y. Li and Wu 2012). This process is evident 
in development of Chinese rail since the late nineties. 
China’s rail system, long holding a monopoly on long distance passenger travel, 
first faced serious intermodal competition in the nineties. The rapidly expanding National 
Trunk Highway System and a civilian air transport network built nearly from scratch 
offered cheaper or faster options for domestic travelers (Fallows 2012; Si-ming Li and 
Shum 2001; Jiaoe Wang, Mo, and Wang 2014). China Rail responded by increasing 
speed and quality of service. A series of campaigns between 1997 and 2007 saw the 
average speed of passenger trains increase by more than 40% (Bullock, Sondhi, and 
Amos 2009, 36–37). Through the mid-2000s, the rail system was constantly operating at 
the edge of capacity for both passenger and freight traffic, and struggled to improve 
speed and thorough-put (Luger 2008). At the same time, profitability was lagging: the 
costs of upgrades were outpacing increased revenues. 
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On the cusp of major reform in 2002 and 2003, under the leadership of Liu Zhijun 
the Ministry ended up embarking instead on its most ambitious and wide-ranging 
development push in its history: the launch of new passenger-dedicated high-speed rail 
lines (HSR). The 2004 Mid to Long Range Network Plan (MLRNP) laid out a sweeping 
plan for the reform and expansion of the Chinese rail system, centering on the 
establishment of what is essentially an entire second set of railways across the entire 
country. China’s HSR network has expanded with incomprehensible speed since the 
opening of the first line (see Figure 2.3). By 2016, total HSR track in operation reached 
22,000 kilometers, more track than existed in all of China in 1949 (Chen et al. 2019; 
Jiaoe Wang et al. 2009, 767). HSR continues the process of time-space compression of 
which rail has long been emblematic (Schivelbusch 1986): the travel time between 
Beijing and Shanghai is five hours by HSR, and more than fourteen hours by 
conventional train. Rail continues to play a central role in China's transportation system 
than in other countries; despite the rapid growth of road and air networks, rail remains a 
competitive option for many Chinese travelers at medium to long distances (Luger 2008, 
41; Zhou et al. 2014). Since 2000 the Chinese network has rapidly deepened and 
expanded: passenger traffic grew at an average of more than 5.5%, and freight by 6% 
between 2000 and 2013 (Zhou et al. 2014), and reached a total ridership of over 3 billion 
in 2017 (National Railway Administration 2018). Subtler yet arguably more important 
than raw speed, however, are dimensions of convenience and comfort (C.-S. Chan and 
Yuan 2017; Givoni and Banister 2012). HSR carriages, and to a lesser extent HSR 
stations, are built to remarkably different standards of comfort and convenience, with 
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different expectations for the cleanliness of facilities, the comportment of personnel, and 
the behavior of passengers.  
 
 
Figure 2.3. Expansion of China’s HSR network, 2008-2017. From top to bottom, left to 
right: the network in 2008, 2011, 2014, and 2017. Source: Lawrence, Bullock and Liu 
2019. 
 
HSR has brought rail back to the center of state-making and nation-building in 
China today. The HSR network is a key part of the state's plan to manage urban growth 
and alleviate regional disparities, directing migrants into second- and third-tier cities 
outside of the hyper-developed coastal provinces (Chen et al. 2019). The rail system is 
also being incorporated into new state apparatuses of citizenship, surveillance and 
security through the implementation of the “real name” system (Brown 2008; Hoffman 
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2017; Leibold 2019). As reflected in the names of the Chinese-built HSR trainsets, Hexie 
and Fuxing, HSR has become symbolic of the triumph of the party-state and its economic 
development (see Figure 2.4). Unlike the spectacular but transient nationalism of events 
like the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Callahan 2010), HSR endures, becoming part of 
everyday life. 
As an enduring symbol of the state, it has also become a source of vulnerability: 
rail disasters, whether in the form of a malfunctioning ticketing system or a deadly crash, 
can rapidly transform into critiques of the state itself. While events such as the 2008 
Sichuan earthquake and the 2011 Wenzhou train crash both mobilized China’s national 
community in transformative ways, their impact on state legitimacy were quite different. 
An extensive literature examines these events, often from the vantage of online discourse 
(D. L. H. Hui 2009; Jieying Wang 2010; B. Xu 2013; Bondes and Schucher 2014; 
Sullivan 2014; Schneider and Hwang 2014; deLisle, Goldstein, and Yang 2016). The 
Sichuan earthquake spurred a wave of nationalist volunteerism reinforcing and 
legitimating the party-state’s rule (D. L. H. Hui 2009; B. Xu 2013). The Wenzhou crash, 
in contrast, mobilized the national community against the state’s perceived indifference 
and corruption. As one Weibo poster writes: “HSR is not for the state's benefit, it's for the 
entire people's benefit! If the entire people's benefit got damaged, the entire people have 
the right to investigate!” (quoted in Bondes and Schucher 2014, 55). The poster speaks on 
behalf of a national community contiguous with the state, but one that is only 
contingently aligned with the state. 
 
74 
 
Figure 2.4. China’s expanding rail infrastructure has become a key pillar of the state’s 
nationalist legitimization narrative, and a key site for the dissemination of that narrative. 
Wuhan Station, 2016. 
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4. Conclusion 
This geographic and historical context suggests the central role the rail 
infrastructure has played in state-making and nation-building in modern China. The 
practices of passengers in navigating rail space interlock in crucial ways with the function 
of rail infrastructure and with the traveling experiences of others, and therefore become 
sites for intervention. By reshaping how passengers move through rail space, these 
interventions produce a new kind of passenger subject. This subject is newly legible to 
the state, and trained to a new degree of social discipline. 
These findings also indicate that the advent of HSR did not represent simply a 
speeding up of rail travel, but an attempt to transform its social character. This fragile 
new “civilized” version of rail space is deliberately shielded from the conventional rail 
system at the level of carriage and station when possible, but waiting room by waiting 
room when necessary. In part, this new bifurcation of rail space echoes growing socio-
economic gaps in China’s political economy. Yet it also realizes those gaps in a visceral 
way for tens of millions of Chinese passengers. The social nuances of rail space’s 
contemporary developments are important context for understanding incidents like the 
2015 city-wide protests in Linshui in response to being bypassed by the proposed HSR 
route: increasingly in China, if you are not onboard HSR, you are being left behind. 
This research project challenges and complements the existing research into the 
nation-ness of Chinese rail by adopting a passenger’s perspective on the experience of 
navigating through the interiors of Chinese rail space to reveal the ongoing production of 
Chinese nation-ness. In the following section I situate the contemporary rail system 
geographically, and summarize the salient features of the rail travel experience in order to 
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examine how they realize both coherence and fracture within rail spaces and communities 
of practice.
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I introduce the methodology behind this dissertation’s 
investigation of contemporary Chinese rail, as well as the data collection methods used. 
In order to understand the rail system as a more-than-human assemblage, I primarily 
employ an ethnographic methodology centered around participant observation. However, 
as formulated by scholars such as Geertz (1973), Clifford and Marcus (1986), 
ethnography understands society discursively: as assembled from signs, symbols and 
texts. To study society as a more-than-human assemblage, I synthesize an alternative 
conception of ethnographic research drawn from the critiques of scholars in science and 
technology studies, anthropology, and geography. Feminist STS thinkers such as 
Haraway and Barad challenge the validity of the “reflective” metaphor, arguing that the 
act of research is not failed mimicry but productive interaction. Similar critiques are 
evident in the methodologies of mobility studies scholarship of the passenger, political 
geographers’ examinations of embodiment and the everyday, and STS investigations of 
the materiality of infrastructure. Affective, non-representational, and materialist 
methodologies all gesture towards a world that is not reducible to text. The resulting 
methodology articulates my fieldwork data, in the form of field notes, photographs and 
interviews, to rail space in all its more-than-human dimensions—not through a naïve 
empiricist assumption of correspondence but by understanding the research as situated in 
the same world as its subject. 
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While this dissertation seeks to excavate the power of materiality in shaping 
nation-ness, my goal is to situate, not to dismiss, the role of discourse. If things are 
textual, then texts are also things. Rail space is a profoundly discursive space, saturated 
with signs and symbols. My fieldwork’s deep engagement with the materiality of rail 
space highlights how the concrete specificity of these signs is inextricable from the 
meaning they communicate. Much of this discourse, it turns out, is about things. More so 
than ad copy or political slogans, rail space is full of directions on how to pick up tickets, 
reminders to carry identification, and how to use the various affordances of rail space. 
This fieldwork shows the impossibility of sorting matter and discourse apart. Only after 
producing this account of rail space as a material and discursive assemblage of people, 
things and infrastructures could I begin the second phase of research on how the things of 
rail space shape discourses of nation and region. This textual analysis of mainland 
narratives of the Express Railway Link in the Pearl River Delta, examined how non-
human things like tickets and identification generate meanings of their own, shaping 
different spatial imaginaries within mainland newspapers. This discursive analysis 
grounded in materialist ontology brings this project’s more-than-human methodology full 
circle. 
2. More-than-Human Methodologies 
Chinese rail spaces can be chaotic and fast-moving, overwhelming the senses. As 
you enter the station, speakers blare announcements and personnel shout directions over 
the dull roar of the station’s hustle and bustle. Every surface is covered with directions, 
timetables, how-to guides, warnings and prohibitions, advertisements, slogans, and 
storefronts. An army of cleaners conducts an endless campaign against detritus: the stink 
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of sweat, urine, and garbage compete with the scents of cigarette smoke, cleaning 
products and perfume. Through all this the rail passenger must navigate, while keeping 
ready to hand the requisite identification which renders them legible and ticket which 
authorizes their passage, and luggage which encumbers them. This task is challenging 
physically as well as mentally: luggage can be unwieldy, and stations are vast. 
At other moments, rail space is oppressively uninteresting. Once seated in the 
carriage, the challenge is not parsing through a multi-sensory assault, but staving off 
boredom. This space demands a different set of skills. Passengers must meet their own 
needs for sustenance, comfort and entertainment while enduring the inevitable 
impositions of other bodies in tight confines and striving to keep their own impact on 
others within acceptable bounds. In the distant intimacy of the carriage, traces of the 
other passengers permeate the space: loud WeChat conversations and cellphones 
streaming action movies pierce through background rumbles and creaks of the train’s 
movement; the smell of food, body odor and occasionally cigarette smoke drifts through 
the carriage. These practices, for all their apparent passivity, are also actively called-
upon, and parallel the embodied, physical and mental challenges of navigating stations. 
This experience—materially embodied and skillfully practiced—is at the center of 
the analytical field in this research project. The passenger is here conceived not as a 
predetermined identity but as a position interpolated through a set of practices situated 
within a richly material and meaningful environment (Ingold 2002; 2011). These 
practices employ a distinctive suite of tools or objects to navigate the challenges of rail 
space, from purchasing a ticket to passing the long empty hours of the journey. These 
practices and objects are, moreover, situated within a particular infrastructural 
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environment which gives them function and meaning. Within each element of practice, 
things, and environment, there are culturally specific particularities which mark them as 
Chinese—which is to say, constituent of the Chinese assemblage. Yet these particularities 
are neither homogenous nor universal: for many passengers, their practices are marked by 
their rejection of or exclusion from the norm. These differences nonetheless still 
articulate a relation to Chinese nation-ness; by investigating these differences, I argue this 
research sheds light on the ongoing production of China as a community and as a 
territory. 
In order to investigate the practices of being a passenger in the Chinese rail 
system and to see how they are entangled with the things and infrastructures of rail, I put 
myself in the position of passenger. Drawing on affective (Crang 2003; Dewsbury 2010), 
more-then-human (Dowling, Lloyd, and Suchet-Pearson 2017; Panelli 2010) and 
materialist (N. J. Fox and Alldred 2015) methodologies, I employed myself as a research 
instrument, registering the physical and mental impacts of rail travel and examining the 
practices of rail travel through my own process of learning (Lave and Wenger 1991). 
2.1. From Reflexivity to Diffraction in Ethnographic Research 
This research project draws primarily on findings from participant observation. 
Participant observation, as a qualitative methodology and research practice, dwells in the 
shadow of long-standing debates over the validity of ethnography. The first question that 
haunts ethnographic work is: what sort of truth claims does ethnographic data make 
possible? Within anthropology, an early insistence on positivist objectivity gave way, in 
the ferment of the cultural turn, to a view of ethnography as a constructed, always partial 
narrative of reality (Clifford and Marcus 1986). This conception of ethnography 
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entrenched a view of ethnography as a practice of writing. Moreover, it foregrounded the 
second question haunting ethnography: what is the role of the researcher in the 
production of ethnographic findings? The re-vitalized theorization of researcher 
subjectivity as a central aspect of ethnographic knowledge gave rise to the concept of 
“reflexivity.” Beyond the question of “bias” or “distortion” of an underlying truth—a 
framework that is still implicitly realist—reflexive ethnographies strive to reflect on how 
the researcher’s social position relative to axes of gender, race, class, religion and other 
social categories shape the data gathered and the findings generated (Pink 2009; 2013).  
At this juncture, scholars of feminist science and technology studies (STS) make a 
pivotal intervention (Haraway 1988; 1997; Barad 2007). Haraway’s critique of reflexivity 
is that it gives up more claim on truth than it ought to scientific positivism. By confining 
its conception of “truth” to textual representation, it concedes the non-discursive world 
altogether.  
[M]y suspicion is that reflexivity, like reflection, only displaces the same 
elsewhere, setting up worries about copy and original and the search for the 
authentic and really real. Reflexivity is a bad trope for escaping the false choice 
between realism and relativism[.] (Haraway 1997, 16) 
Haraway’s well-known critique of the “God trick of seeing everything from 
nowhere” is paralleled by an often-overlooked critique of “the lovely and nasty tools of 
semiology and deconstruction” (1988, 577). Her central concern in “Situated 
Knowledges” is to outline the conditions for knowledge of reality: simultaneously an 
account of the radical historical contingency of all knowledge claims, both other’s and 
our own, “and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world” (1988, 
579, emphasis in original). Haraway’s proposal is to attend to the particular material and 
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semiotic prostheses through which we come to “see”—yet always from certain point of 
view, through a certain body's eyes.  
Barad (2007; 2014) takes up diffraction, Haraway (1997)’s proposed alternative 
to reflexivity, in developing an account of social and scientific practice that is part and 
parcel of reality’s own process of self-production.* Where reflexivity attends to 
sameness, diffraction centers the production of difference (Barad 2014). Barad examines 
quantum experimentation through the lens of Foucault’s apparatus (1979) and Butler’s 
performativity (1990) to forge a novel account of the emergent reality of bodies as 
discursive-material things. Neither photons nor human beings enter the scene as 
independent agents with determinate boundaries and properties, but only become distinct 
and take on exclusive properties in relation to their mutual entanglement (2007, 33). 
Barad shows how in even the most rigorous of the “hard” sciences, the researcher’s 
racial, gendered, and national relations are never excised, only more or less thoughtfully 
accounted for. 
This dissertation takes this radically constructivist but also realist ontology as a 
guide in two senses. This lens shapes my understanding of how it is that passengers, 
things and infrastructures co-produce each other as components in a more-than-human 
assemblage. Moreover, it shapes my understanding of how I, as the researcher, relate to 
the object of my study (N. J. Fox and Alldred 2015). Yet while this theoretical frame 
opens up fascinating and productive avenues for investigation, it does not provide any 
clear methodological guidelines. In order to work out what the units of analysis are for 
                                               
* For a detailed account of Baradian diffraction, see Chapter VIII. 
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my research and what methods I used to gather data on those entities, I synthesize a range 
of literatures in geography, anthropology and STS. Human geography has developed 
novel methodologies for examining questions of affectivity, performativity, and the body; 
here I focus on the literature on passengers and on nation-ness. To examine the non-
human elements of the rail system, I pull together a body of research taking infrastructure 
as its central object of inquiry. 
2.2. Ethnography of the More-than-Human World 
Within human geography, qualitative research has in the past few decades 
undergone a period of rapid methodological proliferation: the “standard suite” of research 
methods of participant observation and interviews has expanded to encompass a much 
wider range of approaches (Crang 2003). In his influential 2003 review, Crang asks 
“whether methods often derided for being somehow soft and ‘touchy-feely’ have in fact 
been rather limited in touching and feeling” (2003, 494). His target here is research that 
prioritizes text and representation over the performative and haptic nature of qualitative 
work (Nash 2000). In the years since, human geographers have developed novel methods 
and methodologies that engage the question of the body as an instrument of research 
(Longhurst, Ho, and Johnston 2008). These new approaches draw on emotional 
(Longhurst, Ho, and Johnston 2008), affective (Kraftl and Adey 2008; Lapiņa 2018; 
Sumartojo 2017; Tolia-Kelly 2006), and visceral (Hayes-Conroy and Hayes-Conroy 
2010; Sexton et al. 2017) dimensions of embodiment to reconceptualize ethnographic 
research not as the production of text but as a multi-sensory, affective engagement with 
the world. Centering the body introduces a greater sensitivity to materiality without 
losing sight of discourse: affective theory in particular draws on Spinoza (2002) by way 
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of Deleuze (1988) to frame emotional and physical impacts on bodies within a shared 
theoretical register (Dewsbury 2015; Thrift 2008; Tolia-Kelly 2006).†  
2.2.1. Passengers and Practice 
Work on affect and embodiment in human geography has examined both 
transportation and nationalism, but rarely at the intersection of both (notable exceptions 
include Edensor 2002; 2004; Löfgren 2008). Geographers and anthropologists working 
on a range of transportation systems have drawn on affect and embodiment to examine 
the passenger as an object of study (Adey 2009; Adey et al. 2012; Jain 2011; Vannini 
2011b). Centering bodily practice draws into focus the temporalities and spatialities that 
travel constructs (Dalakoglou and Harvey 2012; Harvey 2010; Watts and Urry 2008) and 
the role of non-human things—objects and infrastructures—which enable and constrain 
(Adey 2009; Bissell 2009b; 2018, Ch 4; Crang and Zhang 2012; Kraftl and Adey 2008; 
Watts 2008). 
Bissell’s work in particular centers the passenger within an ecological analysis of 
the spaces and communities which constitute transit (Bissell 2018). Bissel’s work situates 
the traveling body vis-à-vis technosocial assemblages of luggage (Bissell 2009b), 
carriage (Bissell 2010b), and the transient but tangible society of passengers (Bissell 
2009a). In addition to examining visceral questions of comfort and discomfort (Bissell 
2008; 2010a), a rich vein within Bissell’s work centers on questions of skill. Watts 
describes train travel as a crafting, a “technical praxis, as derived from the Greek tekhne. 
                                               
† Non-representational theory (Thrift 2008) informs much of the geography research on affect and 
embodiment. However, like others (Nash 2000; Tolia-Kelly 2006), while non-representational 
theory centers on many of the things I wish to study, I do not find it illuminating as to how to 
do so. 
85 
It is the competent expression of a method; a skilled manipulation that transforms” social 
and material relations (2008, 712; cf. Vannini 2011b). Yet the craft is often submerged; 
“beneath the threshold of conscious attention,” Bissell argues, “lies a whole series of 
fine-grained experiential knowledges that commuters develop over time, enabling them 
to traverse urban transport systems with ease” (2018, xx).  
The unconsciousness of skill poses a methodological challenge: how to 
investigate skills that passengers don’t even know they have? One approach is to focus on 
points of rupture: Löfgren, after frustration with participant observation methods, takes a 
historical approach to examine the skills of rail travel and their materialization of class at 
the moment of their development (2008). Watts (2008) conducts a mobile 
(auto-)ethnography to collect data on the crafting of train travel (Watts and Urry 2008). I 
also draw inspiration from other cultural geographies of skill, which use “legitimate 
peripheral participation” of the learning process (Lave and Wenger 1991) as a form of 
participant observation (Adams 2018; Grasseni 2007; Hunt 2018). 
The approach to skill and practice in this literature draws a great deal on the 
thinking of anthropologist Tim Ingold (2002; 2011). Ingold’s work has been conducive to 
geographers in part due to its emphasis on skill’s situated-ness within particular 
environments. Cultural geographers have drawn on his concept of “taskscape” in thinking 
through the co-production of practice and place (Bissell 2009b; Hunt 2018; Patchett and 
Mann 2018; Vannini 2011a). This body of work is invaluable for thinking through the 
methodology of this research project, and forms the core of my analytic of the passenger, 
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object, infrastructure assemblage.‡ However, it does not address the other aspect of my 
research—the extent to which these practices and spaces are national. In conceptualizing 
nation-ness and selecting methods for its investigation, I draw on work within political 
geography and the study of everyday nation-ness. 
2.2.2. Nation-ness and Bodies 
Everyday nationalism or nationhood, building on Billig (1995)’s influential 
formulation of banal nationalism, examines the ways in which nationalism is reproduced 
through the processes of everyday life (J. E. Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008; Skey and 
Antonsich 2017; Closs Stephens 2016). In contrast to “hot” nationalism, everyday 
nationhood examines how the nation lurks in the background—the language of road 
signs, the nation-state boundary used in weather maps—as well as how it surges to the 
fore (R. Jones and Merriman 2009). Much of this work, however, continues to center on 
nationalist symbolism (Airriess, Hawkins, and Vaughan 2012; Batuman 2010; Raento 
and Brunn 2005) at the expense of engaging with nation-ness as an embodied practice or 
material environment. The work of Tim Edensor is an early exception (Edensor 2002; 
2004), recently taken up to explore the emergent nation-ness of everyday life (Edensor 
and Sumartojo 2018; Sumartojo 2017). Merriman and Jones have examined the role of 
the built environment in nation-ness, arguing for a greater engagement with the affective 
role of material objects in the re-formation of national territories and communities (R. 
Jones and Merriman 2012; Merriman 2016; Merriman and Jones 2016). While Ingold 
                                               
‡ For an in-depth treatment of Ingold’s thinking on environment and skill, see Chapter VII. 
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also serves as a touchstone within this body of work, scholars of everyday nationalism 
draw on Ingold’s thinking on place and perception rather than his thinking on skill. 
Also engaging affectivity, scholars building on feminist accounts of embodied 
nationalism (Mayer 2004; Yuval-Davis 1997) have examined nation-ness as a 
phenomenon that is experienced quite differently by those in differently gendered and 
racialized bodies (Desbiens 2004; Dowler 2002; Lapiņa 2018; Radcliffe 1999). This 
literature draws on affective and corporeal approaches to investigate how bodies are 
produced in relation to “the distant (invisible) horizon” of nation (Radcliffe 1999, 213). 
Where everyday nationhood has tended to presume a relatively homogenous nation (Skey 
and Antonsich 2017, 3), feminist scholars have highlighted the variegated patterns of 
inclusion and exclusion within national communities. A handful of scholars employ their 
own affective, corporeal body as an instrument of research to qualitatively investigate the 
embodiment of nation-ness (Lapiņa 2018; Militz and Schurr 2016). Lapiņa (2018) utilizes 
her ambiguous position as a “passing” migrant to autoethnographically examine the 
affective contours of whiteness, and Militz (2017; Militz and Schurr 2016) uses her own 
body as an instrument to record the affective impact of participation in nationalist 
celebrations. 
The engagement with embodiment within political and cultural geography has 
come, ironically, at the cost of an engagement with space itself. Lapiņa (2018) and Militz 
(2017) attend to the bodily affects of nation-ness, but have little to say about how the 
nationalized body relates to nationalized spaces, or national territory. Scholars of 
mobilities and transportation have employed affective methods to investigate the spaces 
inside transportation infrastructures (Adey 2009; Jain 2011; Kraftl and Adey 2008; 
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Merriman 2016) and have at times examined how those networks shape exterior spaces at 
a regional scale (Vannini 2011b). Yet a gap remains between the shaping of bodies and 
the shaping of space. In order to engage methodologically with the built environments of 
rail space and conceptualize how these non-human things become entangled with nation-
ness, I draw on a body of scholarship that takes infrastructure as its unit of analysis. 
2.2.3. Infrastructure and the Non-Human 
My methodological approach to the non-human elements of rail space synthesizes 
work emerging out of ethnographic investigations of infrastructure within STS and 
anthropology (Larkin 2013; Star 1999) and the work of human geographers and 
historians studying infrastructure at the boundary of society, nature, and the state (Carse 
and Lewis 2017; Cronon 1991; Graham and Marvin 2001). Human geography and STS 
treat infrastructure in distinct, potentially complementary ways: geographers typically 
privilege political, economic and social factors, while STS tends to privilege the technical 
at the expense of social and spatial processes (Furlong 2011). An important strand within 
both literatures, though not always explicitly theorized as such, is the investigation of 
how material things both actualize and also subtly transform social relations. Building on 
the thought of the material turn (Bennet and Joyce 2010; Coole and Frost 2010b; 
Whatmore 2006), in my fieldwork I seek to investigate how the material force of non-
human things is put to work within society, without ever becoming reducible to those 
social relations (Dowling, Lloyd, and Suchet-Pearson 2017). Non-human things are and 
remain actors, as capable of transmuting social relations as they are of transmitting them. 
A methodological engagement with materiality shifts “the focus for social inquiry from 
an approach predicated upon humans and their bodies, examining instead […] relational 
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networks or assemblages” (N. J. Fox and Alldred 2015, 399). A materialist lens, therefore 
enables me to extend the affective methods examining passengers and nation-ness to 
include non-humans, producing a more-than-human ethnography. 
Ready-to-hand (Heidegger 1996), things contour the shape of everyday life, 
enabling and constraining practice at the most immediate and visceral level (Ingold 
2002). At the corporeal scale, non-human things enable novel sorts of bodily 
comportment (Ash 2017), though this more-than-human entanglement is underdeveloped 
in the literature (exceptions include Bissell 2009b; Edensor 2002). These individual 
things, however, also circulate, and in their movements serve to coordinate the interplay 
of multiple communities of practice within heterogeneous social networks (Star and 
Griesemer 1989; Bruni 2005). Star and Griesemer (1989; cf. Bowker and Star 1999; Star 
2010) argue that the indeterminacy of certain things allows them to play different roles in 
different social contexts while remaining stable enough to knit those contexts together. At 
odds with Star’s non-hierarchal framework, a growing body of political geographers 
examine how mundane things constitute and realize state power in everyday life (Darling 
2014; Dittmer 2017; Meehan, Shaw, and Marston 2013). Yet even as the materiality of 
things is put to work realizing social relations, they also preserve an “excess” that renders 
them unpredictable (Coole and Frost 2010b, 9; cf. Meehan 2014). 
At sufficient standardization and scope, things undergo a shift from tool to 
infrastructure: they do not simply mediate a relation to the environment but become the 
environment itself. The power of the non-human in constituting social reality is 
embedded yet deeper, and its power to unsettle that reality grows correspondingly 
stronger. At the border between society and nature, the capriciousness of the non-human 
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manifests as a moment of “uncanny,” as infrastructures taken for granted suddenly 
behaves in unexpected ways: faucets fail to run, toilets fail to flush (Kaika 2005, 68–69). 
This unsettles not just people but state: hydraulic infrastructures promise to concretize the 
power of the state in the form of dams and levees, yet the resulting socio-natural hybrids 
entangle the state in a web of relations it cannot fully control (Akhter 2015; Kaika 2005; 
Meehan 2014; Swyngedouw 2014). Infrastructure’s capacity to transform the state even 
as it makes it is illustrated in historical studies. Mukerji argues that infrastructure exerts a 
“logistical” power of unexpected potency, capable of giving rise to “unintended” state 
structures (Mukerji 2009; 2010b; 2010a). In England, road-building unified the 
countryside—in a rebellion against the centralized state (Guldi 2012). In India, the 
colonial railway inadvertently produced anti-imperialist solidarity at the sub-continental 
scale (Goswami 2004). 
Examining for whom infrastructure works is therefore a subtle but powerful 
method for revealing social fracture. Yet at a historical remove, an account of its affective 
impact on everyday life is difficult to assemble. STS scholars have developed 
methodologies for conducting fine-grained analyses of infrastructure, but rarely coupled 
them with an attention to the national scale. De Laet and Mol (2000) is a standout 
exception: their analysis of the Zimbabwe Bush Pump “B” Type centers the pump within 
an analysis of its community-building and spatializing relations at multiple scales. 
“[W]hile nation-building may involve writing a shared history, fostering a common 
cultural imagery or promoting a standard language, in Zimbabwe it also has to do with 
developing an infrastructure for water” (de Laet and Mol 2000, 235). Whereas de Laet 
and Mol suggest this is unique to Zimbabwe’s nation-building, the wider literature 
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suggests that infrastructure, particularly transportation infrastructure, is often central to 
nation-building (Goswami 2004; Kezer 2009; Merriman and Jones 2016).  
Investigating infrastructure poses a challenge. The ethnography of infrastructure 
is, as Susan Leigh Star puts it, the study of “boring things” (1999, 377). Like everyday 
practice (Bissell 2018; Löfgren 2008), infrastructure tends to step out of conscious 
awareness, becoming the invisible backdrop or transparent medium for action. Yet as Star 
notes, this invisibility is highly contingent: “For the person in the wheelchair, the stairs 
and doorjamb in front of a building are not seamless subtenders of use, but barriers. One 
person’s infrastructure is another person’s topic, or difficulty” (Star 1999, 380).  
Breakdown is one point where infrastructure becomes visible, rendered opaque in 
failure (Star 1999, 381–82). Some scholars of infrastructure take these points of 
breakdown and disrepair as sites of study (Chu 2014; Graham and Thrift 2007). Another 
point of entry is the introduction of the new infrastructure—or the introduction of new 
users. As Star notes, infrastructure is animated by communities of practice, the members 
of which have learned its proper use (Star 1999; cf. Lave and Wenger 1991). New 
infrastructure requires an educational project that leaves pedagogic materials behind. 
Early railroads in Europe (Schivelbusch 1986) and China (Köll 2019, 154) produced 
voluminous how-to manuals and etiquette guides, covering everything from purchasing 
tickets to conversing with fellow passengers. Rail spaces became classrooms, “railway 
travel became a form of schooling, turning people into modern citizens” (Löfgren 2008, 
349).  
92 
2.3. Lessons for a More-Than-Human Methodology 
Where does this leave us in terms of understanding how to approach the nation-
ness of rail travel? The tendency of embodied practices and infrastructural relations to 
slip out of focus presents a methodological difficulty of the first order: simply “seeing” 
their particularities requires an awareness that is not possible for either consummate 
insiders or detached outsiders. Charting the contours of traveling practice and national 
community requires blurring insider/outsider distinctions by approaching their boundaries 
without wholly crossing over. 
This question of boundaries connects a Baradian ontology of diffraction (2007) to 
the embodied experience of fieldwork described by Lapiņa (2018) and Militz (2017). 
Both these scholars investigate nations they are not members of by focusing on moments 
when their (in/ex)clusion became particularly affectively salient in emotional, corporeal 
and social registers. As a Danish-passing migrant, Lapiņa (2018) analyzes cases where 
her whiteness enclosed her bodily within Danishness, even as brown-skinned bodies are 
excluded; a racial difference diffracted across national difference. Militz examines how 
an affect of awkward out-of-place-ness indexed her visceral identification of certain 
styles of dancing as national (2017). Studies of travel provide an interesting counterpoint: 
here the researcher and their subjects start as consummate insiders, putting their tacit 
skills to work without conscious awareness. Instead, awareness emerges only at points of 
breakdown. Bissell analyzes cases where unwieldy bodily configurations—carrying a 
bike on board, or the onset of chronic injury—render the familiarity of rail travel 
suddenly, awkwardly present-at-hand, transforming transportation systems from 
transparent medium into a problem to be solved (Bissell 2009b). These scholars employ 
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bodies as research apparatuses (Barad 2007) to bring the boundaries between skill and 
ineptitude, and between belonging and out-of-place-ness, into focus. The particular 
diffraction patterns that these methods reveal are real and also contingent on the bodies 
through which they are produced. 
My fieldwork attends to the subtle interplay of belonging and out-of-place-ness I 
experienced while traveling through the rail system from a dual vantage. Entering 
Chinese rail space, I was simultaneously entering two communities of practice with 
sharply different criteria for membership. Ticket in hand, I was as much a railway 
passenger as anyone else, albeit a novice one. Yet no length of time spent in rail space, no 
skillful mastery of the idiosyncratic nuances of station layouts and carriage sociality 
would transform me into a member of the Chinese national community. In this sense, 
what I was investigating—all I could investigate—is the contours of the relation between 
these two communities of practice. The boundaries of what is distinctively Chinese about 
the Chinese rail system made themselves evident to me through my exclusion from them.  
Learning the bodily practices of Chinese rail travel and passing through its spaces 
served as an exploratory method for bringing to light particular things and infrastructures 
though which Chinese-ness is realized—hot water taps, tickets, cellphones, instant 
noodles and so forth. This affective engagement served as the entry point for a 
descriptive analysis of the material and discursive assemblages which these things and 
spaces constitute, transmit, and transform. Two examples illustrate how learning rail 
space illuminated the specificities of Chinese rail space. When I began my travels, I used 
a hiking backpack, assuming that would be the least cumbersome way of traveling 
through rail stations and carriages. I immediate became acutely aware of how the 
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backpack stuck out: it was distinctively out-of-place among the luggage of Chinese 
passengers. It proved cumbersome as well: clipping in and out to pass through security—
sometimes necessary multiple times in a single journey—was a hassle, and hanging 
straps spilled out awkwardly in the tight confines of carriages. A wheeled suitcase, I 
found, was far less bothersome: it was far easier to move through security checks and 
stow onboard. Moving with wheeled luggage, I saw the infrastructure differently as well: 
not only did I appreciate smooth rolling surface of plazas, stations and platforms, I 
noticed the smooth ramps along the sides of station staircases which allow passengers to 
move between levels without carrying the full weight of their luggage (Figure 3.1). 
 
 
Figure 3.1. In Kunming Station, a passenger takes advantage of the rampway to lower 
their luggage to the boarding platform. 
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One example of how the Chinese rail system is embedded with Chinese-ness is 
language: the combined impact of signs, directions, advertisements and announcements 
makes rail space intensely textual (see Figure 3.2). My non-native fluency in the Chinese 
language made of these symbols a semi-opaque barrier rather than a transparent medium 
of communication. I was consequently highly conscious of how dependent smooth 
movement through rail space is on literacy in a way my respondents were not. Yet 
literacy comes in multiple forms: despite the language barriers I quickly became a fluent 
user of ticket buying apps, whereas I found that many of my older respondents rely on 
children and grandchildren to book their rail tickets on their behalf.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Shenzhen South Station. Written Chinese is materially embedded throughout 
rail space. 
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These examples offer a glimpse of how participating in and learning the practices 
of rail travel shed light on the interplay between traveling skills and nation-ness within 
Chinese rail, posing new questions and opening new avenues for investigation into the 
entanglement of society and infrastructure. I now turn to the research itself. 
3. The Practice of Research on the Train 
Following Watts (2008), I traveled by rail in an ethnographic exploration of the 
practices of inhabiting rail infrastructure. As the nation-ness of rail is precisely what is 
under investigation, my field site was not delineated as any subset of the network, but as 
“rail space”—the interconnected plazas, stations, and carriages of the Chinese rail 
system. Addressing a vast and scattered field site like this presents a certain challenge. To 
address this challenge I drew on multi-sited ethnography in conceptualizing the field for 
this research project. Multi-sited ethnographies emerged in response to a perceived need 
to engage with the centrality of global linkages to social life: ethnographic accounts could 
not simply be of locales (Marcus 1995). Multi-sited ethnography has a particular affinity 
for mobility and circulation: “the multi-sited approach feels necessary in many 
circumstances as a faithful reflection of lives lived not in discrete locations, but through 
various forms of connection and circulation” (Hine 2007). Multi-sited ethnographies have 
been employed to trace the transnational flows of immigrants and global elites (Falzon 
2009; Hannerz 2003), but rarely to national circulations, making my use of multi-sited 
methods somewhat idiosyncratic. Multi-sited ethnography foregrounds the constitution of 
the national scale through the connections and flows the rail system enables. 
I broke my research into two interlocked components. My participant observation 
employed two distinct research strategies: extensive, and intensive. I explored a wide 
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variety of different routes across China to examine the system’s diversity, and I rode 
select routes repeatedly to build a familiarity with local rhythms. These travels gave me a 
first-hand sense of the physical and mental demands of rail travel as well as the 
opportunity to observe how others navigate and inhabit rail space. The conceptual and 
bodily insights from participant observation proved to be invaluable context for the: 
interviews I conducted with rail travelers. Speaking with a broad cross-section of rail 
travelers illuminated how people of different ages, genders, home regions and social 
classes understand and make use of rail space in distinct ways. This passenger’s-eye view 
of the rail system informed my reading of XRL narratives in the second phase of my 
research, directing my attention to the seemingly banal but nonetheless critical 
importance of things like ticketing and travel documents. 
Within the extensive component of my participant observation, I traveled the wide 
territory of the Chinese rail system as far east as Mudanjiang, near the North Korean 
border, and as far west as Khorgos, on the border with Kazakhstan. I took the train across 
the ferry to Hainan Island in the South China Sea, and traveled north to Manzhouli, on 
the Russian border. Routes were chosen to span not just the territorial reach of the rail 
network but to reflect the internal heterogeneity of the rail system: I rode in carriages 
ranging from the luxurious business class on the new-built HSR trains, slippers included, 
to an old diesel train in Dongbei, without air-conditioning in the summer heat. I traveled 
through the bustling, commercialized waiting room of Shanghai’s Hongqiao station and 
the just-built, nigh-uninhabited spaces of Kunming South Station; I sat in the quiet of 
waiting rooms in third-tier stations in the center of the North China Plain and on the 
Tibetan plateau. During these travels, I gathered data on how station spaces differed 
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between regions, and between core and peripheries, in terms of security practices, 
ticketing, and how the flows of passengers were regulated. I also looked for patterns in 
how passengers prepared for travel, what sorts of things they brought with them for 
sustenance and entertainment, and how they passed time during the rail journey. 
I also selected a handful of routes to ride repeatedly to gain a deeper sense of how 
rail spaces varied over time. These routes, between Guangzhou and Shenzhen, Shanghai 
and Nanjing, and Beijing and Tianjin are all heavily traveled commuter routes between 
major urban centers. During these journeys, I attended to how familiarity separated these 
individual stations out from the normal, and how I began to adapt new practices and 
routines geared to the specificities of these places. I observed how stations are materially 
reconfigured, through the use of barriers, as passenger flows fluxed over days and 
months. 
Rail space is a social environment blurs covert and overt participation in 
complicating ways. Despite its occasionally intense intimacy, it is also largely 
depersonalized and depersonalizing. While I immediately disclosed my status as a 
research to anyone who inquired or with whom I spoke, that seldom occurred, and I was 
therefore at most times passing as a regular, albeit foreign passenger. 
I collected data during the ethnographic components in the form of field notes 
documenting observations regarding what I did, the sensations and emotions of rail 
travel, my process of learning new practices through observation and experimentation, as 
well as what I observed of the practices of others. I documented the discursive and 
material environments of stations and carriages by taking photographs; I took short video 
recordings to capture the sounds and movements that characterize the experience of rail 
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travel. Visual methods have had a fraught history within ethnography and geography: 
under the scientific-realist paradigm, they were seen as an objective method of 
documenting visible “realities” (Crang 2003, 500). The radical rethinking of ethnography 
after the cultural turn critiqued the masculinist, colonial “scopic regime” in which images 
capture a feminized, exoticized other (Pink 2013; Rose 2011). Affective methodologies 
engage the researcher’s situated embodiment to avoid falling into the God-trick of the 
gaze from nowhere (Haraway 1988); but arguably fall into an alternate mistake of 
assuming that, in particular, video is both necessary and sufficient for capturing the flow 
of practice (Dewsbury 2010). Accordingly, visual documentation served two purposes in 
this project: first, it served to record my own process of “learning to see” rail space as a 
passenger (Grasseni 2008). Second, photographs and videos documented the visible 
dimensions of the spaces and things which constitute the more-than-human assemblage 
of rail space: this data contributed to the analysis of findings and also constitutes, within 
this dissertation, a way to present those findings.  
The understanding I developed through observation of other passengers and first-
hand experience of the practices of rail travel during my journeys, formed the basis for 
my semi-structured interviews. These interviews served multiple purposes. Firstly, they 
functioned as a form of validation, allowing me to compare my interpretations of rail 
practices and social distinctions against those of insiders. Secondly, interviewing 
passengers from a range of different ages, genders, classes, and home regions (i.e. core or 
peripheral to network) allowed me to situate the findings from the participatory 
observation, identifying similarities and dissimilarities between my first-hand experience 
of rail space and the experiences of others. Lastly, it allowed me to gather data on the 
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longitudinal evolution of rail space: I was particularly interested to interview older 
passengers in order to incorporate passenger’s perspective on how the practices of rail 
travel have changed over time. Interviews questions addressed topics such as initial rail 
travel experiences and subsequent development of traveling practices and understandings, 
as well as eliciting perspectives on how the system has changed over the time. The 
interviews asked about shifting perceptions of space, their understandings of the ease or 
difficulties of rail travel, and how rail travel fit into their everyday life. Understanding 
how rail travels relies on and instills certain practices and skills illustrates the role rail 
plays in the production of nation-ness at an everyday level, allowing me to grasp how the 
experience of railway travel generates “bottom up” understandings of national territory. 
This data documents the mechanisms that knit the system together: the 
standardization (or lack thereof) of station and carriage layouts; how passengers put the 
affordances of rail infrastructure to work in both permitted and illicit ways; how 
discursive representations of the network are embedded within rail spaces; how 
passengers and spaces are managed by railway personnel, and how passengers navigate 
through and subsist within rail spaces. This data allowed me to establish how practices 
dispersed through and within the rail system help produce nation-ness as well, linking a 
community of practice with an infrastructural landscape. In addition to looking for 
standards and commonalities, I documented class- and gender-inflected differences in 
practices, as well as variation across regions. These observations provided concrete 
evidence of how rail spaces reproduce and also generate tensions within the emergent 
nation. 
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3.1. Phase One Data Collection and Analysis 
The data for the first phase of this dissertation research was collected over seven 
months of fieldwork conducted in China. I operated out of Guangzhou for five and half 
months from the fall of 2016 to the spring of 2017, and then out of Beijing for six weeks 
in the fall of 2017. Data from the participant observation was collected in the form of 
written field notes, digital photographs and videos. I wrote more than 60,000 words of 
field notes and recorded over 12,000 photographs and videos. Initial “jottings” were 
taken as close to the time of observation as possible, usually typed on my laptop 
computer while waiting in stations or sitting on trains (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995). 
During longer periods of downtime, or after returning from a journey, I went through the 
notes a second time, fleshing out brief sketches and adding detail to partial scenes. I 
collected ethnographic data during journeys of one to six days, during which I would take 
multiple trains, often purchasing overnight sleeper tickets in lieu of a hostel room. I spent 
more time on HSR trains than conventional, in part simply to cover more ground and 
reach distant regions of the network.  
I conducted twenty interviews with rail passengers, in Mandarin Chinese and 
recorded digitally. The majority of the respondents were recruited through snowball 
sampling relying on friends and professional contacts, with a minority recruited while 
traveling on the train. While I initially anticipated that I would be able to recruit 
respondents and conduct interviews with fellow travelers during the trip, I found this 
unfeasible. Ethically, the lack of privacy made it difficult to ensure confidentiality, and 
the background noise made both listening and recording challenging. Most centrally, 
however, I discovered that depictions in texts and popular media of extremely sociable 
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atmospheres on Chinese carriages have become outdated: during my fieldwork most 
passengers—nearly all passengers, on HSR trains—spend most of the journey in silence, 
interacting with their smartphones. The respondents I did succeed in recruiting onboard 
were on the slower trains on longer routes, where boredom, lack of electricity, and—my 
findings suggest—a different assumption of sociability pushed passengers toward 
conversation. I interviewed travelers of a range of ages and roughly equal numbers of 
men and women (see Table 3.1). Interviews lasted between thirty-two and eighty 
minutes, with an average length of fifty-two minutes. Most interviews took place in either 
Guangzhou or Beijing, often in homes and sometimes in cafes. The most common home 
provinces among respondents were Guangdong and Shanxi. The concentration of 
respondents from Guangzhou is easily explainable as that was where I was based for the 
bulk of my fieldwork. Most but not all of the Shanxi respondents were recruited through 
the same social network. Interviews were transcribed into written Chinese by native-
speaker research assistants; all English translations in this dissertation are the author’s. 
Age range: Men Women Totals 
20s 1 5 6 
30s 3 2 5 
40s 2 1 3 
50s 1 1 2 
60s 2 2 4 
Totals 9 11 20 
Table 3.1. Age and gender breakdown among the interview participants. 
 
I analyzed fieldwork data during the summer of 2017 and the following winter. 
Following ethnographic practice, I processed my “raw” data into a “cooked” form 
through an iterative process of reflection and coding (LeCompte and Schensul 1999). I 
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used ATLAS.ti qualitative data software to code fieldnotes and interview transcripts. I 
coded the Chinese-language transcripts directly, listening to the recordings as I worked to 
ensure that nuances of intonation and expression were not lost. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I used visual data to contextualize field notes and transcripts, offering 
complementary strands of representation (Pink 2013).  
While coding I looked out for differences within the data as much as for 
commonality: in particular I attended to variations between different regions, illustrating 
the differential impact of rail development, and variations between different types of 
carriages and how stations serve different riderships, illustrating how rail produces its 
own internal heterogeneity. Given the strong theoretical core of this project, I anticipated 
using “top-down” coding to draw out patterns in the data related to the project’s research 
questions. This turned out to be true only to a limited extent. Code families related to 
representations of the rail system and Chinese territory that were embedded in the rail 
environs were less evident in rail space than I had anticipated: I only rarely encountered 
maps or other visual representations of the system as a whole. In a similar vein, an 
anticipated code family on understandings of national territory found little application: 
senses of nation-ness were articulated within a narrative of progress far more than as a 
transformation of space.  
On the other hand, code families concerning the routinized practices of rail space, 
relating to behaviors, travel strategies, and the physical and emotional character of rail 
travel proved to be a rich vein of analysis. How travelers perceived other travelers and 
rail space highlighted the entanglement of hygiene, education, and social class; these 
findings contributed to the article presented here in Chapter VII. Additionally, over the 
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course of my fieldwork I identified several key objects which served to articulate the 
practices and perceptions of rail passengers into the built environment of the rail system. 
Codes collating data on standardizations of practice and environment documented how 
behaviors and spaces are rendered generic across geographic and chronological distance; 
these contributed to the analysis of water infrastructure in Chapter VI and the analysis of 
ticketing and securitization in Chapter VIII. 
3.2. Phase Two Data Collection and Analysis 
For the second phase of this dissertation research, I assembled a body of texts 
concerning the Express Railway Link (XRL) between Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Long 
anticipated in the Pearl River Delta region, the XRL extends the rail network beyond 
what is a practical if not a formal boundary of the Chinese mainland state. This makes it a 
fascinating site to examine the entanglement of national communities and rail 
infrastructure. The XRL was under construction during my fieldwork, but was not 
completed until September of 2018. In order to examine how the practices, things, and 
infrastructures I studied during my fieldwork functioned along this unique and novel 
stretch of track, I assembled a body of texts from articles appearing in three mainland 
papers. In analyzing these texts, I focused on how the XRL and its accompanying travel 
documents and border control infrastructures were narrated through the distinct scalar 
imaginaries of the Pearl River Delta region and the Chinese nation. To draw out 
distinctions between these scales, I looked at two regional papers and one national paper. 
The Southern Metropolitan gained considerable renown in the early 2000s due to its 
daring reporting on mainland political scandals. Its sister paper in the Nanfang Media 
Group the Southern Daily is relatively staid, functioning as the official paper of the 
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Guangdong Communist Party. The People’s Daily is the official paper of the national 
Communist Party, and has been the paper of public record since the formation of the 
People’s Republic of China. 
I assembled the texts for analysis using publicly available online databases 
through the newspapers’ respective online portals. I used the Google search engine to 
sweep these databases for articles that included the Chinese terms listed in Table 3.2. I 
discarded articles that only mentioned the search term in passing, in reference to a 
different project, or duplicated other articles; this resulted a body of texts consisting of 
103 articles, including 49 from the Southern Metropolitan, 16 from the Southern Daily, 
and 21 from the People’s Daily. Additionally, I included 17 Chinese language news 
articles I came across during my research, from outlets including the BBC, the China 
News Service, and Xinhua, as well as Guangdong regional papers like the Guangzhou 
Daily and Xinkuai Bao. This body of texts is listed in Appendix A. English language 
articles from publishers like the South China Morning Post and Hong Kong Free Press 
were also collected during this period, and are consulted for context when appropriate. A 
proposed search of China Railway Yearbooks, an official publication of China Railway 
Corporation, for references to XRL, was planned to examine how China Railway narrated 
its own involvement in the XRL project. These yearbooks are searchable via the China 
National Knowledge Infrastructure website (cnki.net). However, I found that that the 
XRL was not mentioned with sufficient regularity and not in sufficient detail to conduct a 
substantive analysis. 
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Chinese term English equivalent 
（粤港澳）大湾区 (Canton-Hong Kong-Macau) Greater Bay Area 
（京）广深港高铁 (Beijing-) Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong HSR 
(XRL) 
一地两检 Joint checkpoint (“one place, two inspections”) 
通行证 Travel Permit (generic term for cross-boundary passes) 
回乡证 Home Return Permit 
港澳居民来往内地通行证 Mainland Travel Permit for Hong Kong and Macao 
Residents (MTP) 
双程证 Two Way Permit 
往来港澳通行证 Exit-Entry Permit for Travelling to and from Hong Kong 
and Macau 
一小时生活圈 One Hour Life Circle 
珠江三角洲经济区 Pearl River Delta Economic Zone 
泛珠江三角洲 Greater Pearl River Delta 
Table 3.2. Search terms for newspaper archives concerning the XRL. 
 
I used this body of texts to conduct an analysis of how the XRL discursively and 
infrastructurally realizes regional and scalar imaginaries. I conducted the analysis in 
Atlas.ti. First I used these articles to build a timeline of the XRL project over the two 
decades since its conception. I found that the migration infrastructure of passport-like 
travel permits and customs procedures was discusses side by side issues of ticketing and 
accessibility; I also synthesized a timeline of how these objects have developed over 
time. I then conducted an analysis of the discursive deployment of the XRL: on whom, 
and on whose behalf, is the XRL intended to work? What are its impacts imagined to be, 
and what spatial extent is it imagined to effect? This analysis shows that the XRL has 
become part of the Greater Bay Area, an imaginary of the Pearl River Delta that 
subsumes Hong Kong into the region and therefore into the nation. However, the regional 
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and national media interpret it in tellingly different ways: within the region, the XRL is 
part of everyday life, while from Beijing it is understood in the context of the nation-
covering HSR network. These findings are presented in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER IV 
NAVIGATING RAIL SPACE 
1. Introduction 
Investigating rail infrastructure as a heterogeneous assemblage composed of both 
human and non-human, material and discursive, social and technological elements is 
easier said than done. In this chapter I describe rail space as it comes to be known 
through the unremarkable practice of rail travel. While China’s rail system is a powerful 
symbol, I argue its potency is not in the ways it remains discursively salient, but the ways 
that it works unobtrusively to weave a set of practices and things into conceptions of 
identity and place. While these processes are not unique to rail space, it is nonetheless an 
illuminating site to examine how practices produce identities, and things and 
infrastructures produce place. 
The account of rail space given here adopts the passenger’s perspective. 
Passengers are not the only community of practice within rail space: the work of cleaning 
crews, public security officers, ticket agents, stewards, architects and designers all have a 
hand in animating the rail assemblage. Passengers, however, are the largest community 
within rail space, and the most transient: which is to say, their relation to rail is not as 
topic, but as infrastructure (Star 1999, 380). For these reasons, understandings of rail 
space among passengers are the most relevant perspectives for examining the questions 
concerning national identity and place that are at the heart of my research. My 
methodology reflects this: my fieldwork aimed to capture the passenger perspective. 
This perspective also serves to structure this chapter. I trace the coming together 
of practices and things through which rail travel becomes a reality, beginning from the 
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moment the journey is first imagined to the final destination. At its core, the function of 
rail infrastructure is to move bodies though space; rail travel is therefore an essentially 
corporeal endeavor. From the passenger perspective, rail travel has little to do with rails 
and a great deal to do with walking, sitting, and standing. Yet bodies are only one of the 
many things which passengers must coordinate in order to navigate their journey. Rail 
space is animated as much by flows of tickets, luggage, water bottles, trash and even air 
as by the flows of bodies. My fieldwork found that some things played a pivotal role in 
assembling the bodies of passengers and the environs of rail space into a functioning 
whole. By “pivotal” I mean that, like a pivot, they fix a relation between two things along 
some but not all axes. In this chapter, I examine how tickets, smartphones, and water 
bottles relate the bodies of passengers to rail infrastructure as well as within broader 
societal debates about class and proper behavior. I attend to matter in order to examine 
how it is suffused with meaning. Bodies in motion are in constant dialogue with one 
another: moving to avoid collisions, to defend space, to invite conversation or refuse it. 
Matter’s capacity to affect other matter encompasses its tangible properties and its subtler 
dimensions. How people move, and what they move with, communicates emotion—
whether they are rushed, excited, anxious, comfortable, bored, amused, angry or eager—
as well as their relation to larger systems of meaning such as gender, class and nation. 
One way in which matter comes to signify is to be inscribed with discursive symbols: rail 
space is rich with discourse telling passengers how to behave, what to buy and what sort 
of citizen to be. How these discourses are juxtaposed and distributed through space sheds 
further light on the emergent contours of Chinese nation-ness. 
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I pay particular attention to the tension between coherence and fracture within 
these processes. The coherence of rail space is contingent. Rail space is composed of 
nodes: each individual element of rail infrastructure must share a degree of commonality 
in order to function within the network. That the stations and carriages within the Chinese 
rail system do, in fact, constitute a compatible and coherent whole across its vast extent is 
easy to take for granted. Whether in the standardization of passenger identification, the 
design of automated ticketing gates, or universal provision of human necessities, 
coherence is the outcome of a massive and unending feat of coordination. This 
ethnography aims to excavate the tremendous effort, by passengers as well as personnel, 
that goes into producing and maintaining rail space as a co-functioning whole. 
Yet against this coherence are patterns of fracture across space and within 
communities of passengers. While Chinese rail space is remarkably standardized in terms 
of passenger practices and spatial organization, my research also examines how 
hierarchies of difference are produced within rail space. This chapter also examines how 
the practices and tools of rail travel vary between passengers, and how these practices 
enable or constrain their movement through different parts of rail space. I found two 
overarching patterns of fracture. The first was between high-speed passenger-dedicated 
rail (HSR) network and the pre-existing conventional network. I found that the spaces, 
things, and even bodies of high-speed stations and carriages constituted a distinct, albeit 
not wholly separate, assemblage. This bifurcation of rail space reproduces and therefore 
deepens well-known tensions in Chinese society writ large between urban and rural, 
wealthy and poor, young and old.  
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Other fractures emerge from the topological character of rail space. The 
standardizing logic of nodes is in tension with the emergent properties of networks: along 
any single line, some stations are more central than others; as lines join into networks, a 
hierarchy between core and periphery emerges. As the system grows in size, the disparity 
between center and periphery tends to steepen. As a consequence of the topological 
quality, regional differences of the sort that long dominated Chinese geography—north 
versus south, coast versus inland—explain less about the character of any given station 
than its position within the network. Hubs, whether in Xining or Beijing, and mid-line 
stations, whether in Guizhou or Hebei, have many of the same characteristics. In this 
chapter, I describe the differences between stations in terms of their topological position, 
rather than in terms of their geographic region.  
1.1. Affordance & Tolerance 
In recounting how bodies, things and environments interact to produce rail space 
as a functional assemblage, it is easy to recount it as a sort of “just so” narrative: all of 
these elements relate in the way that they do because that is the way they must interact in 
order to produce rail space. Such an account eliminates both agency and contingency: 
passengers and personnel are reduced to automatons, and it becomes difficult to imagine 
how rail space could be otherwise. Yet as I encountered time and again in my fieldwork, 
passengers are constantly innovating, developing new ways of using the spaces in which 
they find themselves—often in flagrant disregard for how the spaces are designed to be 
used. Constantly monitoring these emergent uses, the role of designers and on-the-ground 
personnel are felt indirectly, through the shifting contours of rail space which constrain 
passengers’ practices away from those which threaten the system’s smooth function and 
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toward those that reduce friction. To capture how this dynamic plays out through the 
material forms of rail space, I draw on the conceptual pair of affordance and tolerance.  
The concept of affordance, emerged in the field of ecological psychology in order 
to center a relational account of the qualities of things (Gibson 1979). Rejecting classical 
philosophy’s descriptions of the nature of things in terms of objective qualia such as 
color, weight, and so forth that a detached observer might note, Gibson argues that things 
are perceived through practical interaction, disclosing their qualities in relation to the 
particular activities in which the participant is engaged. Social scientists have employed 
this relational account to explore the constitution of social space not through the 
narrations of its architects and designers, but through the experiences of those who dwell 
within them. Affordances are not determined in advance through fiat or design, but are 
emergent relations between the object and the user (Ingold 2002, 166–68): while a chair 
might “be for” sitting in, it equally affords the potential use of footrest, pillow fort 
infrastructure, firewood, tiger-taming implement, and so on. What affordances a thing or 
an environment discloses is shaped not just by “objective” physical qualities but is 
historically and culturally situated as well, passed down through generations of users 
(Ingold 2002, 186). The concept of affordance helps us conceptualize how different users 
turn rail space to their own ends: barriers become impromptu resting spots, and waiting 
rooms become captive markets for media and commerce.  
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Figure 4.1. Passengers have found that traffic barriers in front of the ticket office at 
Guangzhou South Station afford a comfortable place to sit. 
 
If affordance emphasizes open-ended potentiality within socio-technical 
assemblages, tolerance examines the point at which that potential meets a hard limit. 
Tolerance defines the divide between acceptable and dysfunctional. Tolerance, in the 
engineering sense, is the permissible limit or limits of variation materials may have in 
dimensions, properties, or conditions without significantly affecting the function of the 
structure which they constitute. In rail space, tolerance governs how different elements of 
the system—track and wheel, carriage and tunnel, passenger and gate—come together, 
defining what variations, what range of inputs each can tolerate from the other. Tolerance 
does not rule out the contingency that more variation could occur; tolerance only 
identifies the point beyond which the assemblage can no longer function and begins to 
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break apart, no longer forming a whole. While investigating the rail system, I found that 
the technical conception of tolerance blurs into the social: new technologies depend on 
new methods for governing passengers and instilling new practices to realize their 
potential, and vice versa. I therefore employ the concept of tolerance to emphasize the 
mutual constitution of the social standards of mobility, legibility and self-discipline 
which govern the movement of human bodies and the technical standards which govern 
the movement of machines. In this chapter, the blurring of the social and the technical is 
generally reflected in the offloading of ticketing and navigation duties to the passenger, 
but is particularly evident at the station gate and on the boarding platform. 
The implementation of more demanding technical tolerances goes hand-in-hand 
with more demanding human discipline. It is through enforcing tolerances—excluding 
the intolerable—that boundary infrastructure maintains itself as a functioning 
sociotechnical system. Examining the Chinese rail system through the dual lens of 
affordance and tolerance shows a system in the midst of dramatic transformation. 
Technological innovation and social development produce more precisely machined 
human and non-human components, allowing for narrower tolerances: higher speeds, 
decreased friction, tighter schedules, smoother flows and decreased overhead. The 
opaque and shortage-prone paper ticketing system afforded scalpers with a method for 
capturing monopoly profits; as the ticket buying situation became increasingly intolerable 
for passengers, system managers were compelled to introduce a new ticketing system that 
did not offer such an affordance. The proliferation of smartphones affords passengers a 
new way to pass the journey at the same time that it provides China Railway a new, low-
labor avenue to sell tickets. In the account that follows, I use trace how the particular 
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discursive-material, socio-technological assemblage of Chinese rail space emerges out of 
the relations between bodies, things, and spaces. 
The sociotechnical assemblage of Chinese rail is difficult to parse: the bodily 
practices, things and spaces interlock in a multitude of ways that resist sorting out. To 
provide an overarching structure to my account of Chinese rail in this chapter, I borrow 
inspiration from the work of Tim Ingold. Ingold, in his influential account of skilled 
practice, analogizes practice to a journey, characterized by the four stages of getting 
ready, setting out, carrying on, and finishing off (2011, 51–62). In examining rail travel 
as a skilled practice, I take these stages more literally: I describe each aspect of rail space 
in the order that they are encountered by a traveler making their way through the system. 
Some things, like tickets and smartphones, make repeated appearances, revealing 
different affordances at each stage of the journey.  
I build on Ingold’s four stage account of skilled practice by examining an implicit 
fifth stage: the dormant period after the end of one journey and before the beginning of 
the next. I argue that this fallow period is particularly important to understanding how 
skilled practice contributes to the formation of identity. Edensor (2002) suggests that 
habituation to a particular material culture, a grounded and habitual understanding of 
familiar objects, is a central element of national identity. I argue the skillful practice of 
rail travel constitutes such a material culture: it shapes national identity and, because it 
relates to an infrastructural network standardized across China, it plays a particularly vital 
role in shaping national understandings of place. The skills of rail travel put all of 
China—or at least enough of China—ready to hand. 
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2. Getting Ready 
As Laura Watts (2008) observes, rail journeys begin with an act of imagination—
of imagining a destination with sufficient clarity that plans can be made. Yet this 
imagining is “not purely the imaginary work of a Kantian mind” but an embodied and 
practical act of cognition realized through the social and material work of purchasing 
tickets and packing bags (Watts 2008, 713). Purchasing tickets, that initial concrete first 
towards travel, has long been fraught and difficult to access in China. As late as 2011, 
prospective passengers had to make an initial journey to the station days or weeks in 
advance to purchase rail tickets, or if not the departure station itself, then to local 
ticketing agency. Ticketing agencies were a more recent innovation. Recounting their 
experiences in the nineties and earlier, older respondents told many stories of their trials 
and travails attempting to purchase tickets: showing up before dawn to join massive 
crowds in cacophonous ticket offices, waiting in line for hours only to find the route sold 
out. Prior to the advent of a centralized computer system in the late nineties (Bullock, 
Sondhi, and Amos 2009, 54), ticket accessibility was a constant uncertainty: tickets were 
physically allocated to individual stations, and only put on sale five days before the date 
of travel (W. Wang and Yuan 2018). Each ticket window served a different line or 
geographic area, with the corresponding tickets physically on-hand in cabinets filled with 
tiny drawers. During peak travel times like Spring Festival, passengers had to line up the 
night before tickets went on sale to have a hope of getting a ticket before they sold out. 
The anxiety and uncertainty of getting ahold of a ticket fed the rise of ticket 
scalping. Huangniu (黄牛), or ticket scalpers, were a recurring figure in discussions of 
ticketing. These speculators buy up tickets in bulk to resell at a profit, often taking 
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advantage of inside connections at the station. The physical nature of rail tickets afforded 
this opportunity: prior to the introduction of the real name system in the early 2010s, 
tickets weren’t linked to individual passengers. Scalping did afford some options to 
travelers: buying from scalpers meant, at the least, saving time otherwise spent waiting in 
line. During Spring Festival, when returning migrant workers and university students 
flooded into stations, filling every train to capacity for weeks on end, gangs of ambitious 
huangniu might buy up the tickets for an entire service, forcing passengers to pay 
exorbitant prices to get home. 
The design of ticket offices reflects the massive flows of passengers which they 
must accommodate. While part of the station, ticket offices typically have separate 
entrances. After getting a ticket, passengers must exit and re-enter elsewhere: there is no 
assumption that passengers will flow directly from ticket office to platform. In front of 
the ticket windows—sometimes twenty or thirty in a row—passengers often find a series 
of permanent metal barriers set up to physically structure the flow of passengers (Figure 
4.2). Some ticket offices have turnstiles installed to prevent more than one—or two, if 
they are slender—passengers to push up against the window, holding space for the 
passenger holding their ticket to escape. In other ticket offices, metal barriers are replaced 
with lines on the floor, sometimes scuffed to illegibility, marking out the placement of 
queues (see Figure 4.3). At first glance, these barriers appear to operate via separate 
mechanisms: metal railings materially constrain the movement of bodies, while painted 
lines are purely discursive prohibitions. Yet both depend on materiality and discursivity 
to accomplish their effects: metal barriers convey meaning beyond and prior to collision, 
and a painted line that has been worn away prohibits nothing.  
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Figure 4.2. In the ticket office at Hengyang Station, metal barriers and turnstiles 
communicate order. 
 
Figure 4.3. In Sanya Station, some passengers wait behind the yellow lines; others do 
not. 
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These barriers affect passengers’ usage of the ticket office, articulating into the 
material form of the space the intention of system managers, in a manner akin to how 
speed bumps articulate the intentions of traffic police. Latour describes “sleeping 
policemen”—as speed bumps are known in French—as translating from one discourse to 
another by moving from one material form to another (1999, 185–90). Yet what 
passengers do with these barriers is affected, not determined, by their designer’s 
intention. The reliability of the queue comes down to the decisions of the people in line—
both how far some are willing to push, and also how far others are willing to push back. 
When I began my fieldwork, and was slow to present my identification and name my 
destination, experienced and impatient passengers behind me would simply step past me 
as I hesitated. As I came to be more fluent in the rapid juggling of objects and words the 
ticket office demanded, I also learned how to defend my place in line. Other passengers I 
observed pushed the limits of the services offered by ticket offices further: some would 
bypass the line altogether, walking up the exit aisle to ask rapid questions of the teller 
between ticket sales.  
When I began my fieldwork in the fall of 2016, the stations I travelled through 
had multiple ticket offices, but less than half were open at all, and only a handful of 
windows operating in each. It wasn’t until January, the beginning of Chunyun that I saw 
ticket offices in full swing, Chunyun (春运, literally “Spring Move”) is the forty day 
period around Spring Festival, the most significant holiday of the Chinese calendar. 
Chunyun is often described as the world’s largest human migration, as families scattered 
across the country by migrant labor, urbanization and education re-unite to celebrate the 
New Year. Chunyun taxes China’s transportation network to the limit, and the rail system 
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bears much of the burden. In 2017, over 357 million train trips were made during Spring 
Festival. During 2017 Chunyun, I finally saw ticket offices with agents behind every 
available window.  
The 2017 Chunyun was the sixth Spring Festival since China Railway’s 
catastrophic national rollout of 12306.cn, its brand-new, three-hundred million RMB 
online ticketing system. In 2012, online ticketing debuted to near-universal 
condemnation: the website was “harder to land on than the Diaoyu islands” in the words 
of one online critic (Wertime 2012). Long wait times, unreliable connections, and 
countless other inexplicable errors somehow combined to make waiting in line at 
crowded ticket offices a preferable option for many passengers. Yet despite its 
inauspicious beginnings, online ticket purchasing has become the norm: in 2017, more 
than 70 percent of tickets were purchased online (Xinhua Net 2017a).  
The once obligatory passage through the ticket office has been partially 
circumvented: after arriving at the station, passengers can now go to automated machines 
for fetching and purchasing tickets (see Figure 4.4). With only a handful of exceptions,‡‡ 
the automated machines rely on a single form of identification: the second generation 
shenfenzheng (身份证) or national identity card. While a number of other forms of 
identification, including foreign passports and more obscure forms of domestic 
identification can be used to create accounts on 12306.cn and to purchase tickets 
virtually, with these forms of identification passengers must still go to a ticket office and 
wait in line to get the actual ticket. The shift to online ticketing is reflected in the shifting 
                                               
‡‡ In 2016, automated ticketing machines in Dongguan accepted passports alongside 
shenfenzheng.  
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terminology of station signage: some ticket offices are described as the rengong (人工), 
or “human operated” ticket office, for those passengers in need of a live agent for 
purchases, exchanges or refunds. Automated service is rapidly becoming the unmarked 
normal, with human-operated ticketing requiring explicit marking. 
Usage of online ticketing and automated machines varies across space, but less 
along regional lines than across the rails systems’ topology. At major hubs in large urban 
areas like Guangzhou and Beijing, automated machines are widely used. In stations 
serving HSR routes, ticket offices are relatively empty, serving only those who cannot 
use automated processes. In addition to those who need to return or exchange tickets, 
these offices serve passengers who lack second generation shenfenzheng. Many of these 
passengers are not attempting to buy tickets on the basis of hukou booklets, passports or 
other acceptable forms of identification, but those who simply lost or forgot to bring their 
shenfenzheng. These passengers must go to the public security booth typically set up in or 
near the ticket office (often taking over an unused ticket window) with a photo and their 
shenfenzheng number to receive a temporary identification that will allow them to buy a 
ticket that day only. At smaller stations, especially mid-line stations along non-HSR 
routes, there might be no automated machines at all, issuing all tickets through an agent 
(see Figure 4.5).  
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Figure 4.4. Automatic ticketing machines, with detailed, step-by-step instructions in 
Uighur, Chinese, and English. Urumqi Station. 
 
Figure 4.5. The ticket window and security check at Miyun North Station, just outside 
Beijing, serves only conventional trains and relies on “human-operated” ticketing. 
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Uptake of the machines by passengers and stations is uneven demographically as 
well as geographically. Most passengers access China Railway’s online ticketing service 
from a smartphone, using the official 12306 app or more commonly, a third-party app 
such as Ctrip (Xiecheng, 携程) or using what’s called a WeChat “small app.” Ctrip, now 
Trip.com, is one of the world’s largest online travel agencies, and made international 
news with its purchase of UK-based Skyscanner for $1.7 billion (Bloomberg 2016). This 
shift has put the ticket office into the hands of passengers wherever they may be, whether 
in bed at home or on the subway to the train station: all of China has become the ticket 
office. Yet while it may appear the ticket office has melted into air, the obligatory 
passage point has not vanished, only transformed. By attaching tickets to individual via 
state issued identification§§, online ticketing has shut out a Chinese passengers whose 
their births were never registered under China’s strict family planning system (Thomson 
Reuters Foundation 2016; Shuzhuo Li, Zhang, and Feldman 2010).  
Moreover, the technological assemblage of online ticketing, state identification, 
and smartphone requires its own set of skills to navigate. For older or less educated 
passengers using a smartphone or automated ticket machine is not second nature, 
imposing new barriers for those who lack digital or written literacy (Huo and Wei 2013). 
Discussing online ticketing with my older interviewees, I noticed that while they would 
sing the praises of the convenience of online ticketing, they were often rather vague about 
the details. Then, in one interview, my respondent admitted he did not himself use the 
app: he had his daughter buy tickets for him, using his information using her app. This 
                                               
§§ For an in-depth examination of the relationship between rail travel and state identification see 
Chapter VIII. 
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was not a unique situation: I discovered that many younger people, particularly women, 
played the role of de facto ticket agent for their older relations, re-intermediating the 
process supposedly disintermediated by computerization. For technologically savvy, state 
legible travelers, the advent of online ticketing has created a seamless, unhindered 
passenger experience; for others it has restructured the passenger experience beyond 
recognition, rendering old skills useless and imposing new kinds of friction.  
3. Setting Out 
3.1. Packing 
If purchasing a ticket has become (for some) effortlessly convenient, putting any 
city in China only a few taps away, packing remains firmly embedded in the material 
realm. Traveling requires detaching oneself from one’s usual living environment: all of 
the everyday practices that people depend upon to meet their needs are shorn of the 
context upon which they depend. In becoming passengers, people must rethink how they 
will feed themselves, stay hydrated, stay comfortable, and stay sane during their journey 
and after arriving at their destination. Packing serves as a microcosm of rail travel’s 
entanglement of imagination and reality, skill and culture. Packing is an act of skillful 
anticipation: one must cast oneself forward through time to imagine and prepare for 
future challenges. Yet it is an act of imagination anchored in a particular social and 
experiential context: what passengers imagine of their journey and their destination is 
situated within personal experience, second-hand knowledge and media portrayals of the 
challenges they may face and the affordances of which they might avail themselves. 
Moreover, packing is itself anchored in the material reality of the things—the clothes, the 
snacks, the books or laptops—which are assembled into the particular form of luggage. 
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Packing is an act of embodied cognition, skillful work situated in a particular social and 
material context. 
Some passengers bring along snacks in anticipation of the journey: steamed buns, 
hard-boiled eggs, oranges or sunflower seeds; others wait until entering the station to buy 
KFC chicken or McDonald’s burgers and fries to eat on board. Some passengers bring 
along insulated thermoses, knowing they can fill them at ubiquitous hot water taps; others 
prefer to buy bottled water, although the price is two to ten times the cost elsewhere. 
Passengers must anticipate how they will pass the time: some bring books, magazines, or 
if traveling in a group, a deck of cards. The prevalent form of entertainment, however, is 
the smartphone and its endless series of diversions—until the battery runs out. Some 
newer stations and HSR carriages have outlets or recharging stations, but not reliably and 
passengers often carry an external battery for recharging during the trip. Each of these 
decisions is materially made, as one holds a cup of noodles or a book, weighing it against 
future need and anticipated affordances. 
Consequently, how passengers pack is socially and culturally laden. These 
decisions made carry through the journey in the form of luggage. As Bissel (2009b) 
observes, different “body-technology assemblages” produce distinct embodied 
experiences of travel. Yet the practical knowledges of how to maneuver through rail 
space are differentiated not just by considerations of encumbrance and bodily capacity, 
nor by the particular constraints of any given journey; they are shaped by cultural 
difference as well.  
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3.2. The Luggage-Body Assemblage 
Luggage plays a visible role in the mutual entanglement of passengers and rail 
space, its material and discursive properties continuing to play a constitutive role in the 
practice of rail travel. Most viscerally, luggage is encumbrance. While officially limited 
to twenty kilograms on HSR trains and fifty kilograms on conventional trains, in practice 
weight restrictions are rarely enforced.*** A public service announcement prevalent 
within rail space shows Santa boarding an HSR train with an outsized bag: the 
recommendation was not to travel with less, or ship some of it, but to split it into two 
smaller bags. Some passengers take full advantage of this leeway, traveling with two or 
three sizeable pieces of luggage; other ignore size restriction entirely. Traveling under 
such a load requires both skill and fortitude, and occasional assistance. Rail tracks are by 
necessity straight lines, forcing flows of passengers up and down as they make their way 
through rail space. In newer stations, escalators complement flights of stairs—unless they 
break down. Boarding a train from Shenzhen to Guangzhou, the flow of passengers 
slowed to a crawl at the stairs up to the platform: the escalator was out of order, forcing 
the boarding and the disembarking passengers share the narrow stairwell (Figure 4.6). In 
front of me, an old man was pulling a huge wheeled cart of luggage; another passenger 
tapped his shoulder, and wordlessly indicated the pile of luggage. The old man nodded 
assent and the other man grabbed the bottom of the cart and the two carried the load up to 
the platform, where they parted ways once again. 
                                               
*** That these luggage restrictions were actually enforced along the Express Railway Link 
between Guangzhou and Hong Kong caught some passengers off guard and caused some 
resentment when it first opened in 2018 (Tsang, Yau, and Sum 2018). 
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Figure 4.6. A broken escalator forces passengers in Shenzhen Station to navigate the 
kinds of cross-current flow that rail space is designed to avoid. 
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Hard-sided rolling bags are a common sight: wheeled luggage allows passengers 
to take advantage of the affordance offered by the smooth surfaces of railway stations, 
platforms and carriages, and hard smooth sides make for fluid maneuvering of luggage 
through x-ray machines and into luggage racks. Many passengers adopt the practice of 
tying a plastic bag of snacks—oranges, nuts, or instant noodles to the handle at the top of 
the roller bag (Figure 4.7). After seeing dozens of bags arranged like this during my 
fieldwork, I decided to give it a try myself: on the metro on the way to the train station, a 
fellow passenger was so surprised to see it that she started a conversation to ask if I was 
taking the train. While from one perspective wholly pragmatic, this practice is also 
encoded as characteristic specifically of Chinese rail travel. 
 
Figure 4.7. A stereotypically “Chinese” body-technology assemblage of passenger with 
hard-sided wheeled luggage with plastic bag of snacks on top. 
 
Passengers travel for a range of reasons, entailing a different load. On the lighter 
end, some passengers are making a day trip to a nearby location, for work or leisure. 
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They carry only a suitcase, a purse or a light backpack. On the heavier end, there are 
entire households making a move via rail, carrying everything from bedding to mops. 
The most archetypically encumbered passengers are migrant workers (农民工 
nongmingong) whose mobility has been the lynchpin of China’s economic boom. Moving 
between their homes in poor rural areas in the interior to industrial areas up and down the 
coast, migrant workers are frequent and expert users of the rail system. As terms like “the 
floating population” (流动人口 liudong renkou) indicate, their identity is defined in 
terms of constant circulation; as Crang and Zhang describe, they “dwell” in transit 
spaces, adrift between home and worksite (2012, 898). Drawing on the new genre of 
“hired laborers literature” (打工文学 dagong wenxue), Crang and Zhang show how the 
spaces of transit—first and foremost the rail system—are a key site of shared experience 
and identification for migrant workers, a population who otherwise remain firmly 
embedded within native place networks. Poems capture the bitterness of standing in line 
for hours during Chunyun or the challenge of carrying snakeskin bags (蛇皮袋 shepi dai) 
across the country on one’s back (Crang and Zhang 2012, 905). “Snake skin bag” 
describes a particular type of woven plastic bag printed with a sort of plaid said to 
resemble the scales of a snake.††† Cheap, capacious and waterproof, they proved popular 
among migrant workers carrying a year’s worth of necessities, and quickly became 
emblematic of the migrant worker rail passenger. As the poems analyzed by Crang and 
                                               
††† Outside of China, these bags have a long history as a marker of poverty and migration. They 
first achieved infamy in 1983 as “Ghana must go” bags: Ghanaian migrants were suddenly 
expelled from Nigeria, and the bags became synonymous with the resulting exodus (Ling 
2018). 
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Zhang exemplify, these large and unwieldy bags come to constitute a body-technology 
assemblage distinctive to the migrant worker: a body awkwardly stooped under their 
weight, yes, but also a source of emotional and material support (see Figure 4.8).  
The snakeskin bags, along with plastic buckets, repurposed rice sacks and other 
makeshift containers suggest how luggage functions as a powerful marker of social class 
within rail space. Laden migrant workers make a stark contrast with passengers traveling 
with Louis Vuitton handbags, yet often share the same carriages. Moving back and forth 
between HSR and conventional routes, there was no clear line demarcating one group of 
passengers from the other: only a tendency for the luggage of conventional rail 
passengers towards the make-shift while on HSR for luggage to be sleeker and smaller. 
In rail space, the distinction between luggage as encumbrance and luggage as social 
signifier becomes blurred: the very state of being encumbered, to have to labor to manage 
multiple bags across vast waiting rooms rather than wheel swiftly through is a mark of 
lesser status. 
3.3. The Ticket 
Tickets, as material objects, are pivotal for coordination between passengers, 
personnel and rail space. They are an entry permit, a reminder, a navigation aid and allow 
personnel to keep track of passengers’ unidirectional flow through rail space. The axes 
along which they fix relations and along which they enable movement have shifted over 
time; the fixing of tickets to real names is only one example. 
Chinese rail tickets are immediately distinguishable by color: not divided by type 
of ticket, or the class of ticket, or HSR versus conventional, the color difference instead 
indicates whether they have the magnetic encoding that allows them to be automatically 
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Figure 4.8. Passengers use snakeskin bags as impromptu seating in the ticket office of 
Guangzhou Station. 
 
scanned by ticket gates or whether they must be visually verified by a ticket agent. The 
color difference is an important signal for passengers and personnel: gates to board and 
exit train platforms are divided into different channels for those with magnetized and not-
magnetized tickets, typically indicated via signs and floor decals. Ensuring that 
passengers can guide themselves to the correct gate is essential to keeping the boarding 
process flowing.  
This ticketing system in its current form is barely more than a decade old, and is 
already becoming obsolete. From the forties through 1997, Chinese rail tickets were 
narrow strips of cardboard, printed en masse and distributed to stations in lots, stored 
behind the ticket window in countless tiny drawers (W. Wang and Yuan 2018). In 1997 
China Railway introduced the first “soft tickets”, printed at the point of sale by a 
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computer connected to a central network. These tickets—and the system behind them—
made ticketing considerably smoother but retained a problematic fixed quota distribution 
system (Bullock, Sondhi, and Amos 2009, 54; W. Wang and Yuan 2018). In 2008, the 
new Beijing-Tianjian high-speed railway line began to use the machine readable 
magnetically coded tickets—neatly distinguished by their blue color. When online 
ticketing was rolled out in 2011, both tickets got a redesign to include the name of the 
passenger as well as a QR code in place of a bar code. Now the Chinese rail network is 
poised to do away with paper tickets altogether: beginning in 2019, all HSR trains accept 
“e-tickets”: bought online, these tickets allow passengers to enter stations and pass 
through gates using only their national identification card (Junwei Wang 2018). 
The physical body of the ticket remains instrumental for both personnel and 
passengers. Entering stations, security agents mark tickets with a stamp or a pen stroke 
after checking it against identification. In Beijing South, this procedure is impossible to 
follow. Because the station was built with ticket offices inside the main waiting room, the 
only place it is possible to match identification with ticket is at the boarding gate. Here, 
station personnel fall back on an old rail technology: the ticket punch. At the gates to the 
inter-city commuter line to Tianjin, a station agent checks the ticket against the 
passenger’s identification, and clips a distinctive shape into the edge of the paper ticket to 
prevent the ticket from being used again. Tickets also aid navigation for passengers as 
they move through rail space. In rail space, a multitude of signs (Figure 4.9), as well as a 
particularly adorable public service announcement starring a panda traveling alone 
(Figure 4.10), educate passengers how to use their ticket to locate their gate on station 
bulletin. The train, departure time, gate, and carriage number are neatly summarized on 
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the ticket, keeping this information ready at hand. The physical ticket comes into play 
once again when disembarking. Exiting the platform back to the station concourse, 
passengers pass through another check: automated gates for those with blue tickets and 
manned by station agents for those with red tickets. The automated gates mark used 
tickets with black lines; station agents clip or rip tickets to show they have been used.  
The physicality of the ticket is also used to keep track of passengers and stops on 
overnight sleepers, where there is a concern passengers might sleep through their stop. 
The solution is quite elegant: shortly after the train starts moving, stewards go through 
each compartment, collecting the ticket from each passenger, placing it in a binder with a 
pocket corresponding to each berth, giving the passenger a berth marker in return (Figure 
4.11). Before each stop, the steward can easily flip through the binder and see if any 
passengers need to disembark, locate them, and make sure they are awake and ready to 
go. Tickets render passengers more legible to rail space, and rail space more legible to 
passengers. 
3.4. The Station Plaza 
Rail space leaks beyond its own boundaries. Purchasing tickets, fetching them 
from ticket offices, packing luggage and buying comestibles: all this before even entering 
the rail station. The station plaza forms a vital mediating zone between the securitized 
interior of rail space and the surrounding environment. Station plazas serve multiple 
purposes: they are staging areas for travelers; markets for storefronts or hawkers selling 
food, drinks and last minute travel necessities like folding stools or external batteries for 
smartphones; space for station personnel to set up overflow waiting rooms and ticket 
offices during Chunyun; and de facto public parks. Station plazas are places for waiting, 
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Figure 4.9. Signs, such as this one in Chengdu East Station, educate passengers how to 
relate the information contained on their ticket to the physical layout of the station. 
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Figure 4.10. This short public service film shows the panda’s confusion and shame 
transform into triumph and joy after he musters the courage to approach a station agent, 
who shows him how to read his ticket and relate it to the signs and symbols of rail space. 
The film plays on the very infrastructure it teaches passengers to read. 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Binders, like this one on the overnight train between Kunming and Guiyang, 
allow stewards to track passengers as they board and disembark. 
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but are often aggressively empty of places to sit: any available seating is quickly 
occupied by passengers. How to turn these deliberately uncomfortable spaces into a place 
to spend hours waiting requires deploying a range of skills: passengers use their luggage 
or convenient barriers as seats, or place cardboard or newspaper on the ground (See 
Figure 4.12). 
 
Figure 4.12. A group of men play cards in front of Zhengzhou Station, using luggage for 
seating and for a card table. 
 
Public security is a visible presence in station plazas. In the form of uniformed 
officers on patrol, police stations with flashing lights, public security is rarely out of 
sight. Most of these officers are uniformed but unarmed, perhaps with riot control gear—
shields, helmets, billy clubs and mancatchers—leaned against police vehicles or beside 
watch posts. At some stations, plazas are patrolled by squads of SWAT or military police 
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outfitted with bullet-proof vests and automatic weapons. Militarized levels of security 
were most visible at Kunming Station, which was the site of deadly attack in 2014.‡‡‡ Yet 
other stations in the Chinese heartland such as Zhengzhou East Station and Tianjin 
Station also had highly armed security personnel stationed at visible points and patrolling 
around the station. While increasingly a site of intensive state control under the real name 
system and new security procedures, rail stations and rail travel retains a reputation as a 
site of chaos: stories of theft, scams, and violence are commonplace.  As depicted in 
posters in Nanning, the presence of public security personnel helps to defend against 
terror attacks and prevent illegal border crossings in a form of security theatre not too 
distant from that of the post-9/11 United States (Figure 4.13). 
 
Figure 4.13. At Nanning station, approximately 150 kilometers from the Vietnamese 
border, posters illustrate the role of police in defending against threats from outside 
China and from within. 
 
                                               
‡‡‡ This attack, its background and consequences are discussed at greater length in Chapter VIII. 
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3.5. Entering the Station 
Ticket, identification, luggage—juggling the many parts of the body-technology 
assemblage constituting the rail passenger can be demanding, with little tolerance for 
error. At the entrance of the station, passengers must have ID and ticket in hand to pass to 
the ticket window agent, and then right after receiving them back, immediately stow them 
away safely in order to free their hands to load luggage into the x-ray machine and pass 
through the metal detector to the side. The rigor of this examination is typically quite 
low, prioritizing rapid thorough-put over meticulousness. These security checks 
commonly become a bottleneck in the flow of passengers through rail space, and both 
passengers and personnel work to keep things moving. Complications, such as multiple 
pieces of oddly shaped luggage or a misplaced identity card, can cause a pile up, a tangle 
of people and things suddenly not flowing as they ought. Passengers push past anyone 
too slow to get their luggage on the x-ray machine first, to cut ahead in the line through 
the metal detector. To regulate the flow of passengers through the security scans, some 
stations place an agent at a gate before the machines, to prevent the crush of waiting 
passengers from piling up right at the machine. Passengers push against these agents with 
a daring that initially shocked my sense of acceptability, acculturated as I am to the 
fearful respect for TSA in US airports. 
The skill implicit in keeping these checks moving smoothly was forcefully 
brought home one night in Xi’an when in the process of reaching for my passport I 
somehow managed to pull my wedding ring off my finger and fling it under the security 
booth. I heard it bounce, but couldn’t see where it had landed. I saw that the security 
booth, a new addition to the Xi’an station plaza, was set up off the ground. I tried to look 
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underneath the booth with the light of my smartphone, but saw nothing glint but one jiao 
coins. As I searched, I was acutely conscious of the line beginning to pile up behind me. 
In a cloud of anxiety, I decided to pass through, and see if my ring had rolled under the 
booth to the other side. To my infinite relief, it had: I saw my ring lying in plain sight, 
nearly under the feet of passengers walking into the station. The ability of station security 
to swiftly and smoothly move passengers through rail space is dependent on the skillful 
work by passengers to render themselves as safe, legible elements of the ridership of 
China’s rail system—work made momentarily visible in my own failure. While the 
technological dimension of securitization, in the form of the real name system, is easier to 
identify, it functions only because passengers have learned how to accommodate less 
forgiving tolerances of the new regime. 
3.6. Rail Space Media 
These security procedures are relatively new to rail space, and educating 
passengers on how to produce themselves constitutes one of the main components of rail 
space’s discursive environment. Yet the advent of the real name system is only one of 
countless shifts taking place as new infrastructure comes on line or falls into disrepair, 
and as new patterns of use emerge. Both passengers and personnel have to adapt to 
shifting relations between each other and their surrounding infrastructure: they must 
constantly re-learn how to inhabit rail space. To achieve this requires on the one hand a 
significant investment in rendering rail spaces legible, and, on the other, requires from the 
traveler fluency in reading these spaces. It requires moving not just people and trains, but 
information and knowledge—not just matter, but meaning. 
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Countless posters, videos and announcements direct passengers to have their 
ticket and identity card ready, forbid passengers from carrying dangerous items into rail 
space, tell them how to treat personnel, other passengers and station environs, and where 
to go and where not to go (see Figure 4.14). Intercut with these messages specific to rail 
space are another set of discourses which interpolate a wider range of subjectivities. 
Advertisements for automobiles, luxury products and home décor assume a wealthy and 
sophisticated target audience, while nationalist propaganda interpolates passengers into 
the position of patriotic, civilized citizens. These messages concerning how to be a 
passenger and how to be a citizen are not wholly distinct. Often literally intercut on the 
same screens, both discourses moreover interpolate subjectivities through the production 
of affects of pride, shame, consideration and discomfort in relation to fellow passengers, 
personnel and rail environments.  
 
Figure 4.14. A video playing on a screen on the exterior of the Chengdu Station ticket 
office shows the consequence of carrying dangerous items through security: 
embarrassment at inconveniencing other passengers.  
 
From nearly any point in rail space, signs direct passengers to ticket offices and 
ticket machines, to public security or lost luggage, to toilets and water taps and food, to 
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entrances and exits, waiting rooms and boarding gates. In a literal interpretation of 
Latour’s sleeping policeman, some signs take the form of station agents indicating the 
location of services or answering presumed questions. The very ubiquity of these 
directions highlights the degree to which their discursive content is firmly situated in 
particular material contexts: this sign indicating the nearest toilet is not interchangeable 
with an identical sign ten meters away. These signs represent rail space egocentrically, 
meaning according to the particular perspective of a situated perceiver (Klatzky 1998). 
Other navigation aids take the form of maps, representing rail space within an allocentric 
reference frame, locating points within a framework external to the passenger and 
independent of their position (Klatzky 1998). In order to use these maps, passengers must 
learn to adopt the perspective of rail space’s architects and managers. They must 
conceptualize of the station from a holistic point of view. Passengers accomplish this feat 
quite adeptly, but their skill in executing “the god trick of seeing everything from 
nowhere” (Haraway 1988, 581) should not prevent us from reflecting on how odd it is. 
The ubiquity of this skill betrays a salient fact: a crucial element of being a passenger 
within rail space, of inhabiting infrastructure, is to learn how to adopt the perspective of 
those who manage it. The craft of being a passenger encompasses, in part, not just the 
practices of rendering oneself legible, but to read oneself through the same set of 
representations used by the system. To be a passenger demands a certain kind of double 
think, a simultaneous awareness of one’s own perspective and that of another. This 
practice is essential for anticipating what constraints the system puts upon passengers and 
perhaps more urgently, for anticipating what deviations it will tolerate.  
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National maps, in contrast to station maps, are few and far between in rail space. 
Insofar as rail space is national space, it is constituted from the inside out rather than 
from the borders in. Even route maps showing the order of stations is rare; I encountered 
only a handful of schematic maps showing the layout of China’s national rail network. 
When I did see them, it became clear why they were so uncommon: the complexity and 
scale of the network makes looking at a national scale map useless for determining 
routes. Moreover, there is the added complication of multiple services running parallel 
routes before diverging, running along the same route but hitting different stops; the 
range of possibilities overwhelm what any traveler could plan around. In Guilin, a small 
but touristy city, I came across a simplified time table covering all the services operated 
by the Nanning Railway Bureau: even this sub-section of the national network covered a 
bulletin board in fine type (Figure 4.15). 
Examining time tables like these amply demonstrate the cognitive burden that 
computerized ticketing has removed from the shoulders of passengers and ticket agents. 
Working from a start and end point simplified the choices to a manageable number 
between which people can make reasonable judgments. Yet interfacing with the rail 
system purely in terms of departure and arrival stations has substantial import for how 
passengers conceive of the network. A historical comparison draws out the contrast: a 
1921 gazetteer-style guidebook for the Jin-Pu line described each stop in sequence, 
relating information concerning local specialties and sites of historical significance (Köll 
2019, 157–58). The subject of the book is the particular line, conceived of as a linked 
spatial and temporal progression. Selecting a route on 12306.cn by selecting a departure 
station and arrival station, in contrast, conceptualizes the stations of the network as nodes 
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Figure 4.15. As a glance at this “simple and clear” (简明 jianming) time table suggests, 
even presenting the basic route information for one of China’s sixteen railway bureaus 
makes for an unwieldy display. 
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connected by interchangeable linkages. Individual routes or services, regions or provinces 
are abstracted away: only stations are grasped directly, and not by geography but by sign. 
Schivelbusch traces a similar phenomenon in early European rail travel; as Proust put it, 
“railway stations […]do not constitute, so to speak, a part of the surrounding town but 
contain the essence of its personality just as upon their signboards they bear its painted 
name” (quoted in Schivelbusch 1986, 40). The China realized through the rail network is 
to a large extent an urban archipelago, composed of those cities large enough or fortunate 
enough to have a station through which they become knowable.  
Signs are deployed in concert with physical barriers to direct the flow of 
passengers through the at-times rather complex topology of rail space. More than 
complex, the spatial organization of stations is constantly shifting. The walls and doors of 
railway stations are supplemented throughout with mobile barriers, allowing personnel to 
reconfigure the flows through plazas and waiting rooms in response to changing 
conditions. Blue plastic or metal a bit over a meter high, these waist- or chest-high 
barriers are a standard technology throughout rail space. During Spring Festival, these 
barriers form the walls of temporary waiting areas and expanded queues that fill station 
plazas; the excess barriers collect in quiet corners during the rest of the year. On a daily 
or weekly timescale, they serve to redirect passengers around closures necessitated by 
breakdowns or maintenance. In many HSR stations, the security checks at the entrances 
to the cavernous waiting rooms are built from such barriers, betraying their origins as a 
relatively recent addition to Chinese rail space. In fact, stations abound with more 
permanent fixtures rendered superfluous or problematic by changing passenger needs and 
security requirements. Doors that once offered direct access to waiting rooms or boarding 
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platforms are locked shut with cables wound awkwardly around push handles and 
entrances converted to exits are marked with cardboard signs: the configuration of rail 
space is ongoing and improvisational. 
Though the tools of a much more direct and coercive sort of control are plain to 
see, the flow of people through stations is largely self-regulated. Passengers adhere, 
mostly, to the regulation of rail space because it works well enough for them to do so. 
The use of barriers, physical and discursive, speaks of the quiet struggle between 
passengers and personnel throughout rail space. Those responsible for rail space must 
deal with an infinitely creative flow of passengers capable of repurposing rail space in a 
multitude of unanticipated ways. While much of the direction aimed at passengers is 
quite pragmatic, there are clear efforts to establish a sense of proper comportment among 
passengers as well. On station exterior and in waiting halls, and especially in HSR 
carriages, posters and videos exhort passengers to comport themselves mindfully, 
attentive to the needs of the rail system and the needs of their fellow passengers. Videos 
in HSR carriages exhort passengers to minimize their impact on others: do not bring 
smelly food on the train, do not throw garbage on the floor, do not have loud 
conversations or snore. The comportment of rail personnel is also a target: station 
personnel are exhorted to “take service as your mission; treat passengers as family.” 
These practices are represented as being more “civilized” (文明 wenming), part and 
parcel of larger efforts of the Chinese state to shape the social qualities of its populace 
(see Figure 4.16).§§§  
                                               
§§§ For a longer discussion of Chinese discourses around civilized-ness and social quality (suzhi), 
see Chapter VII. 
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Figure 4.16. In an HSR carriage between Lanzhou and Urumqi, educational videos 
demonstrate “civilized” and improper ways to eat, speak, and behave. 
 
Signs and barriers discursively and materially shape flows of passengers through 
rail space, not as distinct processes but as two sorts of material-discursive things: the 
brutely physical communicates meaning, and the semiotic betrays a stubborn materiality. 
The signs that proliferate in rail space do not float unanchored—they are made manifest 
in rail space through particular material technologies: a map, a screen, a signpost, a 
speaker. These materials situate the signs in rail space, both enabling them to 
communicate meaning to passengers, and also subjecting them to hindrances of sight 
lines, ambient noise, wear, and incomprehension. They are peculiar example of Haraway 
(1988)’s “situated knowledge,” a view from somewhere, via certain prostheses, for a 
certain set of eyes. These signs rely on a particular kind of passenger to be effective—one 
who is fluent, not only in the Chinese (or, to a certain extent, English) language but in 
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Chinese culture, and in the unique milieu of rail space. Conversely, barriers are not 
generally experienced through physical collision but are also interpreted—their 
materiality is also read. The signage of Chinese rail space does not just produce a 
particular spatial assemblage, but a particular human assemblage as well.  
3.7. Station Interiors 
A handful of basic station layouts describe the vast majority of railway stations. 
Some variation is due to the nature of the station’s position in the network: major stations 
serving multiple lines have different design constraints than stations serving only a single 
route. More significant variation is found between older stations built around multiple 
separate waiting rooms and newer stations built around a single, shared waiting room 
with multiple gates to the platforms above or below. Guangzhou Station is an example of 
the older design. Fronted by a large plaza connecting to the surrounding streets, internally 
it is organized into a number of separate waiting rooms serving particular trains. As each 
train becomes ready for boarding, those passengers gather their luggage and follow what 
can be a rather long and winding path, descending and ascending in order to reach their 
boarding platform. The signage on these platforms is sometimes lacking: passengers 
follow each other and the directions of strategically placed station personnel more than 
signs. Commercial space is limited: convenience stores sell instant noodles, hot water 
bottles and travel-friendly snacks, and a few restaurants offer hot food. Beijing Station, 
the grandest of the old stations, has a Starbucks.  
New stations, like Guangzhou South Station are not just bigger and newer: they 
offer a wholly different experience. Well integrated into highways and subways, they are 
often difficult or impossible to get to by foot, surrounded by ongoing construction and 
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car-only roadways. Stations built above the lines typically have an upper level which 
consists of a single large waiting hall with a row of boarding gates connecting to the 
middle, boarding level, with stairs descending down to a wholly separate exit hall below. 
This enables a clean, unidirectional flow of passengers: arrivals exit the train and move 
downwards, while a flow of departing passengers descend from above to board. The 
single waiting area allows passengers to circulate freely among the storefronts located 
within the waiting area, making every waiting room into a sort of mall. Kiosks on the 
waiting room floor are filled with high-end luxury boutiques and expensive brand-name 
franchises like Starbucks and KFC (see Figure 4.17). In more established stations like 
Shanghai’s Hongqiao Station, the waiting hall is full of restaurants, cafes, convenience 
stores and boutiques. In just-opened or more peripheral stations, many or even the bulk of 
the commercial spaces are vacant (see Figure 4.18).  
Most stations serve either conventional trains or HSR: particularly in larger cities, 
a new station was built from scratch to serve HSR routes. HSR track is routed according 
to different constraints of straightness and incline; the distance can to some extent be 
explained by technical reasons. These new HSR stations tend to be distant from the city 
center, but also tend to be much better integrated to the city subway. However, even 
when the same station serves both, such as Beijing West Station or Tianjin Station, the 
station interior is configured in such a way as to separate passengers traveling by HSR 
from those traveling by conventional trains. 
Despite their size, central stations are more crowded than those serving single 
lines. Large stations are chaotic and loud, and serve a constant flow of arrivals and 
departures. In these stations, a keen eye for crowd dynamics is as effective a method for 
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Figure 4.17. The waiting hall in Shanghai's Hongqiao Station is fully equipped with 
Starbucks, McDonald's, KFC, and Real Kungfu noodles. 
 
navigation as reading signage, and procedures for buying tickets, moving through 
security and boarding are well-established and efficiently conducted. Smaller stations 
served by only a few trains an hour, or day, have slower, more variable rhythms. Rather 
than a constant bustle, activity peaks and wanes dramatically as trains come and go. 
Procedures vary a great deal more, and are much more ad-hoc. The ticket office might 
consist of a lone ticket window, served by a single agent. Rather than separate boarding 
gates or multiple waiting rooms, the single waiting room has a single ticket gate. Stations 
serving only conventional rail occasionally lack automated ticket scanning gates 
altogether, relying on station agents to check tickets of boarding passengers (see Figure 
4.19). 
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Figure 4.18. The second floor shopping promenade in Guiyang North Station is 
completely vacant; passengers are afforded only a generic convenience store. 
 
 
Figure 4.19. The waiting room at Zhuozhou Station, a mid-line stop between Beijing and 
Baoding. Boarding is conducted without digital assistance: printed placards indicate the 
next train, and tickets are checked by hand. 
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3.8. Bourgeois Stations and Red Stations 
Along with directions for passengers about where to go and how to behave, the 
discursive environment of rail space is also saturated with two other sorts of texts: 
advertisements for commerical products and services, and state propaganda. Host to a 
captive audience of waiting passengers, rail space is a target-rich environment for the 
same advertising pervasive in every other public space in China. In new stations built to 
serve HSR, ads for water purifiers, amusement parks, automobiles plaster walls and 
pillars, and play on loops on digital displays showing gate assignments. Moreover, in 
station after station, it is the same ads: in Chengdu, Guangzhou, Beijing, and Wuhan, 
celebrities like Angelababy advertise home water purification systems and sleek modern 
home furnishings. Ads for the companies that sell advertising for the national HSR 
network are also all over, promoting their ability to cover the entire nation with a single 
campaign. The particular products featured in advertisements within HSR stations 
interpolate a particular kind of rail passenger: a wealthy, cosmopolitan consumer with the 
means to purchase a home and the means and taste to decorate it in an upscale, modern 
fashion. The ads within older stations serving conventional trains interpolate an 
altogether different ridership. There are fewer advertisements, and those that are present 
advertise Alipay, fancy liquor, job hunting websites, and over-the-counter medicines. 
Some furniture advertisements as well, but without the top-tier celebrity endorsements. 
These advertisements target a consumer both more modest in means, and less desirable to 
the seller. 
Alongside commercial advertisements is state propaganda: posters boldly 
proclaiming the 16 Core Socialist Values and Xi Jinping’s ineffable China Dream. Often 
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literally wallpapering passageways, these nation-wide propaganda campaigns and their 
more localized variants blend into the strident discursive environment of rail space. The 
distinctions between directions, advertisements and propaganda is not always clear: ads 
for the Eight Route Army Cultural Tour bridges commercial and political; Lei Feng Spirit 
help desks blur the line between navigating rail space and CCP propaganda; and 
advertisements for rail travel within rail space remind the passenger that China Railway 
is also a commercial enterprise. Nonetheless, different stations combine these three 
themes in different amounts: Xinzhou Station and Taiyuan Station in Shanxi province are 
extremely “red” in comparison to the rather bourgeois atmosphere in Shanghai Hongqiao 
and Guangzhou South. 
The signage of some stations relates to discourses with more regional valences. 
The façade of Guilin North Station has, alongside Chinese characters and English letters, 
its name written in Zhuang, a rare reminder that Guangxi is one of China’s minority 
nationality autonomous regions. In the Pearl River Delta, the name of Guangzhou Station 
in flanked by eight characters lit with neon: “Unify the motherland, revitalize the Chinese 
nation” (统一祖国，振兴中华 tongyi zuguo, zhenxing Zhonghua). Replacing a slogan 
praising Mao Zedong Thought and the Chinese Communist Party, the sign appeared in 
1986. During reform and opening, Guangzhou Station became the first stop for 
entrepreneurs traveling from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan into the mainland: the sign 
welcomes them back, situating these “overseas Chinese” as exiles re-united with their 
ancestral home (Southern Metropolitan 2014).  
Between signage, advertising and propaganda, rail space can be discursively 
overwhelming, with myriad texts and symbols competing for attention. Parsing this 
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complex landscape demands passengers develop what anthropologist Cristina Grasseni 
(2007) terms “skilled vision”, to develop an eye for picking out the right sign amid a 
torrent of information. In rail space, much of the skill is filtering: shutting out the 
imperatives to do this and buy that in order to create space for what the passenger needs 
from rail space rather than the other way around. One measure of this: during my early 
fieldwork, I was struck by a particular slogan that appeared on billboards and banners 
throughout the rail system, most notably on the LCD display in HSR carriages that 
displayed also the train’s speed and the next stop. The slogan reads “safe and top quality, 
build rail and strengthen the nation” (安全优质，兴路强国 anquan youzhi, xinglu 
qiangguo), capturing very succinctly the entanglement of rail and nation that my research 
seeks to investigate. Despite its ubiquity, however, when I asked passengers about it no 
one could recall having seen it. The same was true for the educational videos about how 
to behave within and how to navigate rail space which interested me: to knowledgeable 
rail passengers, these texts were entirely filtered out of conscious awareness. 
3.9. From Platform to Carriage 
Boarding the train is the moment of greatest physical danger in the rail journey, 
where the passenger-oriented spaces of station and carriage rub up against the industrial 
infrastructure necessary to fling tons of metal and flesh across the landscape at hundreds 
of kilometers per hour. Boarding procedure differ between conventional and HSR trains. 
On conventional trains, a team of station and train personnel work together to coordinate 
the boarding process. From the station waiting room, agents indicate or bodily lead the 
sometimes rather labyrinthine way to the correct boarding platform. At the platform, a 
steward stands at every door, checking tickets to ensure passengers are boarding the right 
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carriage and assisting passengers onto the train. At smaller stations without raised 
platforms, stewards set out a narrow set of stairs for passengers to climb, which can 
challenge the dexterity of older or heavily encumbered passengers. On the platforms of 
larger stations, a boarding ramp bridges the gap between station and train, physically 
assembling a smooth, joined surface (see Figure 4.20). After boarding, stewards manually 
disengage the train from the station platform: remove the ramp, fold up the stairs and 
close the door before departure.  
 
Figure 4.20. At a stop on the train between Nanchang and Liling, heavily-loaded 
passengers board across a small ramp as a steward checks their tickets. 
 
HSR trains automate and simplify the process of boarding as much as possible. 
Adhering to tight time tables, HSR trains arrive and depart in a tightly choreographed 
procedure. The narrower temporal tolerances, however, also demand a novel degree of 
coordination and cooperation from passengers. Passengers file onto platforms before the 
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train arrives, queueing up where the door to their carriage has not yet materialized: they 
locate the proper location through small colored plaques set into the platform (Figure 
4.21). A handful of station agents look on, but passengers largely sort themselves into the 
correct queue. When the train arrives, automatic doors slide open and exiting passengers 
and smokers file out and boarding passengers file in. The gap between the train and the 
platform is only a few centimeters, so there is no need for a ramp. At terminuses the lines 
into the train can become snarled as passengers push past each other to locate their seat 
and a place to stow their luggage; stewards stand by at some doors to direct passengers 
unsure which direction to go to find their carriage. After a short stop, sometimes as little 
as one minute, the doors beep in warning. The train conductor stands at the head of the 
train and looks down its length, checking that all the doors are clear. She blows a whistle 
and boards; the doors shut behind her and the train is off once more. HSR boarding 
procedures use tighter tolerances and automation to lessen their dependence on the active 
role of personnel; but equally essential to HSR’s smooth and timely function is an 
increased dependence on the active work of passengers to arrange themselves efficiently 
and quickly proceed to their proper place. 
4. Carrying On 
Once onboard the train, without the focus necessary for navigation, the travel 
experience is stripped down to its most basic core: how to meet one’s essential human 
needs while dwelling within rail space. 
 
156 
 
Figure 4.21. The colored plaques embedded in platforms serving HSR trains facilitate 
boarding by showing passengers where the doors to the train will be located once it 
arrives. When the train misses its mark, passengers and personnel have to scramble. 
 
4.1. The Practices and Symbolism of Hot Water 
Hydration, along with food and shelter, is a human need met in rail space by a 
combination of infrastructural provision, passenger self-reliance, and self-denial. Hot 
water taps are one of the most pervasive and distinctively Chinese affordances of Chinese 
rail space. Omnipresent in carriages and station waiting rooms, electric water heaters 
come in a variety of sizes and configurations, but all deliver boiling hot water freely to 
passengers, subtending a multitude of traveling practices and class discourses. Drinking 
hot water is a practice with a surprisingly enduring role within China’s modern state 
formation: the push to universalize drinking boiled water began in 1934, with Chiang 
Kai-shek’s New Life Movement, a massive campaign by the Republic of China to forge a 
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new kind of citizen. At the center of the movement was a set of rules laying out the 
parameters of civilized and modern life, covering everything from being patriotic to 
queuing at train stations; and of course only drinking boiled water (Fukamachi 2010). 
While long a part of Chinese health practices, the cost of heating put boiling drinking 
water beyond the means of most people (Rogaski 2004). Exhortations aside, the New 
Life Movement did little to change that reality. The Patriotic Health Campaign in the 
1950s, however, aimed to radically reshape hygiene at the societal scale, providing hot 
water door to door in some cities.**** 
In order to access this resource, however passengers have to come prepared with 
the right tools. Soft sleeper carriages, described later in this section, provide an insulated 
water pot in each compartment, but elsewhere in rail space those wishing to fetch water 
for drinking must provide their own thermos. Insulated water thermoses are a common 
sight in rail space, and elsewhere in China. Sometimes filled with tea leaves or other 
herbal infusions, but often with just hot water, thermoses have become a powerful social 
signifier. Among my interviewees, drinking hot water was seen as traditionally Chinese: 
a point of stubborn pride for aficionados, and a weird relic by its detractors. In 2017, a 
photo posted on Weibo become the center of an internet sensation: it showed the 
drummer of seminal 90s Chinese rock band Black Panther sitting backstage holding a 
thermos. The thermos became symbolic of China’s “middle age crisis,” a harbinger of 
China’s rapidly aging population (Sina News 2017). Chinese netizens debated whether 
this made Black Panther uncool, or if it made thermoses cool. At Black Panther concerts, 
                                               
**** For a detailed discussion of the history of drinking hot water and state-making in China, see 
Chapter VI. 
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fans began to hold up thermoses overhead, in place of lighters. On the other side of the 
generational divide, the continued ubiquity of hot water taps in rail space is not matched 
by ubiquitous use. Younger, more urbane travelers who don’t trust the quality or dislike 
the taste of the freely provided hot water—or find carrying a thermos insufficiently 
cool—turn increasingly to bottled water. Rail space has begun to adapt: in 2015, 
Shanghai Hongqiao station installed a drinking fountain in its waiting room that provides 
both room temperature and boiling water (Aquacup 2015). The fountains I encountered in 
Shanghai and in Wuhan remain, however, an oddity within rail space. 
Omnipresent hot water taps also make possible the still popular practice of 
bringing dry instant noodles along on rail journeys. Quotidian and ubiquitous, instant 
noodles play a surprisingly fluid role in the global food system (Errington, Gewertz, and 
Fujikura 2013). In China, the world’s leading consumer of instant noodles (“Instant 
Noodles at a Glance” n.d.), they have a particular association with the rail journey. 
Because hot water is always available, passengers can make themselves a hot meal at any 
time during their journey for only a few yuan. More recently, the combination of health 
concerns and rising income has put a dent in instant noodle consumption. For many 
Chinese consumers, instant noodles are reminiscent of the hardship and struggle of the 
eighties and nineties, a time they are happy to leave behind. From a peak of 46 billion 
servings in 2013, Chinese instant noodle consumption fell below 40 billion in 2016 and 
2017. In 2018 and 2019, however, consumption rose again: according to the China Daily, 
this reflects the invention of higher-end noodles attracting more discriminating 
consumers (Zhao A. 2019). Others, however, argue that the uptick portends an economic 
downturn (Leng 2019). In rail space, instant noodles are a particularly fraught topic: 
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given their strong association with traditional practices of rail travel, they are perceived 
by some as not quite “civilized” enough for modern high-speed rail. The issue leapt to the 
forefront of public opinion with the “Noodle Auntie” (泡面姐 paomianjie) incident. In 
2018, a video of a woman ferociously berating a man for eating instant noodles on an 
HSR train went viral. While the stewardess quietly advised the man to stop, netizens leapt 
to his defense, ultimately forcing the woman to issue a public apology (Sohu News 2018). 
These days both conventional and HSR long-haul trains offer meal services and snack 
carts, but as fewer passengers travel day-long itineraries, more passengers simply opt out 
entirely, foregoing food on the train altogether.  
Hot water taps illustrate the difficulty of drawing clear boundaries between rail 
infrastructure and rail passengers. A passenger must carry an insulated drinking container 
to get water within rail space, by the same token a passenger can also set off from Beijing 
to Guangzhou with a plastic bag full of instant noodles, confident that she will be able to 
get hot water at any point on that journey. Passengers, things and rail space depend upon 
each other to function, forming a human and non-human sociotechnical assemblage—
although not one without internal tensions. While hot water taps fix a certain set of 
practices in relation to the affordances of Chinese rail infrastructure, it does not fix their 
social meaning; passengers navigate these competing discourses as they navigate rail 
space. 
4.2. Smartphones 
If hot water taps and instant noodles are remnants of an older rail assemblage 
lingering on, the smartphone is a harbinger of the future of rail travel. The smartphone 
has become a central object knitting together the human and technical elements of the rail 
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assemblage. This role builds on the pivotal role of smartphones at the intersection of e-
commerce and state biopolitics outside of rail space, offering a case study to explore the 
emerging contours of China’s state-commercial smartphone-assemblage. Moreover, the 
integration of smartphones into rail practice shows how passengers can drive 
development from the bottom up. As discussed in the previous section, smartphones have 
become the typical platform for ticket sales among the young, the wealthy, the urban and 
legible. Yet that role is dwarfed by their role as all-purpose navigation, communication 
and entertainment device at every step of the rail journey. Passengers can do all this 
without leaving a single app: WeChat. 
Since its launch in 2011, WeChat has rapidly spread and evolved to become a 
nearly inescapable element of everyday life in China. Initially designed by Tencent, one 
of China’s tech giants, as a messaging app, WeChat has achieved status as fundamental 
social and economic infrastructure by leveraging network effects: once in place as a 
social platform, it rolled out a digital wallet service, WePay (微信支付 weixinzhifu), that 
quickly become ubiquitous for businesses ranging from telecoms to noodle carts. While 
not the only digital wallet service in China, WePay is the largest. WePay is so ubiquitous 
it has become part of China’s financial infrastructure, “a de facto payment standard in 
China; that is, a ‘set of agreed-upon rules’ that links multiple communities of practice 
across space and time” (Plantin and de Seta 2019, 9; quoting Bowker and Star 1999, 13–
14). WeChat’s launch of “small apps” (微信小程序 Weixin xiao chengxu), essentially 
apps-within-an-app running on WeChat’s proprietary API, further cemented WeChat’s 
infrastructural centrality to nearly every aspect of daily life: one can chat with friends, 
post photos, order food, read the news, summon a taxi, find an apartment, and pay bills, 
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all without exiting the WeChat app. Plantin and de Seta (2019) further argue that 
WeChat’s infrastructural character is deeply entangled with the techno-nationalist project 
of the Chinese state, both benefitting from a market closed to international competition 
and from a foundation of ICT infrastructure developed by the state. As of late 2017, it can 
even be used to buy train tickets: 12306, China Railway online booking service, finally 
released a WeChat small app accepting payment via WePay (Xinhua Net 2017b). 
Not limited to the digital realm, WeChat leaves its mark on the material 
environment of rail space, in the form of erweima (二维码), or QR codes. QR codes offer 
an illuminating example of how arbitrary decisions can snowball into distinct cultural 
spheres. Invented in the nineties in Japan, in China QR codes have become part of the 
texture of everyday life (Ouyang 2018). WeChat users can use their smartphone cameras 
to scan these two-dimensional barcodes to connect to other users or download apps rather 
than enter that information via hand. More crucially, QR codes enable customers to 
quickly and conveniently connect merchants’ WePay accounts at the point of sale: QR 
codes allow digital payments to permeate everyday life, rather than remain limited to the 
virtual world. Beyond their use in storefronts, in rail space QR codes incorporated into 
station maps, official notices and advertisements, turning these static inscriptions into 
gateways connecting passengers to virtual helpdesks, support lines and webpages. The 
QR code on rail tickets pulls up the 12306.cn WeChat app, displaying up-to-date arrival 
and departure details.  
WeChat’s greatest role within rail space, however, hearkens back to its first 
purpose: as a medium of communication. WeChat enables passengers to employ the 
“empty time” of rail travel to connect socially—though with their digitally proximate 
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friends and family rather than with their physically proximate seatmates. On board trains, 
it was a common sight to see passengers with their heads bent over their phones, texting 
in WeChat’s distinctive texting interface. A smaller number use WeChat’s asynchronous 
voice chat feature to communicate: to hear the message in loud spaces, listeners have to 
hold the speaker directly to their ear, a distinctive posture. Some daring individuals even 
use WeChat voice chat in the quiet of the carriage, though that is a behavior that is 
discouraged.  
Despite WeChat’s moves towards becoming a nearly self-contained mobile 
operating system, it is not the only app available. E-commerce apps like TMall, formerly 
Taobao, or Jingdong are another attractive way to pass time, and streaming video apps 
like Youku are another popular option. This broad array of smartphone applications allow 
passengers to self-entertain rather than depend upon other passengers to pass the time. 
Yet that self-sufficiency only lasts as long as their phone’s battery life, and WeChat is an 
app that is notoriously hard on battery life. While electrical sockets or charging stations 
are sometimes available, they are far from common enough that passengers can depend 
on finding one. Instead, passengers who want to ensure uninterrupted electricity must 
supply their own, in the form of the external battery. 
External batteries are popular in China in many contexts, but they are particularly 
important while traveling by rail. These batteries, roughly the same size and shape as a 
smartphone, extend the life span of smartphones to accommodate the temporality of rail 
travel. At the same time, the infrastructure of rail space is evolving to accommodate a 
smartphone-dependent passenger base. Most HSR carriages are equipped with publically 
available outlets, allowing people to charge their smartphones—though it is not yet 
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universal. Newer carriages have an outlet in every row, though older HSR carriages may 
have only a single outlet near the toilets. In conventional carriages, availability of outlets 
is even less reliable: while sleepers are generally equipped with a handful of outlets in the 
hallways, hard seats and soft seats quite often provide no access to electricity. This 
differential of access exacerbates the differing socialities of HSR and conventional 
carriages: HSR passengers can anticipate spending their brief journey ensconced in a 
bubble of smartphone-mediated entertainment. Forced to spend longer journeys with less 
access to electricity, passengers on conventional carriages must rely on older practices to 
pass the time on board. 
In allowing passengers to re-inscribe existing social connections rather than form 
new ones, WeChat—and the larger smartphone assemblage—constructs rail space as a 
national space in way that is very distinct from the way that pre-smartphone rail practices 
did. WeChat’s ecosystem of services is to a large extent nationally circumscribed, and 
WeChat’s users are overwhelmingly China-based: in community and practice, WeChat 
delineates a Chinese assemblage. Yet where onboard social connections were largely 
happenstance and egalitarian, WeChat allows for a production of community at the scale 
of nation that is structured and hierarchical.  
4.3. Carriage Atmospheres 
The character of Chinese rail carriages has evolved a great deal in past decades, 
both in terms of comfort and in terms of sociality. A travel experience once characterized 
by extremes of hot and cold, the press of restless bodies has gradually transformed by the 
addition of new technologies like fans, air conditioners, padding, electrical sockets and 
wifi, as well as by new, stricter expectations for passenger and personnel behavior. 
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Passengers need to tolerate less, and their own tolerances are not put to the test. Prior to 
the advent of HSR, differences between conventional carriages loomed much larger: hard 
and soft seats, and even the occasional luxury sleeper, covered a greater range of comfort 
and style. While distinctions remain between conventional carriages, they are dwarfed by 
the distinctions between conventional and HSR carriages. Conventional carriages are 
divided into seats and sleepers, hard and soft. Hard seats used to be hard: bare wood, 
without padding. Nowadays, the benches are now padded, only slightly less so than soft 
seats. The superior comfort offered by soft seats is now more a matter of spaciousness 
than softness: these carriages pack four seats per row rather than five, and more 
importantly are the last seats to be bought, offering a better chance of a bench to oneself 
instead of a potentially noisome neighbor. Since the introduction of HSR, soft seat 
carriages have become less common: for anyone willing to pay more than the bare 
minimal cost of a hard seat, HSR is a vastly superior option. 
Hard sleepers are the preferred choice for overnight, or even long distance travel. 
With six bunks to a compartment, and a compartment open to the hallway, they offer 
considerably less privacy than the four-bunk, closed-door soft sleepers. That privacy isn’t 
always desirable, however: some women reported that the enclosed space of the soft 
sleepers felt less safe than the relatively public hard sleepers. Whether hard or soft, on 
conventional carriages traveling practices operate on the assumption that a certain 
amount of invasion of space and intrusive sounds and smells are inevitable and that the 
onus is on the other passengers to tolerate it, especially on long hauls (see Figure 4.22). 
Passengers prepare food: not just instant noodles and hard-boiled eggs, but groups or 
families prepare more elaborate meals in cookware brought along for the journey. The 
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arrangement of seating on conventional trains encourages socialization: rows of seats 
face each other across a small table, and on sleepers passengers share the bottom bunks to 
talk, eat and play cards. Groups of passengers sit facing each other and spend the journey 
slowing eating a bag of oranges or sunflower seeds while they pass the time with 
conversation. At some stops, vendors sell snacks or hot meals from carts on the station 
platform; conventional trains stop for long enough to make it possible to get off and make 
purchases. The smell of cigarette smoke wafts through the compartment: while smoking 
isn’t allowed in the carriage proper, it is permitted in the spaces between compartments. 
As the journey progresses, odors less pleasant still waft down the carriage from the 
toilets. 
 
Figure 4.22. A hard seat compartment on the Urumqi-Chengdu train, just outside 
Chengdu. Note the metal hot water thermos in lower left. 
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Through distinct design and personnel comportment, HSR carriages mark a 
dramatic break from the norms of conventional carriages, constituting HSR as a distinct 
social space. HSR carriages impose different expectations about what is considered 
proper bodily comportment. While HSR carriages are broken into second-class, first-class 
and business, these heightened expectations apply within all. Not only is there less 
tolerance for behaviors that negatively impact other travelers, there is a constant 
onslaught of instruction within HSR carriages about what constitutes improper conduct. 
The arrangement of seating on HSR trains is distinct from conventional rail: arranged in 
rows all facing the same direction, making conversation with anyone other than the 
passenger in the next seat over inconvenient (see Figure 4.23). This spatial difference is 
reinforced by signage and advertisements discouraging noise. Even official 
pronouncements however marshal not the disciplinary coercion of law but the quiet 
pressure of social expectation: smoking, having loud phone conversations and other 
misbehavior is depicted as drawing the ire of fellow passengers, not of rail personnel. 
Instead of entertaining each other, on HSR passengers use smartphones to surf the 
internet, watch movies, read news or fiction, watch basketball games, message friends or 
shop. The occasional loud WeChat voice conversation, or action movie blasting at full 
volume, is the exception rather than the rule. Watts (2008) describes the practices of UK 
passengers in terms of a reconfiguration from “packed” to “unpacked” states, spreading 
out laptops and newspapers as they settle in for the ride. Chinese passengers are much 
more self-contained, rarely unpacking more than a phone and a water bottle onto their 
tray table. 
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Figure 4.23. A second class compartment on the Wuhan-Guangzhou line. HSR trains are 
distinguished by a different standard of comfort and service. 
 
The contrast between expectations of passenger behavior on convention and HSR 
carriages was brought home to me on a journey on conventional rail in Sichuan. I had 
taken a high-speed train out of Chengdu to Jiangyou, a nearby city. Sichuan stands out on 
the national-scale map of Chinese HSR: it is a small tangle of unusually short lines 
connected to the rest of the network through a single line to Chongqing. After the 
devastating 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, infrastructure such as the railway line to 
Jiangyou was a major form of economic stimulus and symbolic of the state’s 
commitment to rebuild the province (W. Wang 2008). I rode the HSR out to the end of 
the line, and bought a ticket on an old-style passenger train for the trip back. As the train 
pulled up to the platform, I was surprised to see the route: Urumqi to Chengdu. The first 
thing I noticed entering the carriage was piles of huge bags; I soon learned that the train 
168 
was in the last hours of its nearly two-day-long trip, full of migrant laborers returning 
home before the New Year. My seatmates were eager for conversation and regaled me 
with the trials of their journey: one middle-aged woman, one of the few women in the 
carriage, was particularly eager to chat. We talked until the train stopped at the next 
station, Mianyang. There, a good fraction of the migrant workers got up, threw enormous 
bags over their backs and disembarked.  
The passengers who boarded were strikingly different: in the place of heavily-
laden long-haul migrants were well-dressed urbanites carrying a handbag or daypack 
hopping onto the last train of the night back to Chengdu. An elegant middle-aged woman 
and a young man traveling together sat in newly emptied seats across the aisle. The chatty 
woman, directly facing the pair, greeted them much as she had greeted me. The two new 
passengers ignored her entirely. They very nearly ignored each other: the young man had 
his headphones in, and the older woman simply kept her gaze locked to the screen of her 
smartphone. After a few abortive attempts, the chatty woman gave up, and we sat in 
silence for the remaining half-hour of our journey. 
This encounter crystallized for me a disjuncture between Chinese passengers I 
had been seeing throughout the rail system, highlighting the divergent traveling practices 
and expectations among passengers of different backgrounds. It is not simply that the 
women dressed differently, spoke with different accents or even that they belonged to 
different socio-economic classes; these women each brought different expectations and a 
different suite of traveling skills into the carriage. One was in the midst of an epic multi-
day journey at the end of a year away from home; the other was on a short day trip, never 
out of cellular data coverage. These skills exist in a specific environmental and social 
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context, which despite their spatial proximity were dramatically different for each 
traveler. Seeing these two incompatible practices juxtaposed brought home two 
realizations: the first was how interdependent the practices of rail travel are, even 
practices of self-containment. The second was how effectively the Chinese rail system 
has been organized to minimize contact between passengers with incompatible crafts of 
rail travel. 
The narrowed tolerances for passenger behavior are echoed in narrowed 
tolerances for mess and stink. Smoking is strictly forbidden on HSR carriages. At every 
stop, smokers pile off the train and immediately light a cigarette. When the conductor or 
a loudspeaker announces imminent departure, the smokers stomp out their cigarettes and 
reboard right before the doors slide shut. The question of hygiene loomed large in 
passenger’s accounts of how the rail system has changed over time, and in the distinction 
between HSR and conventional services. It was one of the first distinctions remarked 
upon for many of my respondents, before even increased speed or convenience. When 
describing the experience of rail travel in the eighties and nineties, passengers returned 
again and again to how trash would pile up in cars, left to personnel to deal with. Toilets 
were another source of discomfort to be endured. Many passengers spoke about how they 
planned ahead, deliberately drinking less water to avoid having to use the bathroom on 
long train journeys. On both HSR and conventional trains, standards of cleanliness have 
risen in recent decades, though here as well HSR has set itself apart. 
A dedicated cleaning crew—typically older women with the sun-darkened skin of 
rural migrants—maintains cleanliness, cleaning toilets every half hour and promptly 
disposing of garbage. Cleaners or attendants pass through HSR carriages regularly to 
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collect trash from passengers and mop the floors: piles of brightly colored trash bags 
gather in the aisles before certain stops as cleaning personnel prepare to unload. Cleaning 
on conventional routes is left to the stewards rather than delegated to cleaners, but 
follows a similar pattern. Conventional hard seat and sleeper carriages are equipped with 
small metal trays for trash.  
Toilets on HSR carriages are a substantial upgrade from those on conventional 
carriages, which are sometimes as basic as a hole through which the track is visible 
below; in contrast HSR carriages offer both sitting and squatting toilets with flushing 
water. Each toilet has an inspection check sheet hanging from a peg on the wall: cleaning 
personnel must check off that they cleaned, and then stewards and conductors use the 
same sheet to check off that they inspected the toilet to ensure that it is clean and de-
odorized. 
The drab, functional attire of the cleaning crew is a marked contrast to the 
elaborate uniform of HSR stewards. Another marker of the dramatic break with the 
traditions of conventional rail is signaled via the clothing and training of HSR personnel 
(see Figure 4.24). As argued by Otis (2011), marketization of the Chinese economy has 
led to the formation of a new class of feminized service work, with standards for proper 
bodily comportment quite at odds with the “gender erasure” of the Mao era. This 
disjuncture is made material in the uniforms and comportment of respectively, HSR and 
conventional rail personnel. Where conventional rail personnel, men and women alike, all 
wear coats and pants of a military cut, and share responsibilities for conducting, cleaning 
and sales, the personnel on HSR trains are separated into stewards, service workers, and 
cleaners with different duties on board. HSR personnel, in contrast, are nearly all women, 
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and their uniforms are hyper-feminine. The attire of male HSR stewards is an 
afterthought: they wear uniforms akin to those of conductors on conventional carriages. 
Clothing is the outward marker of a new standard for behavior and service: the brusque 
manner and militaristic comportment for which conductors have long been known is 
replaced among HSR staff by an approach oriented towards producing a qualitatively 
more comfortable traveling experience. 
 
Figure 4.24. The bright pink uniforms of Chengdu Railway Bureau's HSR stewardesses 
are particularly vivid examples of the feminization of HSR service.  
 
5. Finishing Off 
Excepting the case of overnight sleepers mentioned above, passengers are 
responsible for keeping track of when they arrive at their destination. Gathering one’s 
things, disposing of trash and exiting into what might be a place one has never been 
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before makes one suddenly aware the travel fatigue which has been building quietly as 
the kilometers ticked by. Fortunately, no matter what station passengers arrive in, it 
follows the same patterns, with the same standards and the same flows as every other 
station. When I asked my respondents whether they had ever felt lost or disoriented in a 
rail station, many reported the idea was ridiculous “because every rail station tells you: 
automated ticket pickup, automated ticket purchasing, ticket office with human agents, 
entrances, exits, taxi stands, bus stops—even the subway location, they all have clear 
directions.” The rail system does not stand apart from other forms of transportation but is 
deeply woven into roadways and metropolitan mass transit. Taxis, both liveried services 
waiting in queues and “black cabs” operated without formal oversight are readily 
available. Many rail stations stand next to long distance bus terminals, providing service 
to those cities and villages without a rail station of their own. The integration of rail 
stations into multi-modal networks becomes crucial to its function as the system 
increasingly relies on large hubs rather than local stations: Qin (2017) estimates that the 
total number of passenger stations dropped by more than half between 1996 and 2008.  
 “Movement,” Ingold writes, “always overshoots its destinations” (2011, 53). 
There is always an excess, a left-over that remains unresolved. This chapter has 
employed Ingold’s four stages of the journey to show how each stage relates to a 
particular assemblage of spaces and objects that, along with the passenger, constitute rail 
space. I have shown how these things relate bodies into environments, as the wheels of 
the luggage relate passengers’ hands to the smoothness of floors. I have traced how 
traveling things like smartphones reappear at multiple stages in different roles, stitching 
the journey together across time. This account shows how a multitude of disparate things 
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collectively assemble an environment that is, while far from homogenous, nonetheless 
sufficiently self-similar to allow passengers to figure out its complexities, acquire bodily 
habits and even skills in how to navigate and dwell within rail space.  
Here I would like to draw out a fifth stage that is implicit within Ingold’s account 
of skilled practice: the phase after finishing off, but before getting ready once again, 
when the skills actively practiced in the journey are dormant, but not forgotten. “Every 
ending, however, is potentially a new beginning, marking not a terminus but a pause for 
rest in an otherwise continuous journey” (Ingold 2011, 59). What remains to the not-now-
a-passenger when their journey is completed? Ingold’s description of sawing a plank ends 
with cleaning up, tidying the workshop, putting away tools. Yet this space, along with the 
tools within it, remain. Moreover, even away from the saw, the practices of carpentry are 
remembered in the body of the practitioner: one remains a carpenter even without a saw 
ready at hand. It is in this fallow moment that a skill, once acquired, becomes not just a 
skill but also perhaps an identity. As the scholarship of skill has shown, the process of 
learning a skill is often also the process of assuming an identity: becoming a beekeeper 
(Adams 2018), an angler (Eden and Bear 2011), or a taxidermist (Patchett 2016). 
In the case of rail travel, the identity is harder to discern. In a society where nearly 
everyone travels by rail and only a few keep bees, rail travel is less markedly a skill than 
beekeeping: there are no formal certifications for rail travelers, no special organizations. 
Yet as I have shown, despite its ubiquity and invisibility, rail travel is no less a skillful 
weaving together of self, tool, and environment than keeping bees. Where, then does the 
identity reside? I argue the skills of rail travel shape senses of belonging at the scale of 
the network itself—the territory linked together by the topology of station and track.  
174 
The passenger’s luggage may be packed away, their thermos set out to dry, their 
ticketing app closed on their phone, but those tools, along with the skills which put them 
to work, are still there. These things are specific and concrete, belonging to the passenger, 
but are also standardized, compatible with the environmental affordances of any station 
and compartment. These things all speak of the possibility of a journey—the 
imaginability of setting off once more. I have presented this chapter in the form of a 
single journey, tracing a single line from origin to destination. Yet to be a rail passenger 
is not to make a single journey, but the capacity to make any number of possible 
journeys, a capacity latent in the things and the skills assembled in the course of any 
specific journey. This potentiality is re-iterated again and again in the very 
standardization of rail infrastructure and in flows of others through rail space. Like 
Anderson’s “mass ceremony” of the daily newspaper (1983), every individual rail 
journey is conducted in constant presence of countless anonymous others on journeys of 
their own. Considered en masse, the journeys of all passengers mark out a space of 
circulation; a perspective adopted by system planners, but one that is also visible to 
passengers themselves, as they experience the flows through rail space.  
Every journey familiarizes the passenger with how it is done, and equips them 
with the tools to do it, and implies the existence of an infinite series of similar journeys. 
Yet the skillset and toolset in question retain a particular spatial and social extent: the 
places which have been constructed according to the standards of rail space, both the 
technological tolerances of gauge and train, but the social tolerances of passenger 
practices. For the unique assemblage of the Chinese rail system, intimately shaped by the 
Chinese state, the extent is quite nearly contiguous with China’s national geo-body. Rail 
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space is home to overt nationalist discourse about the Chinese nation-state, but it is this 
embodied understanding of what China is that connects that discourse to the lived 
experience of rail passengers. Rail infrastructure, along with other infrastructures of 
mobility, turn the conception of a unified Chinese geo-body from a nationalist imaginary 
into a practical reality for hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens. Mobility 
infrastructures, along with infrastructures of media, education and employment turn the 
conception of singular Chinese society from a nationalist imaginary into a naturalized 
part of everyday life.  
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CHAPTER V 
SCALAR IMAGINARIES OF REGION AND NATION  
IN THE PEARL RIVER DELTA’S EXPRESS RAILWAY LINK 
1. Introduction 
In September of 2018, West Kowloon Station, terminus of the Express Railway 
Link (hereafter: XRL), opened to passenger service. Years behind schedule and over 
budget, the completion of the Hong Kong section of the XRL was nonetheless heralded 
as a triumph in Chinese mainland media. The XRL materially realizes China’s vision of a 
country united by rail: the combination of China Railway’s online ticketing system, the 
second-generation Two Way Permit, and the joint-checkpoint in West Kowloon Station 
work together to enable passengers to board a train in Beijing and in a mere nine hours be 
standing in front of Victoria Harbor, admiring the iconic Hong Kong Island skyline. 
While newspapers made much of the XRL’s national linkages, the majority of passengers 
passing through West Kowloon Station have more proximate points of departure: 
Shenzhen, just across the boundary of the mainland; Guangzhou, the capital of 
Guangdong province; or one of the other cities of the Pearl River Delta. It is at the 
regional scale, rather than national, that high-speed rail (HSR) decisively outcompetes air 
travel (Zhou et al. 2014). The Express Railway Link’s Chinese name reflects this regional 
scope: it is called the “Guang Shen Gang HSR” (广深港高铁 Guang Shen Gang 
Gaotie),: “Guang” for Guangzhou, “Shen” for Shenzhen, “Gang” for Hong Kong. 
During the two-decade process of conceiving, planning and building the XRL, it 
has been imagined at two distinct scales. One of these imaginaries involves Hong Kong’s 
Cantonese periphery: narrowly, the Pearl River Delta, or broadly, Guangdong province. 
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The second scalar imaginary is more expansive, situating Hong Kong in relation to the 
nation as a whole. These imaginaries differ not just in their spatial extent but in their 
interpretive context, narrating the line’s meaning in starkly different terms. The regional 
imaginary characterizes the development of high-speed rail and its complementary 
migration infrastructure in terms of their everyday convenience and economic benefit to 
residents of the Pearl River Delta. The national imaginary emphasizes the affective 
significance of project’s spatial integration in terms of a grand nationalist re-awakening 
of the Chinese people. These imaginaries are distinct but not necessarily in conflict, and 
regularly appear together in mainland newspapers and official documents. This duality 
has long allowed the central state, Hong Kong, and Guangdong provincial and municipal 
governments to cooperate on the XRL without a singular consensus about what the 
project means. Within the actual implementation of the XRL project, however, these two 
scalar imaginaries have come into sharper conflict.  
In this article, I argue that since its inception, the XRL has gone from a distinctly 
regional project imagined by regional governments to a project planned and managed by 
the central state as a key component of nation-wide planning. This shift is reflected both 
in the project’s infrastructure and in the scalar imaginaries through which it is narrated. 
Between 1979 and the early 2000s, cross-boundary relations, including both 
transportation and migration control, were primarily managed on the mainland side by 
local states: provincial and even municipal level government. The XRL first was 
imagined as a means of connecting recently-returned Hong Kong and the cities of the 
Pearl River Delta, improving on existing regional infrastructure. In the time since, 
however, ministries of the central state have gradually but inexorably claimed control 
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over cross-boundary flows. The XRL has been re-imagined and re-designed as part of a 
nation-wide network of high-speed passenger-dedicated rail (hereafter: HSR), and control 
over migration between Hong Kong and the mainland has shifted back to central state 
ministries. As a consequence of these shifts, the XRL that opened in 2018 was quite 
different in form and function than as was initially imagined. It is different in discourse as 
well: today the XRL realizes the “Greater Bay Area” as a “one hour life circle” within 
which Chinese citizens and Hong Kong and Macau residents alike are able to flow freely 
in pursuit of prosperity, cultural enrichment, and comfort. The discourse of the Greater 
Bay Area reveals how the transportation and migration infrastructure of the XRL has 
been nationalized even as it remains ostensibly part of a regional imaginary: regional 
flows within the Pearl River Delta now take place within infrastructure standardized at 
the national scale. Yet differences in how national and regional newspapers characterize 
the XRL show lingering disjunctures in their respective scalar imaginaries. 
This article looks at how state media—newspapers and official government 
documents—characterize the development of transportation and migration infrastructure 
to bolster political legitimacy of different scales. The way these articles frame new 
infrastructural innovations, who they benefit and at what scale sheds light on how 
infrastructure projects such as the XRL integrate multiple, competing entities into a 
coherent “state” unified around a “national” interest. The treatment of the XRL in these 
texts demonstrates that it is intended by both regional- and national-scale state actors to 
produce new senses of spatial belonging: passengers on the XRL are to imagine 
themselves within a tight-knit social and economic sphere and to imagine themselves 
within a vast and prosperous China. The proliferation of discourses such as the “Greater 
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Bay Area” demonstrate that the national scale has subsumed regional scales, largely if not 
fully enclosing regional imaginaries within the nation. These sources also show a 
lingering disjuncture in what scale is prioritized and how the concrete specificities of the 
transportation and migration infrastructure are understood to produce imaginaries of 
spatial belonging.  
In using the term scalar imaginary, I mean to invoke both Anderson’s conception 
of an imagined national community, as well as draw on theories of scale politics coming 
out of political geography. Anderson’s “imagined communities” posits nations as social 
constructs which emerge out of a shared literary and material culture (1983). More recent 
scholars of nationalism have pushed this insight further, investigating how national 
identities are constructed through the mundane practices of everyday life (Billig 1995; 
Edensor 2002; Skey and Antonsich 2017). In China, sub-national regional identity has 
intersected with the imagination of community at the national scale in complex ways. 
Sub-national identity, particularly at the provincial scale, played a pivotal role in China’s 
transition from empire to nation-state (Schoppa 1977; Duara 1995; B. Goodman 1995b). 
In contemporary China, both minority nationality identities, which have a strong spatial 
component (Gladney 1991; Zang 2015), as well as regional identities within the diverse 
Han (Honig 1992; Mullaney et al. 2012; Joniak-Lüthi 2015) have regained political 
relevance (Oakes 2000). In the case of Guangdong, historical oppression, linguistic 
distinction and cultural distance combine to situate "Cantonese” as a highly visible sub-
national ethnic community (Carrico 2012; Ferguson 1993). This article builds on these 
insights by examining one process through which regional identity and national identity 
are built.  
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Overlapping scalar imaginaries shape the construction of communal identity and 
belonging at different scales, and figure as potent “representational tropes” (K. T. Jones 
1998, 27) in intra-scalar struggles between different political actors (X. Jiang 2017). 
Scale is never neutral or natural; in struggles over political legitimacy, scale plays a 
starring role. Political geographers have investigated how space is shaped into particular 
scales through scalar narratives which legitimize certain scales discursively, and through 
institutions and infrastructure which realize those scales materially (Smith 1992; Jessop 
2002; Marston, Jones, and Woodward 2005). This literature’s conception of scale as 
malleable and contingent, both an instrument of and a subject of political struggle has 
been a productive framework for political geographers investigating shifting trajectories 
of state spatiality in China (Chien 2013; Chien and Gordon 2008; F. Wu 2002). Political 
geographers have employed scale politics to examine how local states play different 
central ministries against each other and utilize national imaginaries to legitimize local 
control (X. Jiang 2017). Their concern with scalar imaginaries, however, remains limited 
to the sphere of spatial planning among political elites. Scalar imaginaries percolate 
downwards into everyday life too: in the Pearl River Delta, the development of migration 
and transportation infrastructure is a matter of concern for residents in the course of their 
everyday lives and in how they understand their community and identity. 
This article seeks to bring together Anderson’s imagined communities framework 
and the politics of scale to analyze how state media positions the XRL’s transportation 
and migration infrastructure in order to legitimize the state at regional and national scales. 
By transportation infrastructure, I refer to the railways, roads, and bridges which reduce 
the friction of distance between cities and regions. By migration infrastructure I refer to 
181 
the systematically interlinked technologies, institutions, and things through which flows 
of people and things through those railways and roads are regulated (Xiang and Lindquist 
2014; W. Lin et al. 2017). The Pearl River Delta (hereafter: PRD) is a unique site for 
studying the relation between transportation infrastructure such as rail and migration 
infrastructures, the interlink technologies, institutions, and actors that condition mobility 
(Xiang and Lindquist 2014). Despite a high degree of economic integration between 
Hong Kong, Shenzhen, Guangzhou and the other cities, the PRD is politically and 
administratively divided between the cities of Guangdong province and the two Special 
Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau (Bie, Jong, and Derudder 2015). 
Formerly colonial concessions, the boundaries between these city-states and the 
“interior” of China are, by Chinese law, internal to the Chinese geo-body, yet continue to 
function as de facto international borders. Consequently, mainland citizens and Hong 
Kong and Macau* residents cannot use either regular passports or national identification, 
instead relying on a regionally unique set of travel documents cards to travel within the 
Pearl River Delta. This distinct regional migration infrastructure reflects, and realizes in 
daily practice, the highly asymmetrical relationship between Hong Kong and the interior. 
Examining how these documents and procedures have evolved over the past decades 
makes visible how the balance of power between central and local states has shifted 
towards the national scale, as well as how those shifts are imagined to shape the 
perceptions and lives of PRD residents.  
                                               
* Hong Kong and Macau’s political, economic and social trajectory since returning to PRC 
control has been quite distinct. While Macau provides a striking counterpoint to Hong Kong, 
due to this article’s focus on the XRL I will for the most part confine my analysis to Hong 
Kong.  
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2. Methods 
To understand how state media situates the XRL within the nation-building 
project of the Chinese state, I collected and analyzed articles appearing in three papers 
that collectively presented an array of different mainland perspectives on the 
regionalization and nationalization of the Pearl River Delta. The Southern Metropolitan 
(南方都市报 Nanfang Dushi Bao) developed a global reputation for its investigative 
reporting and “liberal” perspective, although still constrained by China’s media control 
(Y. Zhao and Xing 2012; H. Wang, Sparks, and Huang 2018). The Southern Daily (南方
日报 Nanfang Ribao), which like the Southern Metropolitan is owned by the 
Guangdong-based Nanfang Media Group, strikes a different tone as the long-standing 
official newspaper of the Guangdong Communist Party. The People’s Daily (人民日报 
Renmin Ribao), in contrast, is the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party: 
based in Beijing, it is a reliable mouthpiece of the central Party leadership. Comparing 
and contrasting these three papers illustrates how different scalar imaginaries of the Pearl 
River Delta circulate in regional and national media, with a particular attention to how 
these narratives interpret the material elements of the Chinese rail system and its 
extension into Hong Kong in the form of the XRL. The Guangzhou papers allow me to 
examine variation between more and less ideological publications in the extent to which 
the XRL is mobilized in support of a Pearl River Delta region rather than within a 
national imaginary. 
Conducting research remotely, I used publicly available online archives to gather 
newspaper articles. I focused my research on the period around the opening of the 
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railway in the fall of 2018, gathering articles using search phrases such as “XRL”, “one 
place, two inspections”, “Two-Way Permit” and “Mainland Travel Permit.” This article’s 
findings are based on a body of 103 articles, including 49 from the Southern 
Metropolitan, 16 from the Southern Daily, 21 from the People’s Daily, and 17 articles 
from other Chinese-language outlets, including Xinhua, the Guangzhou Daily, and the 
BBC. English language articles from papers like the South China Morning Post and Hong 
Kong Free Press were also collected during this period, and are consulted for context 
when appropriate.† 
I fused these articles to build a timeline of the rollout of the various elements of 
the emergent XRL checkpoint regime to understand the interplay of political and 
technological development. The history of the transportation and migration infrastructure 
between Guangdong and Hong Kong is a necessary context for understanding how the 
XRL’s innovations are altering cross-boundary relations. I then analyzed how these 
articles mobilize the XRL’s new technologies and procedures within narratives of 
national and regional integration and economic development. These findings show how 
the state mobilizes the rail system to promote narratives of territorial integration, as well 
as how those narratives are subtended and complicated by the infrastructures upon which 
they rely.  
Hong Kong has its own imaginaries concerning the XRL. The XRL is hotly 
contested within the city: conflicts over the funding, construction and legal impacts of the 
                                               
† The texts collected for this research are presented in Appendix A. Articles are referenced 
according to publisher and full calendar date, using the following abbreviations: Southern 
Metropolitan, NFSDB; Southern Daily, NFRB; People’s Daily, RMRB.  
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project have played a key role in the development of the Hong Kong pro-democracy 
protests. Early anti-XRL protests linked the project to issues impacting everyday Hong 
Kong life like high real estate prices and lack of government accountability, pioneering a 
“collective action frame” for political dissent (Xia 2016). In 2018, opposition to the West 
Kowloon joint-checkpoint agreement drew thousands of protesters to gather outside the 
legislature, and pan-democratic lawmakers inside the legislature expelled for attempting 
to prevent a vote (K. Chung et al. 2018). Most recently, railway infrastructure, including 
ticketing machines and even a China Railway passenger train, became targets of 
vandalism during the massive protests in the summer of 2019 (BBC 2019-09-18). Due to 
legal and linguistic barriers, the Hong Kong discourse is largely separate from the 
mainland, though clearly not wholly cut off. The dramatic polarization between mainland 
and Hong Kong perspectives washes out the regional and national distinctions which this 
article seeks to examine. Accordingly, this article examines the XRL’s infrastructure and 
imaginaries from the mainland perspective, with only a limited engagement with and 
analysis of Hong Kong perspectives. 
3. Rail, Scale, and Community in China 
The XRL brings together a number of tensions in China’s contemporary political 
economy. China’s history of rail development reflects the tension between national and 
regional identities highlighted by Chinese studies scholars, as well as the tension between 
central and local states identified by the politics of scale literature. The roots of these 
conflicts reach back to the origins of the modern Chinese nation-state more than a century 
ago, when the Qing empire was first re-imagined by Chinese nationalists as a national 
community. Guangdong province, as a region with both a strong regional identity and 
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wealthy and powerful local governments, offers a unique site to study how intra-scalar 
contention has played out. Guangdong figures prominently but ambivalently in the 
history of Chinese national imaginaries, figuring as both its founder and its betrayer. 
While of arguable importance to the relationship between Guangdong and Beijing, this 
history is key to the relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing. 
3.1. Nationalist Imaginaries of Rail 
Rail has maintained a central role in how Chinese nationalists imagine China as 
an integrated geobody, even as how China is imagined varies. Sun Yat-sen, the founding 
figure of Chinese nationalism, spent his final years detailing a national development plan 
centered around railroads (Y. Sun 1922; Edmonds 1987). Railway concessions, along 
with mining (Thompson 2011), were the raison d’être of the wide-spread Rights 
Recovery Movement, a series of campaigns that were crucial to the mobilization of 
Chinese people across class and region in the name of anti-imperial nationalism (Chi 
1973; Rankin 2002; D. Li 2004; Zheng 2009). These campaigns, however, were typically 
organized at the provincial scale: a Sichuan organization to recover Sichuan railway 
rights, a Shanxi movement to recover Shanxi mining rights, and so forth.  
The provincial scale occupied a pivotal role in the formation of modern China, 
becoming a central locus of politics as native place identity was transmuted into 
nationalism (Schoppa 1977; Duara 1995; B. Goodman 1995b; Platt 2007). A mutually 
constitutive relation between regional and national imaginaries became, in the 
warlordism of the early Republic, mutually antagonistic. For warlords like Yan Xishan, 
railways helped realize autonomous regional spheres of control rather than national unity 
(Jing 1993). Despite its many imperfections, however, railways played a prominent role 
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“as an aspirational symbol of modernity and efficiency” during the early Republic (Köll 
2019, 161). During the Nanjing decade, as the railways were professionalized (Morgan 
2001), they became central to Chiang Kai Shek’s nationalist vision: rail travel, with its 
strict time discipline, was seen as an ideal means for instilling Chinese people with 
modern citizen subjectivities (Köll 2019, 185–90).  
After the defeat of the Japanese, China’s railways were for the first time united 
under a single institution, albeit not yet by continuous track. The Ministry of Railways‡ 
(MOR) established itself as a powerful and independent institution within the PRC. The 
heroic efforts of railway workers and soldiers to repair war damage and build new lines 
to remote regions made for powerful narratives of national recovery and development and 
figured prominently in PRC propaganda (Köll 2019, 247–53). The same “railway” values 
of discipline and punctuality favored by Chiang Kai Shek were re-interpreted as exemplar 
communist ethics under Mao. In 1966, railways played a key role in the Cultural 
Revolution, carrying countless Red Guards across the country, many traveling for the 
first time (Köll 2019, 268). By the late nineties, rail was increasingly symbolic of the 
poverty China sought to leave behind. The ambitious high-speed passenger-dedicated rail 
network (HSR) transformed rail into a symbol of its future prosperity. HSR was a 
national imaginary from its first moment: before a single line was laid, the network was 
already planned out as a coherent national grid (Bullock, Sondhi, and Amos 2009).  
                                               
‡ The Ministry of Railways was dissolved in 2013 and its construction and operations 
responsibilities were taken over by a new state-owned corporation, China Railway. Given the 
high degree of institutional continuity between the Ministry and China Railway, I use the terms 
as chronologically appropriate but treat them as the same entity. 
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The role of HSR in shaping China’s national imaginaries can be seen in the 
slogans that pervade the system’s stations and carriages, as well as in the naming 
conventions of new high-speed trainsets. China’s first generation of HSR trains, initially 
known only by a series of dry identification numbers, was officially dubbed the 
“Harmony” (和谐号 Hexie Hao) railset in 2007 as part of China Railway’s Sixth Speed 
Up (Mao 2007). President Hu had, just two years before, introduced the slogan of 
“Harmonious Society” as a governing principle for his administration (Tomba 2009, 
600). As explained in Ministry of Railways statements, the new high-speed trains were 
intended to build the harmonious society that Hu Jintao had outlined; Ministry officials 
aimed for the new trains to serve as a national symbol akin to the Japanese Shinkansen as 
well (Mao 2007). As HSR became symbolic of China’s economic and political rise, it 
thus also became symbolic of the centrality of the party-state’s governance in guiding and 
shaping China’s national trajectory. 
The newest HSR railset, capable of hitting 350 kilometers per hour, entered 
service in 2016 under the name “Fuxing” (复兴号). Meaning “reawakening” or 
“revitalization,” Fuxing is typically left untranslated in English, marking a shift from the 
Harmony railset. It is a term with a deep resonance with Chinese nationalist discourse, 
evocative of early nationalist calls for a “revitalization” of the Chinese people. In the 
contemporary moment, fuxing features prominently in Xi’s “China Dream” ideology (中
国梦 Zhongguo Meng), a slogan omnipresent in stations and carriages. Defined by 
President Xi Jinping in 2013 as “realizing the great revitalization (fuxing) of the Chinese 
nation”, the China Dream roots the party-state’s legitimacy in a communal dream of 
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national prosperity and strength (Callahan 2017). As a new China Railway slogan makes 
clear, HSR works to realize the disparate elements of the China Dream in a single, 
tangible form. 
In 2019, China Railway put the new Fuxing trains front and center in a new 
slogan: “Fuxing trains gallop across the motherland’s vast and great earth.” Cleverly, the 
verb “gallop” (奔驰 benchi) is the same characters which are used for Mercedes-Benz, as 
much a byword for luxury in China as in the US. “Motherland” (祖国 zuguo) combines 
the character for ancestor and for country, situating HSR’s cutting edge technology 
within a Chinese historical community. This ancient nation is, in turn, situated with “the 
vast and great earth”: the full territorial extent of China’s modern geo-body. Bringing 
together the old and the new, the social and the material, this slogan posits Fuxing trains 
as the active agents of China’s national teleology, fulfilling China’s destiny of becoming 
an integrated national territory and society—and doing so in luxurious style.  
Since the mid-2000s, HSR has gone from nonexistent to reaching all but three 
provinces by the end of 2018; by point of comparison, conventional rail service to Lhasa 
only opened in 2006. With the introduction of online ticketing in 2011, rail has become 
contiguous with the nation along yet more dimensions: tickets to any destination can now 
be purchased via smartphone app, linked to individual passengers by their national 
identification card, the shenfenzheng. With no more than a smartphone and a 
shenfenzheng, a Chinese citizen can travel anywhere in China at any time—anywhere, 
that is, other than Hong Kong or Macau. 
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3.1.1. Guangdong Regional Imaginaries 
The idea of a high-speed rail linkage between Hong Kong and Guangzhou was 
first conceived at a moment when local government was relatively unfettered by the 
central state. Substantive local autonomy for Guangdong has waxed and waned. Prior to 
the period of reform and opening, Guangdong was kept under tight rein by Northern 
cadres loyal to Beijing (Carrico 2012, 30). Guangdong’s distance from national centers of 
power has historically made it a dumping ground for exiles, a place for experimentation, 
and occasionally a rival power center. In the early twentieth century the treaty port of 
Guangzhou and later the colony of Hong Kong were outposts of capitalism and 
imperialism, as well as hotbeds for early Chinese nationalism. As discussed by Friedman 
(1994; 2008), this makes Guangdong the center of an alternative narrative of Chinese 
nationalism—a narrative that continues to undergird Cantonese regional identity (Carrico 
2012). Perhaps more troubling to a new-fledged PRC, however, was Guangdong’s history 
of provincial autonomy: Cantonese warlord Chen Jiongming’s 1922 split with Sun Yat-
sen has been portrayed in official historiography as a betrayal of Chinese nationalism in 
the name of regional separatism (Duara 1995, 193–204). Consequently, Beijing’s distrust 
of local cadres in Guangdong was driven by distrust of foreign contamination, lingering 
capitalist tendencies and of Cantonese regional identity itself (Carrico 2012).  
Hong Kong exemplified the party-state’s suspicions of the Cantonese. As 
Guangdong went through the travails of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution, Hong Kong stood as an isolated remnant of Guangdong’s capitalist and 
colonial past, and an increasingly tempting image of its future path. Hong Kong was cut 
off from the rest of the delta in 1950, when the Ministry of Public Security erected a 
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fence along the Hong Kong-mainland boundary. The fence slowed cross-boundary flows 
of people and goods to a trickle, severing trade networks and family connections (Vogel 
1990, 46). As Hong Kong’s economy flourished on the back of its cheap labor and global 
connections, Hong Kong became an example of what Guangdong could become. During 
reform and opening, the same reasons of history and distance that marginalized 
Guangdong under Mao made it an ideal site for economic experimentation: Guangdong 
was host three of the first four Special Economic Zones that became the engines of 
China’s coastal development (Naughton 2006, 27–28). The provincial government took 
full advantage of Beijing’s tolerance and Hong Kong’s proximity, operating by the 
maxims: "If something is not explicitly prohibited, then move ahead. If something is 
allowed, then use it to the hilt" (Vogel 1990, 80–82).  
Throughout reform and opening, Hong Kong was the lodestar for Guangdong 
development as well as a source of capital and practical know-how (Vogel 1990). Hong 
Kong was a symbol of modernity uniquely compelling for residents of the Pearl River 
Delta in its cultural and spatial proximity. Advances in transportation and migration 
infrastructure steadily narrowed the gap during the eighties and nineties. Non-stop 
passenger service between Hong Kong and Guangzhou resumed in 1979, reducing the 
travel time between Guangzhou and Hong Kong to less than three hours, speeding the 
movement of people, goods and ideas (People’s Daily 1979). The proliferation of TVs in 
the Pearl River Delta spread the influence of Cantonese popular culture hundreds of miles 
into the mainland, despite official efforts to curb the use of large antennae (Vogel 1990, 
66).  
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Guangdong’s cultural distinction, history of political conflict and powerful 
regional economy combine to make it one of the most salient regional identities in 
contemporary China. For all that, the Cantonese have received remarkably little attention 
from scholars: as Mullaney observes, “their status as Han has been so thoroughly 
naturalized that it has failed to register as a problem in need of consideration” (Mullaney 
2012, 6). While a rich body of work has examined ethnic and minority nationality 
identities in contemporary China (Gladney 1991; 1995; Oakes 2000; Harrell 2011), 
Chinese studies has only recently begun to re-evaluate the complexity of contemporary 
Han identity (Mullaney et al. 2012; Joniak-Lüthi 2015). Carrico (2012) poses the 
question of why the Cantonese are not their own minority nationality on the basis of their 
distinctive language, culture and history, and concludes that the Cantonese exist as an 
integral periphery within China’s national community. Anchoring the far end of countless 
North-South stereotypes, Carrico examines how Cantonese people variously accept, 
contest and invert their marginalization within the Chinese national community, re-
imagining Guangdong as an alternate center or altogether distinct spatial entity (Carrico 
2012).  
The role of Hong Kong is integral to regional and national imaginaries of 
Guangdong. Yet cultural compatibility alone did not turn the Pearl River Delta into an 
industrial powerhouse, driven by the synergy between cheap and innovative production 
networks in mainland China and the globally-connected financial sector in Hong Kong 
(Bie, Jong, and Derudder 2015). Rather it was the sustained effort of Guangdong 
provincial government between 1979 and 2000 to develop the necessary transportation 
and migration infrastructure that turned the Pearl River Delta into the world’s factory. 
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Once built, however, that infrastructure enabled not just economic integration but 
growing rates of cross-boundary employment, marriages (G. Lin and Ma 2008; So 2003), 
housing (E. C. M. Hui et al. 2011; E. C. M. Hui and Yu 2009) and even schooling (N. L. 
S. Leung 2012). These cross-boundary circulations have become increasingly central to 
official imaginaries of the Pearl River Delta, at regional as well as national scales. The 
XRL and accompanying changes to migration infrastructure are couched in terms of 
realizing a “one-hour life circle” in the PRD: a singular space united by ubiquitous, 
convenient transportation through frictionless boundary crossings. While there is 
relatively little work on the role of rail in shaping these imaginaries at the communal 
level, rail development in the Pearl River Delta has generated a rich analysis of China’s 
politics of scale. 
3.2. Politics of Scale 
China has come to be the world’s “paradigmatic infrastructural state” (Bach 
2016), where funding and controlling infrastructure is a core mechanism of state power. 
The national rail system exemplifies this imaginary both nationally and abroad. Yet 
Chinese studies scholars have long understood the Chinese state as internally 
heterogeneous, with substantial variation between regions and localities (Shue 1990; 
Remick 2002; Hillman 2010; Shue and Thornton 2017). Yet the balance of power 
between center and locality has shifted over time. While reform and opening entailed 
devolving state power downwards to the local level and outward to the market, the 
central state has also strategically reclaimed power when local governments deviate too 
far from national guidance (F. Wu 2002; Chien and Gordon 2008). New work suggests 
that the “local developmental state” (Zhu 2004) or “Chinese-style federalism” 
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(Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1995) paradigms of the eighties and nineties is yielding 
to a resurgent central state that employs regionalization to undermine provincial 
autonomy (Y. Li and Wu 2012; Chien 2013). Naughton (2014), looking at central 
budgetary expenditure and revenues, finds an inflection point in 1995. After declining 
from roughly a third of national GDP in 1978 to a nadir of just over ten percent in 1995, 
revenue and expenditure has risen to nearly a quarter of GDP in 2012. Tjia (2015)’s 
detailed study of the course of railway reform notes a similar trajectory: a series of efforts 
towards decentralization in the nineties, followed by recentralization in the 2000s. Tjia 
characterizes this as a process of asset-discovery: empowering and incentivizing local 
railway bureaus just enough to reveal underutilized assets. This may underplay a genuine 
shift in central-local power balance over the past decades. Rail development bears the 
strong imprint of central state authority, studies of the Pearl River Delta have shown that 
local government also plays a key role in the financing and planning of rail infrastructure 
(X. Jiang and Yeh 2013; Z. Li, Jiang, and Yeh 2014; X. Jiang 2017). 
Chinese railways’ origins in the turbulence of the early twentieth century has left 
a lasting impact on their spatial organization. First formed as independent concerns under 
governmental and private management, the geographical division of China’s rail network 
into a series of Railway Bureaus (铁路局 tielu ju) after 1911 has proven an enduring 
structure to this day (Köll 2019, 59). Railway bureaus, already organized as largely self-
sufficient units prior to the war, smoothly transitioned into the danwei system established 
in the 1950s (Köll 2019, 168, 239). 
The Ministry of Rail was central to the PRC’s national development and national 
defense strategies, and remained well-funded throughout the Great Leap Forward and 
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Cultural Revolution. The MOR was charged first with rebuilding China’s war-torn rail 
network and, after 1964, extending it inland (Comtois 1990; Naughton 1988; Meyskens 
2015). In 1966, however, a directive empowering railway bureaus and branch bureaus to 
pursue the revolutionary movement as they saw fit triggered, in branch bureaus§ like 
Xuzhou, paroxysms of factionalism and in-fighting that ground traffic to a halt. This, in 
turn, triggered a recentralization: in 1975 Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed the power of the 
Ministry to reestablish order. The subsequent intervention at Xuzhou normalized traffic 
and became a model for Deng’s wider 1975 reforms. After Deng’s return to power in 
1978, authority was once again returned to the Ministry-level administration, and China’s 
railway system entered reform and opening under central control (Köll 2019, 271–79).  
The shift to a market economy put demands on the railway system to move 
increasing numbers of people, commodities and resources at the same moment that the 
central state was offloading financial responsibility for state-owned enterprises (Bullock, 
Sondhi, and Amos 2009; Tjia 2015). By 1986, the MOR was fully dependent on its own 
income to fund expansion and upgrading (Tjia 2015, 86). While remaining under state 
ownership, decentralization measures devolved substantial power to allocate resources 
and seek profit to railway bureaus and branch bureaus. The cradle-to-grave system of 
schools, hospitals, and recreation associations operated by the MOR, were spun off into 
private enterprises or shifted to other ministries, reducing the 3.4 million strong 
workforce in 1978 to 2.5 million in 2000 (Tjia 2015, 48, 54). Yet despite constant 
                                               
§ Branch bureaus (铁路分局 tielu fenju) formed a layer of management underneath the railway 
bureaus and above station sections. An unclear division of asset control and financial 
responsibility between bureau and branch bureau was often blamed for inefficient allocation of 
resources before and after reform. 
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promises of reform, core transport operations resisted substantive change. When the rail 
system repeatedly failed to turn a profit between 1993 and 1997, pressure for reform 
mounted (Tjia 2015, 68, 86). Under pressure from pro-decentralization institutions like 
the World Bank and internal pressure from the State Council, the MOR proposed a series 
of decentralizing reforms between 2000 and 2003 (Tjia 2015, 86–88).  
Under the leadership of Liu Zhijun, Minister of Railways from 2003 to 2011, 
however, the MOR went the opposite direction. Liu pushed for bold new development, 
and in 2004, the State Council approved the Mid to Long Range Network Plan 
(MLRNP), which laid out a sweeping plan for the reform and expansion of the Chinese 
rail system (Ministry of Railways 铁道部 2004). Under this new “Great Leap-style” 
development, privatization and decentralization came second to meeting the needs of 
national economic and social development (Tjia 2015, Ch 5; Köll 2019, 285). Seemingly 
unlimited loans paid for the construction of the massive new HSR passenger network 
while keeping ticket prices at state-mandated lows; freight transport, particularly of coal, 
received a similar combination of infrastructural upgrades and subsidized pricing (Tjia 
2015, Ch 5). 
Liu Zhijun’s tenure saw the MOR consolidate power upwards: Liu abolished the 
branch bureau in 2005, de-distancing the Ministry from ground-level operations (Tjia 
2015, 54–55). The MOR also consolidated power vis a vis other central ministries such as 
the National Development and Reform Commission, which officially has authorization 
power over certain large railway projects (X. Jiang 2017, 63–64). Liu Zhijun’s scandal-
ridden downfall, due to spiraling corruption investigations and multiple high profile rail 
accidents between 2008 and 2011 (Tjia 2015, 111; see also Osnos 2012), provided an 
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opening for the central state to bring the Ministry to heel. The 2013 dissolution of the 
Ministry into China Railway Corporation and the State Railway Administration did little 
to change day to day operations, but saw the absorption of the national railway grid into 
Xi Jinping’s One Belt One Road initiative (Tjia 2015, 111–12). 
The shifting trajectory of China’s national rail administration has shaped the 
development of the XRL in key ways. Originating in the decentralization of the nineties, 
the course of the XRL in the time since shows the discursive and material work of re-
imagining that took a regional project and subsumed it within a re-invigorated national 
network.  
3.2.1. Rail and State Scale in Guangdong 
While the XRL itself has not received much scholarly attention, political 
geographers examining other rail projects in the Pearl River Delta shed invaluable light 
on the regional context (C. Yang 2006). The politics of scale in the Pearl River Delta are 
informed by the Canton-Beijing tensions discussed above. Reform and opening’s 
experiments with decentralization and privatization reached their apex in Guangdong. In 
1993, the Guangzhou Railway Bureau was the first and to date only of China’s eighteen 
railway bureaus to incorporate. In 1996, the Guangshen Railway Company, first 
corporatized in 1984, was re-incorporated as a joint stock company, the only Chinese 
railway traded on the Shanghai, Hong Kong, and New York stock exchanges (Tjia 2015, 
50–55). The Guangshen Railway Company was a pioneer of service diversification, 
branching out into shopping malls and touring agencies (Tjia 2015, 122). The Guangshen 
company was a technological pioneer as well, putting into service a foreign-made HSR 
train in 1998, well before HSR became a national priority. 
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As the MOR became cash-strapped in the late nineties, it increasingly relied on 
joint-ventures with provincial and local government to finance new lines (X. Jiang 2017, 
62–65). Guangdong province, as one of China’s wealthiest provinces, was an eager 
partner; and in 2003 joined with the MOR to expedite the construction of the Pearl River 
Delta Inter-City Rail System (hereafter: PRD ICRS). Wholly distinct from the XRL, the 
PRD ICRS is a commuter rail network linking the cities of the Pearl River Delta. Under 
the initial agreement between Guangdong and the MOR, the network was to be financed 
50% by each party. This agreement quickly fell apart, kicking off a decades-long intra-
scalar struggle between Guangdong and the MOR, entangling not just PRD municipal 
governments but the formidable National Development and Reform Commission (X. 
Jiang and Yeh 2013; Z. Li, Jiang, and Yeh 2014). This struggle demonstrates that even 
under post-2000s recentralization, the Ministry of Railways still must gain the 
cooperation of local state actors to finance and secure land for new lines.   
Guangdong wanted to build the network under its own control, both to reduce 
costs and to avoid the unfair treatment other joint-venture participants received from 
MOR. The MOR sought maintaining its monopoly on rail construction and operation, as 
well as ensure the ICRS’s technical compatibility with the national network. Local 
governments control the land necessary for construction and for raising funds, while 
national-level ministries monopolize legitimacy and technical capacity. Within this 
struggle, narratives of scale are a central strategic tool: national ministries, provinces and 
cities all aim to align their goals within a compelling scalar imaginary. Thus, in their 
attempts to shut out the MOR, Guangdong emphasized the regional character of the ICRS 
(X. Jiang 2017, 68). Scale is also constructed through material means: the MOR’s 
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emphasis on national standards marshaled technology in service of the national scale (X. 
Jiang 2017, 62–63, 68). The struggle over control of the project produces multiple scale 
both materially and discursively, yet as Jiang notes, actors at every scale framed their 
arguments within an overarching concern for the “national” interest (2017, 71). The PRC 
ICRS, a rail project with an explicitly regional focus, makes for an illuminating 
counterpoint to the XRL. Like the ICRS, the trajectory of the XRL evidences both the 
discursive dominance of the national imaginary, and a central state increasingly effective 
in exerting administrative control over the regional scale. The trajectory of the Canton-
Kowloon Direct train also illustrates the XRL’s project’s dramatic shift towards the 
center. 
3.3. The History of the Canton-Kowloon Direct Train 
Cantonese railways were relatively successful in the late Qing and early Republic; 
contrasting interests between officials, merchants and foreign agents that hampered rail 
development elsewhere in China were more harmoniously aligned in the Pearl River 
Delta, with multiple functioning and profitable lines by 1911 (Jin 1977). The Canton-
Hankou line was redeemed from an American company in 1905, and opened an initial 
section to Shaoguan in 1915 (Jin 1977, 93). A 1904 line to Sanshui connected the western 
bank of the delta, and the Canton-Kowloon line, completed in 1911, connected the east. 
Originally part of an 1898 British concession (C.-K. Leung 1980, 173), the section 
between Guangzhou and the border was redeemed via loan—backed by the Chinese 
government, but provided by the Hong Kong colonial administration (Tsin 2002, 134). 
Managed by the Canton-Kowloon Railway in the north and the Kowloon-Canton 
Railway in the south, “direct” service initially required trains to pause and switch engines 
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at the border before continuing on (NFDSB 2018-09-21a). After 1949, the line was 
separated altogether—not just administratively and legally, but physically. While never 
recognized as an international border by mainland officials, the distinct customs and 
immigration regimes on each side nonetheless led to the adoption of procedures and 
infrastructure like that of an international border. Prior to 1979, cross-boundary 
passengers had to disembark, walk 100 meters across a small bridge and pass through 
customs. A two-hour wait for the second train made the trip an all-day affair (Vogel 
1990, 60, 338). Mail trains resumed service in 1954, and freight in 1973, but direct 
passenger service did not resume until 1979 (NFDSB 2018-09-21a). Passengers passed 
through mainland customs in Liuhua Station—renamed Guangzhou East Station after 
1996—and passed through Hong Kong customs at Hung Hom Station in Kowloon 
(Guangzhou Daily 2019-04-04). 
In the 80s and 90s, the Guangzhou-Hong Kong line was a conduit not just for 
passengers and goods between Hong Kong and the mainland, but social norms and 
technology as well. The border control unit in Guangzhou was quick to adopt 
computerized procedures to handle the high throughflow (Guangzhou Daily 2019-04-04). 
Under guidance from their Hong Kong counterparts, the mainland section adopted new 
uniforms for stewards, including skirts, berets and make-up (NFDSB 2018-09-21a). This 
model of feminized service work was in stark contrast to the proletarian “iron women” 
promoted by the Mao-era party-state (Otis 2011, 38–43). Flowing the other direction, 
China Railway’s speed ups during the nineties compressed the Guangzhou-Hong Kong 
journey from roughly three hours—the same as in 1911—to less than two (NFDSB 2019-
09-21a, Bullock, Sondhi, and Amos 2009, 38). Handover, in 1997, was marked 
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materially by the rail system by the opening of new direct services from Beijing and 
Shanghai to Hong Kong (NFDSB 2018-09-21a). 
Circulation between Hong Kong and the mainland is not simply a question of 
transportation infrastructure, however, but of creating solutions to the novel challenges of 
the region’s unique boundary regime. Because the boundary is an ostensibly a domestic 
demarcation but in practice an international border, Chinese customs and immigration do 
not accept either PRC or Hong Kong passports or national identification as appropriate 
travel documents. The drive to develop a substitute that would allow Hongkongers and 
mainlanders to navigate the mainland-Hong Kong boundary was led by the Guangdong 
provincial government, working in concert with Guangzhou and Shenzhen officials. The 
resulting system of passes and permits is complex, and fundamentally asymmetrical. 
Hong Kong residents have enjoyed greater freedom to move across the boundary than 
mainlanders since PRC immigration began to crack down on border crossing in 1950s 
(Breitung 2002). The Ministry of Public Security introduced single entry passes for 
residents of Hong Kong and Macau in August of 1951, only a few months after banning 
entry and exit. Single entry passes proved unwieldly and in 1956, the “Hong Kong Macau 
Compatriot Home Return Introduction Booklet” was introduced: effective for three 
months, it eased the burden on travelers and immigration personnel alike.  
In 1979, the Ministry of Public Security delegated authority to the Guangdong 
Provincial Public Security Department to issue a multi-entry Home Return Permit (港澳
同胞回乡证 Gang Ao Tongbao Huixiangzheng) valid for three years, extended to 10 
years in 1981. A small booklet similar in size and function to a passport, the Home 
Return Permit allowed Hongkongers relatively unfettered access to the mainland, 
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whether for business or to visit relatives. The Home Return Permit remained the standard, 
familiar document for cross-boundary travelers through the 80s and 90s, though a major 
computerization reform in 1988 eased administration bottlenecks. 
However, the limitations inherent to the booklet format became clear as cross-
boundary travel became routinized. The limited number of pages rendered the ten-year 
validity irrelevant, as frequent travelers could fill a booklet in a matter of months. In 
1999, a new “card-style” identification was introduced: officially called the Mainland 
Travel Permit for Hong Kong and Macao Residents (港澳居民来往内地通行证 Gang 
Ao Jumin Laiwang Neidi Tongxingzheng), it is still often referred to as a Home Return 
Permit in regional newspapers. In this article, I refer to it as the Mainland Travel Permit 
or MTP. Stamped with the logo of the Guangdong Public Security Department, the card-
style permit allowed Hongkongers stamp-free entry to the mainland, further reducing 
friction at the border.  
Mainlanders wishing to travel to Hong Kong, on the other hand, were far more 
constrained. While travel has become easier, at every stage the options available to 
mainlanders have been sharply limited in comparison to those of Hongkongers. From the 
closing of the border in 1951 up to 1979, there was no formal document allowing 
mainlanders to legally travel to Hong Kong. After the first Special Economic Zones were 
established in the Pearl River Delta, however, the need for some official travel between 
Hong Kong and the mainland quickly became pressing. Travel permits issued under the 
direction of Guangdong Public Security Department, were initially limited to official 
business. Gradually, these documents were adopted to allow mainlanders to visit relatives 
in Hong Kong as part of tour groups. In 1986, the Exit-Entry Permit for Travelling to and 
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from Hong Kong and Macau (往来港澳通行证 Wanglai Gang Ao Tongxingzheng) 
gained official status from the Ministry of Public Security. Unofficially, they are called 
Two Way Permits (双程证 Shuangchengzheng) to distinguish them from the One Way 
Permits** issued to permanent migrants. Throughout the 80s and 90s, Two Way Permits 
consisted of a two-page booklet—the size of a passport, but only usable once (China 
News Service 2017-06-30). While at Handover in 1997, the mainland-Hong Kong 
“border” was redefined as an internal “boundary,” in terms of migration and 
transportation infrastructure the transformation was symbolic only: in all other respects, 
the boundary continued to function as it had before (Breitung 2002, 1760). While 
substantive changes to infrastructure and procedures of cross-boundary travel gradually 
eased bottlenecks in the following decade and a half, the boundary regime remained 
restrictive and deeply asymmetrical through the early 2010s. 
4. The Express Railway Link 
4.1. Building the XRL’s Transportation Infrastructure 
The idea of a high-speed passenger-dedicated rail line between Guangzhou and 
Hong Kong dates back to the late nineties, almost two decades prior to the XRL’s grand 
opening in 2018. In its earliest iteration, the link was a regional if not urban project put 
forward by regional actors, advocated for in terms of its local impact. Only later was the 
line incorporated technologically and symbolically into China’s national HSR system. At 
the 1999 Fortune Global Forum in Shanghai, the enterprising mayor of Guangzhou 
                                               
** One Way Permits, initially limited to 75 per day in 1980, gradually rose to 150 per day in 1995 
and have not risen since. They do not play a major role in cross-boundary traffic (Breitung 
2002, 1754). 
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pitched the Chief Executive of Hong Kong on the construction of a direct, high-speed 
line between their cities, superseding the direct train that had operated since 1979. He 
proposed using magnetic levitation technology to connect the Pearl River Delta’s two 
largest cities in a mere half hour. When introducing his plan in 2002, the mayor claimed 
the Sui-Gang Maglev (穗 Sui, meaning Guangzhou and 港 Gang, meaning Hong Kong) 
would deliver a constant stream of visitors to Disneyland Hong Kong, then nearing 
groundbreaking (Xinkuai Bao 2002-03-27). In Hong Kong, the Executive Council had 
approved the Railway Development Strategy 2000, which included, alongside a wide-
ranging expansion urban and peri-urban commuter lines, a “Regional Express Line” to 
the Hung Hom border crossing (“Railway Development Strategy 2000” 2000). The 
maglev proposal was studied by the Hong Kong Government, along with the Shenzhen 
city government and the Ministry of Railways, culminating in a Hong Kong proposal to 
the mainland in late 2001. 
This regional leadership was shortlived. Within a few years, the central state 
began to bring the regional express into line with country-wide rail infrastructure 
planning. Following consultation with mainland rail experts, the maglev proposal was set 
aside in favor of conventional high-speed rail (NFRB 2002-12-15). This decision was 
driven in part by the high costs and unreliability of maglev technology, but also by 
compatibility concerns. Building around a distinct technological infrastructure would 
have kept the line, now dubbed the Guang-Shen-Gang Expressway, cut off from the vast 
expanse of already existing track (NFDSB 2018-09-23b). As would prove more 
significant, it would also have kept the line cut off from vast expanse of not yet built 
high-speed rail track which the next decade would bring.  
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In 2004, the State Council approved the Mid to Long Range Network Plan 
(hereafter: MLRNP), which laid out a sweeping plan for the reform and expansion of the 
Chinese rail system. Chief among these changes was the introduction of a national high-
speed passenger-dedicated network, today known as HSR (Bullock, Sondhi, and Amos 
2009, 74–76). The 2004 MLRNP envisioned a network of four vertical and four 
horizontal lines to link China’s major urban centers, as well as intercity lines to provide 
accessibility within China’s three great urban agglomerations: Beijing-Tianjin, the 
Yangtze Delta, and the Pearl River Delta. One of the proposed north-south lines ran from 
Beijing to Shenzhen, but strikingly did not include any mention of a continuation into the 
Hong Kong (MLRNP 2004). In the 2016-2025 Mid to Long Range Plan, approved by the 
State Council in 2016, Hong Kong finally made an appearance as the terminus of the 
Beijing-Hong Kong line. 
Despite their conceptual unity, the construction of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen and 
the Shenzhen-Hong Kong sections of the line occurred over different timelines. The 
mainland section, funded half by China Railway and half by the Guangdong provincial 
government (NFDSB 2018-09-21a) in a bid to accelerate rail development to alleviate 
bottlenecks in the Pearl River Delta (X. Jiang 2017, 65) started construction in 2005 and 
was completed in 2011. Connecting two of China’s largest urban centers, it quickly 
became one of China’s busiest lines. The Hong Kong section moved far more slowly. 
The Hong Kong section was not approved until 2010, when it was scheduled to be 
completed in 2015. Hounded by unanticipated challenges ranging from civil protest (Xia 
2016) to flooded tunnels (A. Lee and Ng 2014), the line finally opened in September of 
2018, three years late and HK$19.5 billion over budget. 
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4.2. Setting up the XRL’s Migration Infrastructure 
As illustrated by the history of the Guangzhou-Kowloon Direct train, the 
infrastructure of track and train are only half of the problem. Establishing an 
infrastructure of documents and procedures to render residents on both sides of the 
boundary legible to the government of the other is a challenge all its own. As the XRL 
project inched closer to reality, the migration infrastructure of the Pearl River Delta 
continued to smooth away points of friction in the flows of people through the region. 
While the experience of Hongkongers changed in substantive ways, the most dramatic 
transformations benefitted mainlanders: not only did the frustrating process of obtaining 
and renewing Two-Way Permits become significantly more convenient, the permits 
became available to a much wider swathe of the country. While travel between the 
interior and Hong Kong remains asymmetrical, the gap has diminished. 
The card-style Mainland Travel Permit introduced in 1999 provided a high degree 
of mobility to Hongkongers throughout the 2010s. A second generation Mainland Travel 
Permit was introduced in 2013. In addition to introducing new safety and anti-forgery 
features, the new card is compliant with global electronic travel document standards. 
Crucially, the second generation card stores individuals’ biometric data, allowing 
Hongkongers to swipe through customs and avoid waiting in long lines (NFDSB 2014-
04-18). The physical change coincided with a significant and telling jurisdictional shift. 
The second-generation MTPs are issued by the national-level Ministry of Public Security, 
reclaiming authority delegated to the Guangdong department in 1979. While still 
administered through the Guangdong department’s offices, the logo of the Guangdong 
Public Security Department has been replaced by the Ministry’s.  
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Access to Hong Kong for mainlanders has always been more limited. The Two-
Way Permit, initially restricted to use by Guangdong residents, has gradually been 
extended and regularized to the rest of China (Breitung 2002; 2009, 115–16). In 2002, a 
multiple-use Two-Way Permit became readily available to mainlanders for the first time. 
Valid for ten years, these passport-like booklets do not on their own allow their holders to 
travel: mainlanders must apply for visa-like exit endorsements on a short term visits to 
Hong Kong. As with visas, different endorsements are issued for specific purposes, 
ranging from group sightseeing to work and study to family reunions, each requiring a 
separate application process and supplementary materials (Breitung 2002, 1754). The 
point of greatest friction, however, was that endorsement applications had to be made 
through the Public Security office of the Permit holder’s city of residency. As a result, 
sojourners from other provinces living in the PRD could not apply to travel to Hong 
Kong or Macau without first making a trip back “home”—to the city where they 
officially resided. Even mainlanders living in Hong Kong and married to Hong Kong 
residents had to make this pilgrimage. Until 2019, Chinese citizens residing in Hong 
Kong were forced to return to their city of official residence once every three months to 
apply for a new endorsement, a process that could take weeks (NFDSB 2017-01-19).  
Exit endorsements for individual leisure travel became possible in 2003 with the 
introduction of the individual traveler scheme (Breitung 2009, 116). It began small: 
initially, only residents of four cities in the Pearl River Delta could apply. The scheme 
quickly expanded: by the end of 2004, all the cities in Guangdong province as well as 
Beijing, Shanghai and major cities in the Yangtze River Delta and Fujian province were 
included. Gradually expanded between 2003 and 2007, eligibility remains limited to 
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residents of 49 cities (Hong Kong Tourism Office 2019). Including a city in every 
province excepting Gansu, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, 
Shanxi, Tibet or Xinjiang provinces, the individual traveler scheme today includes 
approximately 200 million mainlanders: mostly wealthy, mostly coastal, mostly Han, all 
urban.  
In 2012, China’s immigration service began to relax the regulations requiring 
mainlanders to apply for Two-way Permits only in their city of registered residence: 
beginning in major cities like Beijing, students, workers and spouses of registered 
residents were allowed to apply without having to return home. Gradually expanded to 
registered residents and to more cities, in April of 2019 the policy was expanded to the 
entire country, easing a long-standing bottleneck (Xinhua 2019-03-26). In the Pearl River 
Delta today, a long-term sojourner with a registration in, for example, Hangzhou, can 
apply for a new permit at the Public Security Bureau near where they actually live, and 
then get an exit endorsement in the rail station on their way to Hong Kong—an 
experience that nears, if not quite meets, the ease with which a Hong Kong resident can 
travel to the mainland. 
In 2014, the Ministry of Public Security began trials in Guangdong of a new Two-
Way Permit patterned after the new card-style Mainland Travel Permit. After more than a 
year of watching Hongkongers sweeping through automated customs and immigration 
procedures, the new card was eagerly anticipated by Pearl River Delta residents (NFDSB 
2014-04-2; 2014-04-18). While still requiring a separate exit endorsement, the new card-
style Two-Way Permits ease the process considerably. The new card is embedded with 
thermally reactive ink on the reverse side; allowing the same card to be re-used without 
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running out of pages. Moreover, the new technology enables automated stations to issue 
endorsements in minutes rather than weeks; these stations are now available not just at 
public security offices, but inside PRD rail stations (Guangzhou Daily 2019-05-24). 
As mainland rail infrastructure and the citizenship-based infrastructure with 
which it is increasingly interdependent, has developed over the past decades, the 
experiences of mainlanders and Hongkongers have shifted. In  2000, the MTP allowed 
Hongkongers an unhindered freedom of movement in the mainland that even mainlanders 
did not possess; today the MTP is increasingly out of sync with mainland transportation 
and migration infrastructure. Mainlanders’ shenfenzheng is seamlessly integrated into 
China Railway’s online ticketing infrastructure through WeChat smartphone apps. 
Passengers relying on the MTP, in contrast, constantly encounter ill-defined limits and 
unpredictable interruptions in their ability to buy tickets. When the XRL opened in 2018, 
the MTP was supposed to be compatible with China Railway’s online ticketing system; 
yet some Hongkongers found themselves unable to purchase tickets, a shortcoming that 
some attribute to institutional neglect and others to secret blacklists (You and Su 2018). 
The MTP still unevenly integrated into automated ticketing infrastructure outside the 
Pearl River Delta; in most of China, MTP holders must buy tickets at a ticket office in the 
same way that the holder of a foreign passport does (NFDSB 2014-07-23). 
Recently MTP holders have encountered a new problem: ticket agents refusing to 
issue tickets at the window. When issuing new MTPs after their ten-year expiration, the 
PSB incremented the final digits from 00 to 01. Shenfenzheng identification numbers are 
fixed, and the ticketing infrastructure interpreted the mismatch between the card and the 
ticket office’s information as an error (NFDSB 2017-01-19). Frustration with ticketing 
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issues contributes to a growing sense of alienation among MTP-dependent Hongkongers. 
As shenfenzheng-based identification verification proliferated though China’s online and 
governmental infrastructures in the 2010s, issues caused by MTP incompatibility have 
compounded. The MTP serves as a de facto shenfenzheng for Hongkongers living and 
working on the mainland, used to open bank accounts and register at hotels. This has led 
to Hongkongers encountering financial issues, as changing MTP ID number cause 
conflicts with bank records, rendering them unable to pay rent or engage in online 
commerce (NFDSB 2014-07-23). These proliferating points of frictions led official 
delegations from Hong Kong and Macau to call in 2017 for the MTP be made fully 
compatible with mainland transportation and migration infrastructure so that city 
residents can “enjoy the unhindered, ‘just a pause and then go’ experience of mainland 
citizens’ shenfenzheng” (NFDSB 2017-01-19). 
For mainlanders, the emergent infrastructure has gradually reduced friction both 
within the mainland and in traveling to Hong Kong. For Hongkongers, the experience has 
been more mixed: the card-style MTP makes travel easier, but the shortcomings of the 
MTP as standard identification have become quite stark. The changes to migration 
infrastructure discussed so far have greatly transformed the function of the XRL without 
directly impinging upon its operation. The introduction of the new joint checkpoint at 
West Kowloon Station, however, brings the infrastructure of the new line and the new 
migration infrastructure together. 
4.3. “One Place, Two Inspections” 
Ostensibly a straightforward proposal to simplify immigration clearance, the West 
Kowloon Station joint checkpoint has become a central point of contention for anti-XRL 
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activism and narratives of mainland reintegration. The joint checkpoint (一地两检 yidi 
liangjian, literally “one place, two inspections”) integrates mainland and Hong Kong 
immigration and customs side by side in the heart of Kowloon. While a similar 
arrangement in Shenzhen, under which travelers leaving Hong Kong cleared customs in 
Shenzhen Bay Port had existed for a decade, the proposal to set up a joint checkpoint on 
Hong Kong territory provoked considerable popular and legal opposition (N. Sun 2017). 
To understand the transformation of cross-boundary relations the joint checkpoint 
represents, it is useful to look back at the customs arrangements employed for previous 
direct trains between the mainland and Hong Kong. 
The direct Guangzhou-Hong Kong service that opened in 1979 ran from 
Guangzhou Station and Hung Hom Station in Kowloon. Travelers passed through 
Chinese border inspection in Liuhua Station, a temporary checkpoint erected next to the 
station proper before boarding the nonstop train to Hung Hom. In 1996, the terminus of 
the direct service and the border inspection moved to Guangzhou East Station. In 
Guangzhou East, the customs and immigration process went through a number of 
refinements, introducing an early self-service station in 2009. With the new biometric 
MTP introduced in 2012, passing through immigration and customs take as little as 15 
seconds. On the Hong Kong side, passengers disembark before passing through Hong 
Kong customs and entering the city. 
When the direct services between Beijing-Kowloon and Shanghai-Kowloon 
began in 1997, however, this model of customs clearance posed challenges. Unlike the 
nonstop Guangzhou-Hong Kong service, these services stopped at multiple stations 
between their origin and destination. Passengers boarding in Beijing or Shanghai might 
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disembark before reaching Hong Kong, and other passengers might board. Instead, the 
entire train stopped at Changping Station in Dongguan so passengers could pass through 
customs before crossing the border into Hong Kong (Xinhua 2017-05-27). This tiresome 
process greatly inconvenienced passengers: “Back then,” recalled one old passenger, “my 
right hand pulling my child, my left hand dragging my luggage, standing in line for an 
hour—it was truly time-consuming and exhausting” (Xinhua 2017-05-27). A short-lived 
experiment took place in 2003, attempting a new procedure to conduct the customs 
clearance on board the train between Guangzhou and Shenzhen. A month later, both 
Beijing and Shanghai trains converted to a direct-only service: passengers passed through 
customs in Beijing West and Shanghai Stations, and were no longer allowed to board or 
disembark at intervening stations (Xinhua 2017-05-27; China News Service 2003-10-03).  
This history illustrates the difficulties of integrating Hong Kong-bound routes into 
the mainland grid. Every station with service to Hong Kong had to become, in function, 
an international customs and immigration port—unless, somehow, passengers could pass 
through mainland customs and immigration procedures after disembarking in Kowloon. 
Such a model had already been put into practice just to the north. A joint checkpoint in 
Shenzhen was proposed during the seventh Guangdong-Hong Kong Cooperation Joint 
Meeting in 2004, with strong support from the Hong Kong General Chamber of 
Commerce (NFRB 2004-08-05). Opened in 2007, the joint checkpoint houses Hong 
Kong customs on territory leased from the mainland, allowing passengers to pass through 
both sets of entry and exit procedures in the same building.  
The West Kowloon joint checkpoint appears to simply reverse the arrangement. 
Yet in the eyes of anti-XRL Hongkongers, it sets a dangerous precedent in conceding 
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Hong Kong territory to mainland control for the first time in over one hundred years (N. 
Sun 2017). They argue that allowing mainland Chinese laws to be applied within the city 
violates Article 18 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law (Siu and Chung 2017). In order for 
Chinese customs to operate in Kowloon, part of the station, along with the platform and 
carriages, must be placed under the jurisdiction of mainland laws, an arrangement ruled 
constitutional by the Hong Kong High Court in 2018 (Lum 2018). Anxiety around 
mainland influence is evident in controversies about “hidden spaces” discovered in plans 
for West Kowloon Station (Su 2018); even the announcement of free station wifi made 
some suspect eavesdropping (Yau 2018). Reports that passengers attempting to enter 
Hong Kong had been intercepted by mainland immigration were greeted with concern in 
Hong Kong (Su and Chung 2019), while being hailed as triumphs of policing in the pages 
of the Southern Metropolitan (NFDSB 2019-01-04). 
Where the previous rail connections between the mainland and Hong Kong 
functioned by pushing mainland customs further from the border and turning domestic 
carriages into pseudo-international space, establishing the joint checkpoint in Hong Kong 
achieved the opposite, annexing what had been Hong Kong space into the Chinese HSR 
network. The term “one place, two inspections” echoes in form the “one country, two 
systems” principle that protects Hong Kong autonomy while functioning to blur the 
distinctions between Hong Kong and mainland territory. Yet as a practical measure the 
increased convenience is evident, at least in the pages of mainland media. In the pages of 
the Southern Metropolitan and the Southern Daily, the discussion of the joint checkpoint 
focuses on the details of its function, how it affects how people move through the region 
and the new possibilities it offers to residents and businesses. In the People’s Daily, the 
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joint checkpoint receives a relatively brief and abstracted description, focusing on how 
the new model will further unify the Greater Bay Area’s marketplace (RMRB 2018-01-
31). 
The West Kowloon Station joint checkpoint illustrates how the transportation and 
migration infrastructure involved in making the XRL project a reality is enlisted in 
different scalar imaginaries. While the role that the XRL has played in the scalar 
imaginaries of Hong Kong residents is significant (Xia 2016), in the following section I 
focus in on how the XRL has been imagined on the other side of the boundary. The 
infrastructure discussed above has been enlisted in national and regional media to 
produce imaginaries of China and of the Pearl River Delta. While the origins of the XRL 
suggest a distinctly regional—even urban—imaginary, by the time of its opening in 2018 
the Pearl River Delta had itself been re-imagined as an integral part of a larger national 
unit. 
5. From Pearl River Delta to the Greater Bay Area 
The opening of the XRL in 2018 was narrated, in both regional and national 
media, as a significant step towards the creation of the “Guangdong Hong Kong Macau 
Greater Bay Area” (粤港澳大湾区 Yue-Gang-Ao Dawanqu). In articles on the joint 
checkpoint, the new Two-Way Permits and Mainland Travel Permits, new ticketing 
machines and customs technology, the two-decade process of construction is portrayed as 
the long-awaited realization of the Greater Bay Area. Yet the very idea of the Greater 
Bay Area, now the all-encompassing new imaginary for the future development of the 
Pearl River Delta, was at that time only two years old. Prior to 2016, the term was rarely 
used to refer to the Pearl River Delta; most often called the PRD (珠三角 Zhu Sanjiao), 
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sometimes the term Greater Pearl River Delta (泛珠三角 Fan Zhu Sanjiao) was used to 
include Hong Kong and Macau. The Greater Bay Area gained official imprimatur and 
official definition in 2016, after appearing in the 13th Five Year Plan. It has rapidly 
become the default toponym for the region in both national and regional media, imagined 
to be not just an interlinked economy, but a fully integrated cultural and political entity in 
the lives of residents. 
Greater Bay Area has been adopted by provincial, urban and the special 
autonomous region governments alike, though each places emphasis on different aspects. 
Even as they adopt the Greater Bay Area in official planning documents and newspaper 
reports, Cantonese narratives of the Greater Bay Area retain a scalar imaginary distinct 
from that of Beijing. In narratives originating in Beijing, accounts of the Greater Bay 
Area situate it firmly within the nation, emphasizing its unique role within the broader 
Chinese economy, alongside the Yangtze River Delta and greater Beijing. A key function 
of the Greater Bay Area is to employ mechanisms of work, study, housing, and 
entrepreneurship to integrate Hong Kong and Macau into the national community. Within 
the region, accounts of the Greater Bay Area emphasize its importance to everyday life 
and global economic competitiveness; it is imagined as a self-contained entity, put 
alongside global economic and cultural powerhouses like the greater Tokyo or San 
Francisco bay areas. Yet differences between these scalar imaginaries are seen more in 
the margin, in what is emphasized, than in actual difference in vision. 
5.1. The Greater Bay Area as Seen from Beijing 
In the pages of the People’s Daily, the spatial imaginary the Greater Bay Area 
produces is related to a very different scale. From the vantage of Beijing, the completion 
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of the XRL is not simply or primarily a matter of integrating Hong Kong into the regional 
economy, but of returning Hong Kong compatriots to “the embrace of the motherland” 
(RMRB 2018-08-30). While contributing to the economic and technological development 
of neighboring cities like Shenzhen and Dongguan, it is also a matter of developing Hong 
Kong’s relationship with Shanghai and other mainland cities—aligning Hong Kong’s 
strengths with the country’s needs. While the regional papers mention that the West 
Kowloon station will provide long distance service to 44 mainland cities, the People’s 
Daily informs its readers that these cities include Beijing, Shanghai, Shijiazhuang, 
Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, Guiyang, Guilin, 
and Kunming (RMRB 2018-09-22a). The People’s Daily also tends to locate agency at 
the national scale. In one People’s Daily article, it is the mainland network that is the 
grammatical subject, extending into Hong Kong rather than Hong Kong joining the 
national network (RMRB 2018-09-22b). Articles such as this frame HSR’s integrative 
power as benefitting Hong Kong’s development, but subsume the city’s benefit within 
overall national development (RMRB 2018-09-22b). When acknowledging the region’s 
global connections, the People’s Daily echoes the language of the 13th Five Year Plan in 
situating the Greater Bay Area within the One Belt, One Road national strategy of global 
development (RMRB 2018-08-30). The Greater Bay Area becomes a site through which 
China can project power beyond its borders. 
The analyses of the XRL’s transportation and migration infrastructure operate at 
an analytical distance from practical concerns of life in the Greater Bay Area. When 
covering the joint checkpoint, the bulk of attention is given to the process of passing the 
necessary laws at the National People’s Congress (RMRB 2017-11-01). The advantages 
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of the joint checkpoint are explained in terms of its role in economic and social 
development, with relatively little attention to their mundane practicalities (RMRB 2018-
01-31). The destination it puts in Hongkongers’s grasp is Guilin in Guangxi province, 
rather than Guangzhou or Shenzhen (RMRB 2018-09-22b). The concrete details of 
station design receive limited attention (RMRB 2018 09-05]. New policies to ease the 
“vexatious” process of getting travel documents address the Two-Way Permit—discussed 
under its official name rather than the regional appellation—alongside passports and 
immigration permits for travel to Taiwan (RMRB 2018-04-27). 
As in the regional papers, the XRL’s impact on the flows of people within the 
Greater Bay Area figures prominently in the pages of the People’s Daily (RMRB 2018-
01-31). Where the regional papers examine in detail the experiences of residents living 
and working across the boundary, however, for the People’s Daily the impact of the XRL 
is summarized by the nameless passengers who cried out “The joint checkpoint eases the 
people’s livelihoods!” (RMRB 2018-09-24). While re-iterating the “one-hour life circle” 
discourse of easy living, work and travel, the limitless future prospects offered by 
strengthening ties with mainland cities and entering the embrace of the motherland is the 
greatest opportunity brought by the XRL (RMRB 2018-08-30). 
Of particular interest is the impact of the Greater Bay Area on the young people 
of Hong Kong. The XRL and other transportation projects help young people understand 
the mainland better and offer more choices for future life-styles (RMRB 2018-10-29). 
According to the People’s Daily, “For the young people of Hong Kong, the construction 
of the Greater Bay Area is a surging wave; if you seize the opportunity, you have a 
chance to realize your dreams in the future” (RMRB 2019-03-06). The People’s Daily 
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articles touch briefly upon projects to facilitate the engagement of the young people of 
Hong Kong entrepreneurship opportunities on the mainland (RMRB 2018-08-30).  
As seen from Beijing, the Greater Bay Area is instrumental, a mechanism for 
advancing national goals of economic growth and pulling Hong Kong into the mainland. 
Making it easier for Hongkongers to live, work, study and travel in the neighboring cities 
matters because it normalizes circulation between Hong Kong and the mainland (RMRB 
2018-09-22b). The XRL has become part of the HSR network not just in terms of 
infrastructural standards or ticketing but in terms of its role in producing a space of 
national circulation. 
5.1.1 Cantonese Perspectives on the Greater Bay Area 
The two regional papers have much more specific points of view on the XRL, and 
focus their attention on its impact on the conduct of everyday life in the Greater Bay Area 
rather than on grand nationalist narratives. One striking characteristic of the Southern 
Metropolitan is its use of maps to describe railway development; the most striking aspect 
of these maps is their consistently regional scale. The 48 Southern Metropolitan articles 
collected for this research included ten maps, whereas none of the People’s Daily or 
Southern Daily articles had a map. Of the maps in the Southern Metropolitan, the 
majority (7) were of the Pearl River Delta area, two showed the entirety of Guangdong 
province, and only one—a schematic drawing of rail routes—was at the scale of China 
proper.  
Within the delta, where the articles position the reader spatially and culturally 
tends towards a much higher degree of specificity. The audience for regional newspapers 
is sometimes framed as Chinese citizens, but articles also refer to “Guangdongers” (老广 
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Lao Guang, NFDSB 2014-04-18, 2014-05-20b). An article that describes the journey to 
Hong Kong as 19 minutes, for example, concretely locates the reader in Shenzhen 
(NFDSB 2018-09-24). Other articles discuss how the XRL’s arrival will transform 
smaller towns or districts like Humen (NFDSB 2018-09-12) and Nansha (NFDSB 2018-
09-27). The Southern Metropolitan most consistently, however, writes for a Guangzhou 
audience interested in the flow of Hongkongers into Guangzhou for business. From 
Guangzhou or Shenzhen, the XRL creates a new spatial imaginary at the regional scale: 
the XRL serves as a new link in the gradually cohering “one-hour life circle” the 
residents of the Greater Bay Area has long been dreaming of. In the words of a man 
living in Shenzhen and working in Hong Kong, “in the future, it doesn’t matter where 
work is, as long as it’s in the Greater Bay Area. The HSR’s ‘one-hour life circle’ will 
completely change our traditional understanding of physical distance” (NFRB 2018-10-
04). This spatial imaginary, however, is situated within a sophisticated understanding of 
the logistical realities of circulating through the Greater Bay Area, including both new 
conveniences and continued challenges. 
Unlike the ten thousand-foot view offered in the pages of the People’s Daily, the 
regional papers examine the intricacies of the XRL’s transportation and migration 
infrastructure at the ground level. New travel documents, application procedures and 
customs processes all receive detailed coverage. Rather than adopt the official 
administrative term “Mainland Travel Permit,” the Southern Metropolitan writes about 
the Home Return Permit (NFDSB 2014-07-23, 2017-01-19). Moreover, the regional 
papers reflect a complicated affective relationship with this infrastructure: residents are 
frustrated by delays and mismanagement, and elated by new conveniences and options. 
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Reporters eagerly describe the new comforts and conveniences of the new carriages and 
the speedy flows of the new stations and customs areas. The journeys described and 
imagined take place within a regional context. 
The experiences of young Hongkongers is discussed in the People’s Daily also 
appears repeatedly in the pages of the regional papers. One article in the Southern 
Metropolitan follows a government program to attract young Hong Kong entrepreneurs 
to Guangzhou: one woman talks about how troubles encountered using a MTP to buy 
tickets drove her to get a mainland residence permit; another person mentions how 
mainlander suzhi (素质 human quality) has improved in recent years (NFDSB 2018-10-
18]. In the Southern Daily, the concrete specificities of the “one-hour life circle” are 
explored through the story of a man who lives in Shenzhen to save money while 
commuting daily to work in Hong Kong (NFRB 2018-10-04). Not only do the 
experiences of Greater Bay Area residents receive more detailed treatment in regional 
media, these accounts are focused on the mundane details of how everyday life is lived 
by those circulating along the XRL between Hong Kong and the mainland. Life in the 
Greater Bay Area is framed in terms of cost and convenience, not within a discourse of 
national reunification.  
While referencing the same Greater Bay Area imaginary, national and regional 
media place their emphasis on different aspects of the imaginary, and highlight different 
spatial relations. The Greater Bay Area participates in a national narrative of political and 
cultural reunion as well as a regional narrative of economic and social fluidity. Yet the 
imaginaries have yet to fully align: despite efforts to draw its youth into the Greater Bay 
Area imaginary, the role of Hong Kong remains unsettled. While the story of the XRL 
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project is largely one of increasing mainland dominance, there is one site where Hong 
Kong’s section of the HSR network remains markedly different: in the physical design of 
its HSR carriages.  
The inauguration of the XRL was also the inauguration of a new trainset, the first 
HSR trains to be owned and operated by the MTR, Hong Kong’s publicly-owned mass 
transit operator. While built by mainland companies and technologically compatible with 
mainland track, these trains were given a new name and a distinctive red and orange 
livery, symbolically distancing them from the white and blue trains operated by China 
Railway. Selected via public competition, the name Vibrant Express (动感号 Donggan 
Hao) combines the characters for feeling and movement; written in the other order, 
“Vibrant Express” forms a verb meaning “to be moved to emotion.” While mainland 
media frames the emotions moved by the train as nationalist sentiment (RMRB 2018-09-
24), the name is bland enough to be interpreted in any number of ways. The compartment 
design is equally accommodating to multiple meanings: interiors have been designed to 
be compatible with the expectations of both mainland and Hong Kong travelers. Signage 
is in Simplified and Traditional Chinese characters, along with English, and voice 
announcements are in Mandarin, Cantonese, and English. On the technological 
dimension, the seat-side electrical sockets have both mainland and Hong Kong 
compatible plugs (China National Radio 2018-09-22; NFDSB 2018-09-24).  
As discussed above, the naming conventions of mainland HSR trains have been 
closely aligned with the party-state’s narratives of Chinese nationalism; the clear 
symbolic distinctions made between China Railway and MTR trains suggest a hesitance 
to import the nationalistic and party-centric connotations of the “Harmony” and “Fuxing” 
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trainsets. Despite being built to the same technological specifications as Harmony trains, 
it was felt that Hong Kong’s trains had to be distinct. The Vibrant Express, however, is 
only one of many train services running along the XRL. The MTR operates services 
along the Guangzhou-Hong Kong route, but China Railway branch bureaus operate 
services to Shenzhen, Guangzhou and 42 other mainland cities. West Kowloon Station 
sees no shortage of white and blue trains.  
6. Conclusion 
The development of the XRL took place during a period of dramatic shifts in the 
balance of power between the center and localities. Born at a moment of Cantonese 
autonomy and power, the XRL was first conceived of as a regional project serving 
regional needs. However, in the decades since, the Ministry of Railways has re-
centralized authority over rail construction and embarked on an ambitious plan of HSR 
development at the national scale. HSR introduced a novel sort of transportation 
infrastructure across all of China, integrating cities to a degree unimaginable in prior 
decades; during the same period, the integration of the shenfenzheng-based real name 
system into rail ticketing linked mobility and citizenship to a new extent. Parallel 
developments in the PRD’s idiosyncratic migration infrastructure shifted authority to the 
national level and reduced the asymmetry in access to cross-boundary travel. The sum 
impact of these changes was to re-imagine the XRL as an integral part of a national-scale 
vision even as it remains part of an ostensibly regional imaginary. The discourses 
circulating through regional and national media concerning the opening of the XRL in 
2018 show how the Greater Bay Area articulated regional and national imaginaries in a 
largely, albeit not entirely, harmonious way. 
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This article shows that the infrastructure itself figures prominently in scalar 
imaginaries: the presence of particular railway connections, customs and immigration 
processes, and the layout of stations are the substance out of which national and regional 
visions are made. The XRL contributes towards a national imaginary because it is built to 
a national standard, connects to a national network, and depends upon national 
identification regimes. For the national Party, it is part of a narrative of national 
rejuvenation and (re-)integration. It contributes to a regional imaginary because it enables 
everyday life to take place within a particular regional context and serves a regional 
community. For Cantonese in the Pearl River Delta, it is a narrative of economic and 
social interlinkage. 
Yet the role of infrastructure is not limited to contributing raw material to state 
media discourses. The affective relations to infrastructure that emerge through everyday 
use are themselves productive of discursive meaning. Whether the experience of travel is 
smooth and comfortable and so reduces the friction between one place and another, or is 
troublesome and alienating and so erects boundaries between them, is part of how regions 
come to be imagined at different scales. This capacity of infrastructure to shape 
perceptions of belonging and community is precisely why it is of interest to nation-
builders: how the youth of Hong Kong experience the Greater Bay Area matters to 
Beijing precisely because Beijing aims to draw them into the national imaginary, into the 
China Dream.  
This concept of infrastructure suggests the importance of a “thickness” to national 
belonging. Nationalist discourse, in the form of patriotic education or flag-waving 
parades, is the most legible dimension of a phenomenon which is rooted in everyday life; 
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without these roots nationalism has little grip on the people whom it claims as its own. 
Infrastructure is one institution through which nation-ness can permeate society, shaping 
the circulations which define the boundaries of a community. Infrastructure comes to 
define the contours of everyday life in ways which then lend nationalist discourse an 
intuitive, visceral naturalness. Yet in the end, infrastructure is a text whose meaning is 
interpreted not only by official discourses but by users—a text which, unlike official 
narratives, is embedded in the fabric of their everyday lives.  
This article confines its analysis to mainland accounts of the XRL, yet a “thick” 
infrastructural approach to scalar imaginaries also suggests a novel approach to the 
mainland-Hong Kong relationship. While a superficial reading of the XRL’s 
infrastructure suggests a simple relation between increased flows and increased 
connection, a more nuanced engagement shows how increased flows can create fracture. 
The technical specificities of rail infrastructure are a text to be interpreted within a 
particular discursive tradition and situated material context, and in the Pearl River Delta, 
Hongkongers have a radically different history than mainlanders. Cho argues that the 
Mainland Travel Permit, a document which defines Hongkongers as Chinese at the same 
time that it denies them citizenship, functions as a migration infrastructure that reinforces 
the disjunction between home and citizenship (2017, 189). When mainland citizenship or 
residency offered few advantages and numerous limitations in comparison to a Mainland 
Travel Permit, there was little incentive for Hongkongers to want one. As national 
standards emerged around HSR and the shenfenzheng, Hongkongers were excluded from 
a more and more substantive set of privileges in the mainland, heightening a sense of 
alienation rather than ameliorating it. In line with Cho’s analysis, this article’s 
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examination of how the MTP is tightly woven into the XRL’s infrastructure suggests that 
the entire line may function as an instrument of alienation for Hongkongers, enabling 
smooth flows through places that cannot be their home. 
Bridge 
This chapter contributes a sustained attention to the discursive construction of 
Chinese rail’s nation-building force, and departs from this dissertation’s focus on the 
national scale to analyze how the region is imagined within and distinct from the nation. 
More than just a material infrastructure, Chinese rail shapes nation-ness through its 
mobilization within state discourses of national revitalization. It is also mobilized within 
discourses of regional economic development that do not contradict but do not quite 
correspond with the national imaginary. While the capacity of rail infrastructure to 
restructure social space and create new senses of belonging is shared among mainland 
newspapers, the specific things and practices which enable rail travel figure in different 
ways. This empirical analysis of XRL imaginaries sets up the next chapter’s more 
theoretically rich engagement with conceptions of state and nation. Rather than debate 
whether these abstractions are real or reified imaginaries, the next chapter argues they are 
best understood as internally heterogenous assemblages, linked through the intermediary 
of infrastructure. As the XRL shows, infrastructure creates both coherence and fracture: 
what appears straightforwardly unifying from a national vantage induces fracture at more 
local scales. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BETWEEN NATION AND STATE: BOUNDARY OBJECTS, INFRASTRUCTURES 
AND COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE IN THE CHINESE RAIL SYSTEM 
Introduction 
This article is a sympathetic critique of a certain scholarly stance regarding the 
nation and the state. Evident across a disparate body of scholarship, this stance is marked 
by a radical ontological skepticism concerning their object of study. They hold that nation 
or state does not exist—or at least does not exist in the sense that it is assumed to exist. 
Rather than real entities in the world, nation and state are understood as reifications—
discursive categories that are mistaken for real (Brubaker, 2004; Calhoun, 1997; Mitchell, 
1991). This analytic frame introduces a split between the realm in which nation and state 
can be spoken of as coherent entities, and their “reality,” which is quite a bit messier. 
My critique is sympathetic because this skeptical stance has been enormously 
productive for theorizations of nation and state. Refusing to take the nation for granted 
has enabled scholars to chart out a heterogeneous set of discursive practices and 
communities within the ostensibly national unit (Bhabha, 1990; Duara, 1995; Sparke, 
1998). For scholars of the state, reframing the territorial state as a discursive “effect” has 
augured an investigation of a complex tangle of material assemblages (Joyce and 
Mukerji, 2017; Painter, 2006, 2010). Through myriad case studies of heterogeneity and 
porosity within nation and state, this literature has qualitatively transformed how we 
understand these entities. It is no longer tenable to assume the existence of a singular 
national community undivided by fractures along lines of gender, race, class or region; it 
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is no longer tenable to speak of a unitary state exerting absolute power over a perfectly 
delineated space. 
Despite its insight, however, this stance risks obscuring the ways in which nation 
and state are nonetheless coherent material things. First, there are real, substantive ways 
in which in order to exist nations and states do propagate sameness and do establish 
boundaries. These mechanisms of nation-building and state-making are far messier than 
the discourse of their perfectly bounded homogeneity allows, yet they cannot be fully 
separated. A nation without any means of shared imagining is not a community in even 
the most illusory of ways. A second consequence of conceiving of the nation and state’s 
material coherence as reified illusions is that it obscures the ways in which difference can 
be constitutive of coherence. Heterogeneity and porosity are not necessarily failures of 
nation-building and state-making, irregularities to be tolerated or errors not yet fixed. 
They may, in fact, be instrumental to their overall coherence. 
I observed the tangled relation between discursive and material coherence 
firsthand during fieldwork investigating how the state rail system manifests Chinese-ness 
at a national scale. A signature achievement of the world’s “paradigmatic infrastructural 
state” (Bach, 2016), China’s rail infrastructure is a vast infrastructure of people and 
technologies enabling circulation at a novel speed and scale, knitting the country together 
both discursively and materially. While it appears monolithic from a distance, an 
examination of the everyday realities of rail travel reveal a multitude of fractures. 
Passengers from different backgrounds use different practices to navigate the same 
system of stations and carriages, generating divergent understandings of the rail system. 
Even examining a single component of the system, such as the ubiquitous hot water taps, 
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reveals both coherence and fracture. These fractures are not simply failures of 
homogenization and territorialization but are a mechanism for managing tensions within 
China’s ridership. 
In this article I argue for a conceptualization of nation and state that conceives of 
them as real entities that are nonetheless internally heterogeneous. I develop this 
argument in three steps. First, I critique the literature of nation and state to show how 
“reification” has been plucked from its roots in dialectical materialism (Lukács, 2009) to 
argue against the reality of nation and state. Second, I examine how a parallel debate 
about the reality of scientific fact has played out within science and technology studies 
(STS). Instead of abandoning fact, STS scholars have proposed an alternative conception 
that that situates its reality in terms of the strength of its entanglement within a network 
of material-discursive, socio-technical things (Barad, 2007; Haraway, 1988; Latour, 
1993, 1999). Third, by drawing on the concept of boundary objects (Star and Griesemer, 
1989), I show how infrastructure functions as a network of things which entangle nation 
and state, and thereby give them reality. I then turn to Chinese rail infrastructure for a 
concrete example of how boundary objects knit together infrastructure and communities 
of practice at the scale of nation and state while also tolerating—and even producing—
substantive forms of fracture. 
The conception of infrastructure as a simultaneously social and material thing has 
its origins in STS, but is proving a productive site for both state theory and the political 
geography of the nation. Infrastructures, as “matter that enables the movement of other 
matter” (Larkin, 2013: 329), are both objects of study in their own right and a means to 
examine the other processes which they mobilize. Infrastructure allows scholars to get at 
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the concrete specificities of how communities of practice (Bowker and Star, 1999; de 
Laet and Mol, 2000; Star, 1999), national communities (Akhter, 2015; Jones and 
Merriman, 2012; Kezer, 2009; Merriman and Jones, 2016), and states (Guldi, 2012; 
Harvey, 2012; Scott, 1998) come into existence.  
Centering material infrastructure facilitates the investigation of real coherence and 
fracture at two levels. First, it illuminates coherence and fracture internal to the national 
community, and within the state apparatus. Drinking hot water is simultaneously 
understood as a part of being Chinese, but is also as an old-fashioned habit rejected by 
many Chinese travelers. The hot water tap was historically part of a particular state-led 
nation-building project, but is now seen as an impediment to new state development 
priorities. These fractures within nation and state are real, manifesting and driving 
struggles over the organization of state space and the character of the national 
community. Their mere presence, however, does not necessarily threaten the coherence 
of Chinese-ness. 
Second, centering infrastructure offers insight into the close, yet fraught relation 
between nation and state. While few geographers would make the mistake of equating the 
two (Agnew, 1994), the question of how or why they are entangled remains under-
analyzed (Agnew, 2010; Antonsich, 2009). I argue infrastructures like rail are a point of 
articulation between nation and state: states build them, and nations inhabit them. While 
both are made real through the same infrastructure, however, each has a distinct relation 
with that infrastructure: to the state, it is a means of control over a territory; to the nation, 
it is a landscape in which it dwells. As a “boundary infrastructure,” rail binds nation and 
state and also marks the boundary between them. This indirect relation helps explain how 
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large-scale infrastructural projects can shape national sentiment in powerful ways 
contrary to what the state intended (Akhter, 2015; Goswami, 2004; Guldi, 2012; Mukerji, 
2010). The study of infrastructure reveals it to be not just a passive, transparent medium 
for nation and state but a crucial site of their production. 
Situating reification in theories of nation and state 
Skepticism concerning the reality of nation and state emerged within the context 
of the “cultural turn”, a wave of scholarship dissatisfied with positivist social theory 
(Özkırımlı, 2010; Steinmetz, 1999). Critics argued that an empiricist emphasis on 
objective measurement and abstract model-building neglected vital subjective and 
discursive dimensions of social phenomena. Moreover, they argued, these “objective” 
theories unreflexively internalized and reproduced a discourse steeped in racist, sexist 
and other oppressive power relations. The cultural turn challenged scholars to not only 
attend to subjective and discursive dimensions of their object of study but also to critique 
the assumptions pervasive within their inherited theories. This critique took different 
forms within theorization of nation and of state.  
For the study of nation, Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983) 
marked an inflection point in the transition from predominantly “structural and 
materialist” analyses towards “cultural studies” approaches (Eley and Suny, 1996). 
Before Anderson, “modernist” theorists of the nation explained it in the context of large-
scale sociohistorical processes such as capitalism, industrialization, and modernization 
(Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Özkırımlı, 2010). Anderson, in contrast, examined the 
discursive and affective aspects of nationalism: what did the nation feel like? Imagined 
Communities became “the genealogical locus of contemporary subjectivist approaches to 
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nationalism” (Goswami, 2002: 771). Subjectivist approaches reveal the nation as a far 
more heterogeneous realm than portrayed by the modernists, riddled with fractures along 
race, gender and class lines (Ahmad, 1994; Bhabha, 1990; Chatterjee, 1993; Hall, 1997; 
Yuval-Davis, 1997). Anderson’s emphasis on “imagined-ness” centered questions of 
narrative, identity and meaning. In light of the heterogeneity thereby unveiled, however, 
it took on a second meaning. If the nation appears homogenous, yet in reality holds 
multitudes of differing subjectivities, then homogeneity only exists in the realm of 
discourse. The nation transforms from an imagined to an imaginary community.  
While political geography has held on to a sense of the nation as a coherent entity, 
it has nonetheless tended to increasingly situate it in a representational register (Jones and 
Fowler, 2007). Billig (1995)’s banal nationalism framework has inspired many political 
geographers to engage with the nation’s mundane manifestations (Koch and Paasi, 2016). 
Contrasted with the “hot” nationalism of marches and sloganeering, the banal of weather 
maps and postage stamps has provided an entry point into the spatial, temporal, and 
gendered unevenness of national feeling (Christian et al., 2016; Jones and Merriman, 
2009). Nonetheless, even studies of material things like money (Penrose, 2011), stamps 
(Raento and Brunn, 2005), or road signs (Jones and Merriman, 2009) center their analysis 
on how the thing represents, rather than realizes, the nation.  
The most theoretically explicit effort to conceptualize the nation as a purely or 
predominantly discursive thing builds on reification theory (Brubaker, 2004; Calhoun, 
2007; Özkırımlı, 2010). Their objections to taking nations as “real, substantial things-in-
the-world” echo the critics of the cultural turn: by mistaking “categories of ethnopolitical 
practice” constructed by “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs” for objective units of analysis, 
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scholars have been “unintentionally doubling or reinforcing the reification of ethnic 
groups” (Brubaker, 2004: 8, 10). For Calhoun, “nations are constituted largely by the 
claims themselves, by the way of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts 
of claims to produce collective identity” (1997: 5). Özkırımlı refrains from defining the 
nation as anything other than “a symbol with multiple meanings” in order to avoid falling 
“into the trap of ‘reification’” (2010: 206). Brubaker hastens to add: “to 
rethink…nationhood along these lines is in no way to dispute their reality” (Brubaker, 
2004: 11; cf. Calhoun, 2007: 27; Özkırımlı, 2010: 208). Yet describing the reality of 
nation solely in terms of discourse constitutes a significant narrowing in scope from 
modernist theories of nation—indeed, a retreat from Anderson’s own formulation. 
Imagined Communities joins “objective” and “subjective” dimensions of the 
nation in a single analytic, rather than discarding the former in favor of the latter. The 
emergent material and technological infrastructure of “print-capitalism” is as central to 
Anderson’s thesis as the “imagined community” it co-constitutes. Books and newspapers 
are not just a means for the dissemination of symbolic representations but material 
objects in their own right. Among the first “modern-style, mass-produced industrial 
commodit[ies]”, print media accomplished their effects through everyday ubiquity, 
driving the development of national vernaculars as an “unselfconscious, pragmatic” 
process rather than deliberate nation-building (Anderson, 1983: 34; 42). This assemblage 
produces coherence—the extraordinary “mass ceremony” of reading the newspaper—and 
fracture—the creole nationalisms of the new world. For Anderson, the discourse of nation 
is inextricably coupled with the material infrastructure. 
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With the state, reification has narrowed the scope of theory in a different way. 
Rather than highlighting myriad heterogeneous subjectivities, reification is employed to 
highlight heterogeneous material processes within the seemingly unitary state. While on 
the whole the study of the state “remained relatively aloof” from the debates of the 
cultural turn, others met its challenge head on (Steinmetz, 1999: 3). Following Abrams 
(1988), Timothy Mitchell critiques the abstract ideal of a clearly bounded state, but 
correctly seeks “not just to reject such metaphysics, but to explain how it has been 
possible to produce this practical yet ghost-like effect” (1991: 91). Mitchell explains the 
appearance of the state as “‘structure’ that somehow stands apart from individuals, 
precedes them, and contains and gives a framework to their lives” as a “structural effect” 
emerging from the proliferation of Foucauldian discipline (1999: 89). He analogizes the 
state-idea to the “artificial machine” of the modern military unit: its unity is “an effect 
produced by the organized partitioning of space, the regular distribution of bodies, exact 
timing, the coordination of movement, the combining of elements, and endless repetition” 
(Mitchell, 1999: 89). What appear as boundaries of the state are “lines drawn internally, 
within the network of institutional mechanisms” and mundane sociomaterial practices of 
the society within which the state manifests (Mitchell, 1991: 90, emphasis in original). 
While the appearance of coherence and unity is empirically observable, it is not evidence 
of a real entity. 
In geography, Mitchell’s framework has been taken up to theorize the 
“heterogeneous, constructed, porous, uneven, processual and relational character” of state 
practice (Painter, 2006: 754). Territory’s existence is re-conceptualized as an effect of 
specific “networked socio-technical practices” (Painter, 2010: 1093). Painter’s reading of 
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state-effect pushes beyond Mitchell to posit an essential ontological distinction between 
the state and its constitutive materials:  
“When I apply for a passport identifying me as a citizen of a state, the 
passport, the office and the officials that issue it, and the border post through which 
it allows me to pass all exist. However, the state in whose name they function is 
neither an aggregation of these elements, nor a separate reality behind them, but a 
symbolic resource on which they draw to produce their effects.” (Painter, 2006: 
758) 
Further rejecting the coherence of the state, Joyce and Mukerji theorize the state 
as a “state of things,” a material assemblage “held together, sometimes very uncertainly, 
at particular key sites and through the actions of key actors and processes, human and 
nonhuman” (2017: 1). Denying the state any coherent essence or intention, they describe 
states as “experiments in logistical power”: a concept that, like “state effect”, locates the 
coherence of the state in an ontologically ambiguous elsewhere. On one hand, defining 
the materialities of state as heterogeneous conceals the ways in which key sites of state 
power “from transport infrastructures to post offices to legal archives” produce material 
coherence (Joyce and Mukerji, 2017: 2). On the other, these theories pay little attention to 
the myriad, contradictory discourses of state. 
Critiques of reification necessary work to de-naturalize the state and unveil the 
concrete specificities of the heterogeneous practices and materiality within. Yet if lack of 
a homogenous essence or clear boundaries is sufficient evidence to undermine a thing’s 
reality, it is unclear what limits this critique to the state. Returning to Mitchell’s analogy: 
if an army merely “seems” to be more than the sum of its individual soldiers, then why 
does a soldier not merely “seem” to be more than the sum of their constitutive muscles 
and organs, due to the coordinated and regularized practices through which they are 
combined? Conversely, if we grant that a soldier or a passport exists, then on what 
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grounds is nation or state reduced to a mere symbolic “effect”? Critiques of reification 
end up producing the two-tiered ontology they are intended to circumvent. 
Reification theory as formulated in Marxist analysis wasn’t meant to deny 
objective reality to ideas—quite the opposite. Reification describes the “phantom 
objectivity” of the commodity-form, “an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-
embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between 
people” (Lukács, 2009: 32). Similarly, nation, state and nation-state are forms which 
despite being essentially social nonetheless take on the appearance of being natural and 
inevitable. Just as Marx sought to peel away the mystifications of the commodity-form to 
reveal the social relations within, so too do scholars of nation and state seek to 
denaturalize the commonsense assumptions of their objects of analysis. Yet here they part 
ways. For Marx, the reification of the commodity form is not a subjective experience that 
exists in contradiction to objective conditions. Rather, it is a subjective experience that 
emerges within objective conditions (Marx, 1990: 164–67). People encounter 
commodities as objective because an entire “world of objects and the relations between 
things” has already come into being; “only in this context does the reification produced 
by commodity relations assume decisive importance both for the objective evolution of 
society and for the stance adopted by [people] towards it” (Lukács, 2009: 34). 
Lefebvre develops the concept of reification within his critique of the state: states 
reify space, rendering it “abstract.” Abstract space appears as “a floating ‘medium’, a 
simple abstraction, a ‘pure’ form” that precedes, and serves as a container for, everything 
else (1991: 82). This creates an “illusion of transparency” (Brenner and Elden, 2009: 371; 
Lefebvre, 1991: 51, 27) which allows for both “continuous, rational economic 
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calculation” and “comprehensive, encompassing control” of a sort unattainable within 
other modes of social space (Brenner and Elden, 2009: 358). This appearance of 
homogeneity is inseparable from a material transformation: “the national territory” is “a 
physical space, mapped, modified, transformed by the networks, circuits and flows that 
are established within it” (Lefebvre, 2009: 224). This space is inextricable from the state: 
the state “binds itself to space” in an act of mutually constitutive production (Lefebvre, 
2009: 224, 228). This novel form of space is joined to nation as well, bound as it is by 
language and by a certain system of social behaviors, which “rarely articulated as such 
because they seem obvious—acquire a quasi-natural self-evidence in everyday life and 
common sense" (Lefebvre, 2009: 224–5). 
Despite its apparent totality, abstract space remains fractured in two distinct ways: 
first, abstraction parcelizes space into economically functional units (Lefebvre, 2009: 
233). This sort of fracture is not a failure to abstract space, but an essential element. 
Other fractures are more threatening: 
“[…] in addition to being a means of production [the space thus produced] 
is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power; yet that, as such, it 
escapes in part from those who would make use of it. The social and political (state) 
forces which engendered this space now seek, but fail, to master it completely.” 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 26 emphasis mine) 
Conceiving of abstract space as a reification is not a matter of denying their 
reality. Rather, it allows Lefebvre to inquire into the conditions of their emergence while 
remaining sensitive to their internal fractures. Frustratingly, Lefebvre rarely addresses the 
concrete mechanisms through which state space emerges and fractures. However, the 
examples he does give are evocative: roads and rails, waterways and airways; 
infrastructures that enable circulation (Lefebvre, 2009: 237–9). 
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Marx argues for a recognition of the commodity as socially constructed: 
contingent upon a particular history and set of social relations, but equally contingent on 
taking up and reshaping objective material conditions. Marx critiques reification’s 
seeming inevitability and necessity as illusory. In critiques of nation and state, reification 
has been re-interpreted as implying their existence is illusory. As a consequence, these 
theories produce a two-tier ontology in which something—be it “cultural idiom” 
(Brubaker, 2004: 10–11) or “barbed wire” (Mitchell, 1991: 94–95)—is realer than nation 
or state. For nation, the “objective” material conditions which are constitutive of coherent 
national communities have fallen to the wayside. For state, the sharp ontological divide 
between the state-idea and the state-effect excludes consideration of either coherent 
materialities or fractured discourses. In the following section I show how theoretical tools 
developed within STS can provide a framework for reconceptualizing the ontology of 
nation and state in order to fully grasp their “objective” materiality as well as their 
“subjective” discourses, their overall coherence as well as their internal fractures. 
From boundary objects to boundary infrastructure 
The cultural turn also influenced the ontological approach that emerged within 
science and technology studies. Some of the hottest debates of the era—what Latour 
(1999) terms the Science Wars—centered on STS research into the social dimensions of 
the “hard” sciences. Paralleling Marx’s critique of commodities, STS scholars contended 
that facts are real not because they exist prior to and beyond society, but because they are 
constructed out of social relations between things. This conception of scientific fact as 
social is equally alien to both radical social constructionism and defenders of scientific 
objectivity. Rather, the aim is “to have simultaneously an account of radical historical 
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contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for 
recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings, and a no-nonsense 
commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world, one that can be at least partially 
shared” (Haraway, 1988: 579).  
In place of a firm boundary between reified categories and real objects of 
analysis, a co-productive ontology recognizes that “the ways in which we know and 
represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we 
choose to live in it” (Jasanoff, 2004: 2). This relational ontology requires a new 
epistemology that situates knowledge within the world: reality is perceived not from an 
objective “view from nowhere”, but through mediation: the creation of particular, 
situated networks of “semiotic-material technology to link meanings and bodies” 
(Haraway, 1988: 585). Facts become infrastructural, an assemblage of things naturalized 
into omnipresence and transparency through standardized practice (Star, 1999: 380–83). 
Within this relational ontology, the heterogeneity and porosity of things is accepted as a 
matter of course; knowledge is not a matter of describing ideal types but of investigating 
the conditions under which things emerge and the relations which stabilize them.  
Star proposes that “boundary objects” play a critical role in this processes of 
stabilization. Where Latour’s actor-network theory (1999) describes the stabilization of 
facts through hierarchy, boundary objects do not assume a singular authority. Reflecting a 
more ecological view, the circulation of boundary objects forms a coherent network “for 
doing things together” without consensus on what is being done (Star, 2010: 602). 
Boundary objects are “plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the 
several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across 
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sites” (Star and Griesemer, 1989: 393). A boundary object does not mark an external 
boundary: rather, it constitutes a boundary inside the network, a fracture integral to the 
network’s coherence. The boundary object mediates between and even instrumentalizes 
distinct communities of practice in service of the ecological whole. 
While the boundary object’s capacity to afford different interpretations to 
different communities is essential to keeping things moving, that ambiguity remains 
dangerous. The network can tolerate only so much indeterminacy. Standards are 
necessary for defining which elements of the object are abstracted and which remain 
concrete, ensuring the objects’ translatability (Star and Griesemer, 1989: 393). Boundary 
objects exist in constant tension, material/discursive things caught between “concrete and 
abstract, specific and general, conventionalized and customized” (Star and Griesemer, 
1989: 408). Boundary objects exist at the conceptual scope where their balance between 
plasticity and stability is functional: scientific specimens are boundary objects, yet so are 
entire repositories and even “the state of California” (Star and Griesemer, 1989: 409). As 
their use becomes naturalized within a community, however, boundary objects change. 
Their ontological plasticity is constrained; diverging interpretations and uses must be 
brought into line or end up marginalized (Star, 2010: 605). The balance between 
coherence and fracture shifts as institutions expand, and boundary objects transform into 
something new: infrastructure (Bowker and Star, 1999; Star, 1999).  
Infrastructure is discursive and social: it is learned as part of membership, shapes 
and is shaped by the conventions of a community of practice, and standardizes 
interactions across time and space (Star, 1999). As Lefebvre notes, once established it 
fades into background. Infrastructure is material and technical: it is embedded in the built 
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environment, gives concrete form to technical standards, and re-inscribes contingent 
material histories both when is built and then continuously as it breaks and is repaired. 
Boundary infrastructure envelops the communities it binds, becoming environment. Even 
at the scale of infrastructure, however, communities of practice remain plural: “any 
working infrastructure serves multiple communities of practice simultaneously” (Bowker 
and Star, 1999: 313). Boundary infrastructure preserves the boundary object’s 
juxtaposition of coherence and fracture, “allowing for local variation together with 
sufficient consistent structure to allow for the full array of bureaucratic tools to be 
applied” (Bowker and Star, 1999: 313).  
While maintaining coherence across wider scopes necessitates increasing 
standardization, homogeneity is never absolute. Fracture is displaced but never 
eliminated. The boundary object framework offers a way of conceptualizing the complex 
interplay of coherence and fracture that persist even within highly organized 
infrastructural networks. This perspective offers a way for theorists of nation and state to 
investigate the manifold roles played by infrastructure not just within nation and state, but 
between them. 
Infrastructure at the boundary of nation and state 
Research on the nation-building and state-making capacity of infrastructure has 
been lent force by a renewed interest in the material (Kelly, 2014; Squire, 2015; 
Whatmore, 2006). Others pushing against the limitations of representational approaches 
draw inspiration from feminist work on performance and embodiment (Hyndman, 2004; 
Mayer, 2004), and work on affect and non-representational theory (Dittmer, 2014; 
Müller, 2015). This return to material things investigates how “their physical and 
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technical properties and […] their ‘role’ in a network” constitute forms of everyday 
practice deeply embedded within a national culture (Edensor, 2002: 106). Drawing on 
STS work (Law and Mol, 2001), Merriman and Jones (2009, 2016) sketch out an 
approach to nation and infrastructure foregrounding affect, practice, and materiality. 
Material things are not passive bearers of state symbolism but constitute more-than-
human assemblages capable of actively “cultivating or delimiting state power” (2014: 
215).  
De Laet and Mol (2000)’s study of the Zimbabwean Bush Pump traces a line from 
state-funded infrastructure to community- and nation-building. For de Laet and Mol, the 
boundaries of the pump are hard to pin down: does it include the pump head alone, or the 
concrete headworks it is installed on? What of the bore hole it sits atop? What of the 
community which uses it and maintains it? Like Mitchell’s state, it is difficult to tease out 
the boundary between it and society. De Laet and Mol describe this as one aspect of the 
pump’s “fluidity”. The pump is a boundary object, flowing between communities: to 
engineers it is a technology, to doctors a promoter of public health, to villagers the center 
of a community, and to the state a nation-builder. A functioning pump gives villages “a 
shape, a size and a materiality that they did not have before” (2000: 245), and without the 
engagement of the local community, “the well is dead” (quoted in de Laet and Mol, 2000: 
234). The pump’s own boundaries are fluid: its design documents specify what it is not, 
offering adaptations to diverse local conditions. This fluidity allows it to knit diverse 
locales together. At the state scale, the pump produces a national community: not simply 
a set of separate installations, the Zimbabwe Bush Pump is a national standard, each 
pump undergirded by a state-backed system of production and maintenance. "As it helps 
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to distribute clean water, it also builds the nation…while nation-building may involve 
writing a shared history, fostering a common cultural imagery or promoting a standard 
language, in Zimbabwe it also has to do with developing an infrastructure for water" (de 
Laet and Mol, 2000: 235).  
This approach to infrastructure, emphasizing the role of state-backed 
infrastructure in cohering national community, has been documented both in the rhetoric 
of nation-builders and in the scholarship. In early republican Turkey, nationalists wrote 
that rail “weaves an iron web across the homeland” (quoted in Kezer, 2009: 511). 
Scholars of rail and roads have investigated how they serve to homogenize space and 
create community (Harvey, 2012; Schueler, 2009; Verstraete, 2002). Dams have often 
been central to nation-building enterprises (Kaika, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2014). On a more 
mundane level, others have shown how the material culture of everyday life shapes 
national identity and spaces, through media consumption (Foster, 2002), driving practices 
(Edensor, 2004), and technoscientific imaginaries (Hecht, 2009; Jasanoff and Kim, 
2015). 
Yet if material things have the power to build nations and states, then they have 
the power to undermine them as well. Merriman and Jones (2016) give the example of 
the Severn Bridge. The bridge unites Wales and England even as it demarcates between 
them: a literal boundary object, it means different things from different perspectives. 
Kezer (2009) shows how rail infrastructure and urban design made manifest nationalist 
visions of an interconnected, homogenous Turkey even as they become sites of friction. 
Hydrological infrastructure such as dams, sewers and drinking water systems have often 
been built to demonstrate or reinforce state power, only to end up exposing the state to 
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novel risks (Kaika, 2005; Meehan, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2014). In Pakistan, the Tarbela 
dam served to fragment not just the national community but state space as well (Akhter, 
2015). 
In other cases infrastructure serves to produce coherence along one dimension 
while producing fractures along others. Goswami (2004)’s analysis of Indian rail shows 
how colonialist carriage design created a novel pan-Indian unity even as it entrenched 
novel class distinctions and re-inscribed gendered differences. This contrariness is not 
confined to the colonial or post-colonial context: Guldi (2012)’s history of roads in 
nineteenth-century Britain shows how the consolidation and standardization of road 
construction united localities in a successful rebellion against the metropole. 
Infrastructure shapes communities of practice, to be sure, but not necessarily the 
communities that were expected or intended. 
These studies suggest that infrastructure plays a subtle but central role in the 
production of nation and state. Thinking infrastructure as boundary objects allows us to 
remain sensitive to imbrications of coherence and fracture within nation and state, and 
also between them: infrastructure articulates between nation and state without rendering 
them synonymous. State-sponsored national languages may offer a shared medium of 
communication through which anti-government critiques then circulate; a bridge may 
enable economic circulation while also becoming symbolic of ethno-territorial 
distinction. In the following section I present the Chinese rail system as a case study 
wherein the boundary object framework allows for the fine-grained analysis of new and 
lingering fractures within what appears to be a monolithic whole. 
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The Chinese rail system as boundary infrastructure 
The Chinese rail network functions as a boundary infrastructure which both binds 
together and fractures national community and state territory. Shaped by the state and 
inhabited by the nation, this ubiquitous transportation network is a common point of 
reference, a shared experience across China, even as how it is experienced varies 
dramatically. The history of rail in China traces a fractious course, illustrating 
infrastructure’s complex role in bolstering and undercutting nation and state. During the 
first half of the twentieth century, rail was at the heart of a rapidly cohering nationalist 
discourse even as its material form was profoundly fractured (Leung, 1980; Liu, 1999; 
Wang et al., 2009). In 1949, the PRC inherited a badly damaged, incoherent and 
unbalanced rail network (Leung, 1980). Between 1949 and 1978 new track increased 
connectivity and extended rail’s reach, forming a coherent national network for the first 
time (Comtois, 1990). The Third Front (1965-71) saw the rail network push into China’s 
mountainous interior, integrating territories into national industrial and transportation 
networks (Meyskens, 2015; Naughton, 1988).  
The system has undergone continued change since reform and opening. Rail was 
pivotal for China’s economic boom in the eighties and nineties, delivering migrants to 
coastal factories. A series of speed ups beginning in the nineties increased average speeds 
by 40% between 1995 and 2007 (Bullock et al., 2009: 37). Despite rapid expansion, the 
passenger network has been continuously running at capacity; passenger traffic grew at 
an average of more than 5.5% per year between 2000 and 2013 (Zhou et al., 2014). The 
emergence of high-speed rail in the mid-2000s has introduced a distinct socio-
technological assemblage. HSR led to the construction of new rail lines and stations, the 
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production of new coaches, and the introduction of new standards for in-station and on-
coach service and passenger behavior. The rollout of the real name computerized 
ticketing system in 2012 and new security measures taken in the wake of terror attacks on 
rail stations in 2014 have rendered the state a tangible presence in rail travel and rail 
space. The rail system’s ongoing development was a source of national pride among my 
respondents, though they were also quick to point out its shortcomings. Student discounts 
make it an attractive option for students; more reliable than air in terms of speed and 
price, it remains competitive for job-hunter and business travelers as well. It remains a 
central means through which Chinese people experience China. 
To illustrate how wide-ranging transformations of rail infrastructure relate to 
nation and state, here I focus on the hot water tap. Accessible in every station and 
carriage within the Chinese rail system, the hot water tap is a concrete example of how 
the state shapes the everyday environment in order to shape the national community. The 
hot water tap shows how such infrastructures produce a coherent national space. The 
practice of drinking hot water is prevalent in China. Commonly attributed to the guidance 
of traditional medicine, the ubiquitous practice of drinking hot water—and crucially, the 
infrastructure enabling that practice—originates in the early modern Chinese state’s 
nation-building efforts. Nationalists and statesmen decried the poor character of the 
Chinese population and sought to instill, among other qualities, a ‘modern’ sense of 
hygiene (Sigley, 2009). The Kuomintang’s 1934 New Life Movement equated trivial 
details of personal hygiene, including drinking only boiled water, with patriotism, but 
lacked the logistical power to develop the requisite infrastructure (Lei, 2009). The 
Patriotic Health Campaign in the fifties to establish public health infrastructure altered 
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the landscape, making hot water widely and freely available across China (Hesketh and 
Wei, 1997). The PRC state not only promoted drinking hot water but developed the 
infrastructure necessary to make the practice part of everyday life, even distributing 
family-sized thermoses door to door daily (Liu, 2016). Much of this infrastructure 
remains wide-spread: hot water taps or kettles can be found nearly everywhere in China, 
and thermoses are a common sight on streets and in workplaces. In rail stations and 
carriages, hot water taps are often the only freely available drinking water. One index of 
the ubiquity of the practice: lack of facilities for boiling water ranks among the top 
complaints for Chinese tourists abroad (Li et al., 2011). 
Taken as a boundary object, the hot water tap allows us to trace the transmutation 
of top-down population governance techniques into a coherent national community of 
practice. Within the rail system, the homogenous environment afforded by ubiquitous hot 
water taps enables a distinctive set of traveling practices (see Figure 6.1). Knowing that 
hot water will be available throughout, passengers plan ahead, carrying refillable 
thermoses and instant noodles to eat during their potentially days-long journey. This 
coherence-first narrative, emphasizing the integration of nation and state, captures a real 
and substantive change in the social and spatial arrangement of Chinese territory. Yet this 
narrative only captures so much—as fieldwork revealed, the rapid development of the rail 
network has produced new fractures. 
I gathered data on Chinese rail travel practices through seven months of 
participant observation within the rail system and 20 interviews with rail passengers. The 
participant observation, drawing on affective and materialist methodologies of 
infrastructure, covered the territorial breadth of China from Manzhouli in the north to 
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Sanya in the south, from Khorgos in the west to Mudanjiang in the east. I also rode 
selected routes repeatedly to build depth. This data guided interviews with travelers of 
different age, gender, class and regional origin concerning their practices and perceptions 
of rail travel. Pairing participant observation with interviews combined attention to the 
material conditions of rail space and to the meanings circulating in and around those 
spaces.  
 
Figure 6.1. Hot water taps are as elemental to Chinese rail space as restrooms. From left 
to right, top to bottom: Urumuqi South Station, Beijing Station, Manzhouli Station, 
Chengdu South Station, Hengyang Station, Nanjing Station, Kunming Station, 
Guangzhou East Station, Xiamen Station. 
 
The past decades have seen growing differentiation within rail space. First, hot 
water taps remain ubiquitous, but their use has not. The hot water taps and the rail 
traveling practices they enabled were well-known to the passengers I interviewed: “Even 
though most of the time I don’t like to eat instant noodles, I still have this fixed 
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impression that eating instant noodles and rail travel go together extremely well” 
(Interview 2). Yet even while acknowledging the norm, a number of respondents defined 
their own practices against it. “Me, I like to drink cold water. Winter and summer, I 
always drink cold water—it’s my personal habit” (Interview 4). This is possible because 
today, alongside the freely available hot water taps, a wide-spread commercial food and 
beverage distribution system has emerged. Convenience stores in every rail station and 
vendors on every train sell water, soft drinks, and snacks. One older passenger said: “The 
treat of riding high-speed trains nowadays is, you don’t even have to think about what to 
eat or drink. You don’t have to think to bring a boiled egg, bread or that kind of snack. If 
you want to buy something you can buy it right then. There’s no need [to prepare], the 
train provides everything” (Interview 7).  
High-speed rail has circumvented the need for food and water during the journey 
altogether through sheer speed. The average 500 kilometer trip took almost eleven hours 
in 1995; in 2007 it took only seven and a quarter (Bullock et al., 2009). At current HSR 
speeds, it takes less than two. This has radically changed preparations for rail travel: 
“These days the time you spend on the train is so short.…You don’t need any instant 
noodles” (Interview 15). Consequently, the old tricks of experienced travelers are 
rendered unnecessary. “Like my mom, she really has a lot of experience: on the train 
she’ll buy a big can of fruit or something, then after she eats the fruit she’ll use the can 
for drinking water. When she gets off the train, she just throws it away. She’s clever with 
things like that, but I don’t think it’s necessary. For me, it’s too much bother” (Interview 
1). This is simultaneously a generational and a class dichotomy: the “old” ways of 
traveling are the same practices are still in wide-spread use on the slow, conventional 
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trains that serve poorer, peripheral areas. On these trains, even instant noodles pre-
packaged in a paper cup are an unnecessary expense for some passengers, who pack their 
metal bowls and utensils. 
The clearest divide within rail space is between the conventional rail network and 
HSR. The HSR system is being built and operated at a spatial and cultural remove: not 
only are new HSR stations being built kilometers away from old stations, but in stations 
like Shanghai Hongqiao and Wuhan, hot water taps stand alongside American-style 
drinking fountains (Salzman, 2017). In other cities, station management is deliberately 
working to exclude instant noodles: in Shenzhen, clerks reported they were not allowed 
to sell noodles at station kiosks, and in Beijing, I found noodles being sold from literally 
under the counter. Yet other HSR stations, to the contrary, provide specially marked areas 
for eating instant noodles (see Figure 6.1, lower right).  
The bifurcation of rail space is shaped by station design, but also manifests 
popular dissatisfaction with the conventional rail system and its practices. In interviews, 
passengers narrated their experiences with the Chinese rail system with a mixture of pride 
and annoyance: yes, the rail system is a national accomplishment, but it is full of 
countless frustrations as well. Many of these have to do with the behavior of other 
passengers: they are too loud, or their food too odiferous. These practices and the poorer, 
more rural passengers who rely on them, are representative of a chaotic and unpleasant 
past which both railway management and many passengers are eager to move away from, 
towards a modern and hygienic future of mineral water and KFC.  
The example of the hot water taps reveals a widening gap between different 
communities of travelers: practices formed in Chinese rail space are being supplemented 
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and replaced among the young, the wealthy and the urban by practices borrowed from 
more cosmopolitan modes of conveyance. The emerging two-tier rail network is an 
adaptation to an emerging two-tier ridership; socio-economic fractures within the national 
community manifesting as spatial fractures within state infrastructure. Hot water taps and 
instant noodles aren’t unique: other banal boundary objects, such as the capacious and 
eye-catching “snakeskin” bags favored by migrant workers, also come to mark communal 
boundaries within rail space (Zhang, 2010). Different communities of rail passengers use 
the rail system in different ways, and different state institutions adopt different policies 
on what practices to encourage and deter. Because the rail system serves such a diversity 
of passengers and incorporates such a vast swathe of state institutions, it becomes a 
terrain upon which struggles over the nature of nation and state play out. Yet what these 
disparate factions share is the rail system itself—by orienting themselves in relation to it, 
it knits them together. 
Conclusion 
Contemporary theories of nation, state and nation-state take a justifiably wary 
stance towards their object of study: each produces a reified ideal of unity and 
homogeneity that far exceeds the reality. Yet while these ideals exceed the real, material 
transformation of space and community, they nonetheless depend upon it. The boundary 
object framework provides an approach that does not equate coherence and homogeneity, 
allowing us to examine the fractured, yet coherent reality of nation and state.  
This article makes a timely intervention in the study of contemporary China. 
Infrastructure is central to the “China Model,” yet as Oakes (2019) observes, 
infrastructure is itself rarely investigated. The case of the Chinese rail system shows how 
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interlocking networks of hot water taps, thermoses and instant noodles knit rail space 
together both materially and discursively. Despite the rapid development of automotive 
and air travel, as well as information and communications technology, the ramifications 
of their particular materiality are rarely examined in depth (exceptions include Leibold, 
2016). China’s image as a monolith, ethnically homogenous with a strong central state, 
has been significantly complicated by studies revealing a heterogeneous ethnic landscape 
(Gladney, 2004; Mullaney, 2011) and a complex interscalar politics between central and 
local state actors (Li and Wu, 2012; Xu, 2017). Adopting an infrastructural lens allows 
for a fine-grained analysis of how this fractured terrain.  
More broadly, conceptualizing infrastructure as a sort of pivot between nation and 
state—fixed along some axes while moving freely along others—illuminates the indirect 
means through which states shape nations. State projects of nation-building enlist 
mundane things like hot water thermoses and environments like rail stations to produce 
certain kinds of citizens. Yet the communities which emerge in those spaces are given 
meaning by the people who animate them, not the state that designed them. In the case 
examined here, fractures have been subsumed within a coherent whole. Yet an 
infrastructural lens is also useful in examining how and why fracture overwhelms, 
creating break-away nations and dissolving states (Akhter, 2015; Goswami, 2004). 
Approaching infrastructure as a boundary object between the governed and the governing 
allows us to move beyond cataloging the differences between nation and state towards a 
concrete, materialist understanding of how they come to be—and how they don’t. 
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Bridge 
This article serves to situate the intellectual project of the dissertation in relation 
to the broader social science literature. Despite its focus on the minutiae of how nation-
ness manifests in bodies and non-human things, this research intends to speak to theories 
of nationalism and national identity. This article contributes to the dissertation as a whole 
by introducing the role played by non-human infrastructure in articulating together social 
structures as a theoretical concept. It also provides empirical findings regarding the 
history and contemporary usage of hot water infrastructure in rail space. These findings 
illustrate the core theoretical contribution of this dissertation: that nations are both 
coherent and fractured entities. This is important context for the next article on social 
distinctions within rail space. Despite the seemingly unbridgeable gap between different 
levels of social class, they are nonetheless united through the social spaces in which they 
signify. 
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CHAPTER VII 
BEING A CHINESE PASSENGER:  
PRACTICING QUALITY AND CIVILIZATION ON THE RAIL 
 
 
Introduction 
In this article I use the everyday practices of rail travel to investigate the 
production of social ‘quality’, or suzhi (roughly: ‘soo-jer’), in contemporary China. Rail 
travel has long been a dominant mode of travel in China and continues to grow, with total 
ridership exceeding 3 billion trips in 2017.19 Studies of the Chinese rail system from the 
perspective of passengers, however, have been limited and largely focused on questions 
of economic decision-making.20 This article draws on the cultural geographies of 
mobility and skilled practice to investigate the nature of rail travel in China from an 
embodied and material perspective. This perspective illuminates how rail travel and the 
spaces in which it takes place embed and reproduce larger cultural structures—in this 
case, conceptions of social quality (suzhi) and civilized-ness (wenming). The stations and 
carriages of the Chinese rail system, which I term rail space, realize these abstract 
notions in concrete form through the flows of rail travel. 
                                               
19 National Railway Administration, 2017 nian tiedao tongji gongbao [2017 Railway Statistics 
Bulletin] (2018); C.Comtois, ‘Transport and Territorial Development in China 1949-1985’, 
Modern Asian Studies XXIV (1990), pp.777–818; C.-K.Leung, China: Railway Patterns and 
National Goals (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1980) 
20 N.Zhou, G.Ollivier, R.Bullock and Y.Jin, High-speed Railways in China: a Look at Traffic 
(The World Bank, 2014); C.-S.Chan and J.Yuan, ‘Changing Travel Behaviour of High-Speed 
Rail Passengers in China’, Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research XXII (2017), pp.1221–
1237; J.J.Wang, X.Jiang and J.He, ‘Spatial Impacts of High-Speed Railways in China: A Total-
Travel-Time Approach’, Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space XLV (2013), 
pp.2261–2280 
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While rail travel was conceived from the start as an intrinsically passive activity,21 
recent scholarship in cultural geography and mobility studies argues that, to the contrary, 
movement is always an actively practiced skill, ‘the competent expression of a method’ 
in which even passivity must be competently performed.22 Rail travel highlights the 
unavoidable and fraught nature of travel sociability: within the tight confines of the rail 
carriage, the practices of each passenger constitute the travelling conditions for everyone 
else. Accordingly, ‘together with being a travelling body comes a series of 
responsibilities to other travelling bodies.’23 Yet what are those responsibilities, and how 
are they negotiated? This article examines how on Chinese rail carriages, answers to 
those questions have become entangled with national-scale debates over proper and 
civilized behavior, materially reshaping China’s rail system in the process. 
This article deepens the engagement of geographies of mobility and skilled 
practice with the production of cultural dimensions of place. Studies of mobility often 
frame their analysis in universalistic terms of ‘passenger,’ ‘journey,’ and ‘destination,’ 
leaving the role of specific national, regional, or ethnic cultural context underexamined.24 
                                               
21 W.Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: the Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th 
century (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986), p.54 
22 L.Watts, ‘The Art and Craft of Train Travel’, Social & Cultural Geography IX (2008), p.712; 
D.Bissell, ‘Moving with Others: The Sociality of the Railway Journey’ in P.Vannini, ed., The 
Cultures of Alternative Mobilities: Routes Less Travelled (Farnham, UK, Ashgate, 2009), p.67 
23 Bissell, ‘Moving with Others’, p.68 
24 D.Bissell, Transit life: how commuting is transforming our cities (Cambridge, MA, The MIT 
Press, 2018); J.Jain, ‘The Classy Coach Commute’, Journal of Transport Geography XIX 
(2011), pp.1017–1022; M.Sheller and J.Urry, ‘The New Mobilities Paradigm’, Environment 
and Planning A XXXVIII (2006), pp.207–226; Watts, ‘The Art and Craft’; L.Watts and J.Urry, 
‘Moving methods, travelling times’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space XXVI 
(2008), pp.860–874; for note-worthy exceptions, see T.Edensor, National Identity, Popular 
Culture and Everyday Life (Oxford, Berg, 2002); T.Edensor, ‘Automobility and National 
Identity Representation, Geography and Driving Practice’, Theory, Culture & Society XXI 
(2004), pp.101–120; P.Vannini, ‘The Techne of Making a Ferry: a Non-representational 
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Suzhi, civilized-ness and the Chinese rail system are situated within a distinctively 
Chinese discursive and material context.25 I draw on Tim Ingold’s account of the relation 
between skill, culture and place26 to argue that rail produces an interlocked topological 
and territorial ‘region’ at the scale of the nation—though as this article’s account of suzhi 
makes clear, not a singular or homogenous national culture. 
This article contributes to the understanding of contemporary China as well. In 
contrast to a conception of suzhi as a passive, corporeal investment in some bodies at the 
expense of others,27 I argue for an active conception of suzhi that centers skill and spatial 
situated-ness. Foregrounding the ways that skill is situated in place draws attention to 
how spaces, not just bodies, takes on civilized or backwards qualities. In turn, centering 
suzhi in the analysis of rail space illuminates a neglected dimension of how passenger-
dedicated high-speed rail (hereafter: HSR) reshaped China’s cultural geography. Rail has 
long been central to China’s development: during opening and reform, it met the need for 
cheap mass transportation, delivering migrant workers to coastal factories and students to 
                                               
Approach to Passengers’ Gathering Taskscapes’, Journal of Transport Geography XIX (2011), 
pp.1031–1036 
25 On suzhi, see T.Jacka, ‘Cultivating Citizens: Suzhi (Quality) Discourse in the PRC’, positions: 
asia critique XVII (2009), pp.523–535; G.Sigley, ‘Suzhi, the Body, and the Fortunes of 
Technoscientific Reasoning in Contemporary China’, positions: asia critique XVII (2009), 
pp.537–566; A.Kipnis, ‘Suzhi: A Keyword Approach’, The China Quarterly CLXXXVI 
(2006), pp.295–313; on wenming, see P.Duara, ‘The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-
Asianism’, Journal of World History XII (2001), pp.99–130; R.Holmes, ‘Pillars of Fat: The 
Corporeal Aesthetics of Civilization (Wenming) in Contemporary Art’, The China Journal 
LXXII (2014), p.125; on rail, see Leung, Railway Patterns; E.Köll, Railroads and the 
Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2019) 
26 T.Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill 
(London, Routledge, 2002); T.Ingold, Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and 
Description (London, Routledge, 2011) 
27 A.Anagnost, ‘The corporeal politics of quality (suzhi)’, Public Culture XVI (2004), pp.189–
208; Sigley, Technoscientific Reasoning 
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distant universities. Yet in the early 2000s, despite years of investment in expansion, 
upgrading rolling stock and increasing speed, the system remained a crowded, chaotic, 
and unpleasant means of transport that pushed passengers to their limit.28 China’s airways 
and highways, also recipients of massive state investment, offered increasingly attractive 
alternatives to rail to a growing segment of travelers with different—‘higher’—
expectations of what constitutes acceptable travel conditions in terms of speed, cost, and 
comfort.  
The rail system responded with a huge investment in a brand new set of trains and 
track: passenger-dedicated high-speed rail. While a substantial literature examines HSR 
in terms of China’s political economy and urban development,29 HSR’s impact on rail 
travel’s social character has received less attention.30 The futuristic profiles of sleek new 
carriages and the hulking facades of new stations are complemented by an equally novel 
social environment within: like an airplane cabin but more spacious, stewards in sharp 
new uniforms await passengers inside air-conditioned, non-smoking compartments of 
forward-facing seats.31 Yet HSR’s impact is not limited to creating distinct facilities and 
                                               
28 S.Lee, ‘Higher Earnings, Bursting Trains and Exhausted Bodies: the Creation of Travelling 
Psychosis in Post-reform China’, Social Science & Medicine XLVII (1998), pp.1247–1261; 
Bullock et al., Tracks 
29 R.Bullock, J.Sondhi and P.Amos, Tracks from the Past, Transport for the Future: China’s 
Railway Industry 1990-2008 and its Future Plans and Possibilities (Beijing, The World Bank, 
2009); Z.Chen, K.E.Haynes, Y.Zhou and Z.Dai, High Speed Rail and China’s New Economic 
Geography: Impact Assessment from the Regional Science Perspective (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2019); Y.Qin, ‘China’s Transport Infrastructure Investment: Past, Present, and 
Future’, Asian Economic Policy Review XI (2016), pp.199–217; Zhou et al., High-speed   
30 Chan & Yuan, ‘Changing Travel Behaviour’, M.Givoni and D.Banister, ‘Speed: the less 
important element of the High-Speed Train’, Journal of Transport Geography, XXII (2012) 
pp.306–307 
31 China Railway Yearbook 2012 [Zhongguo Tielu Nianjian] (Beijing, Ministry of Railways 
Archives History Center [Tiedaobu Dang’an Shizhi Zhongxin], 2013), p.115; the similarity 
between HSR and airline stewardesses was also remarked upon by respondents. 
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levels of service, but about what passengers do and do not do. New, more ‘civilized’ 
social norms are communicated through official media, but also through how passengers 
conduct themselves and relate to others. An examination of how suzhi is actively 
practiced in rail space reveals that HSR serves the needs of a more discriminating 
ridership as much by cordoning off low-suzhi rail travel practices as by increasing speed: 
HSR’s innovations are social as much as technical.  
In the following sections, I illustrate how Ingold’s accounts of skill and region can 
put to work recent scholarship on the geographies of skill and mobility to investigate the 
production of cultural space. Ingold’s thinking is also used to highlight the role of place 
and skill within the literature on quality and civilized-ness in China. Following a brief 
discussion of methods, I examine how embodied suzhi markers are used by passengers to 
regulate their social interactions on board, as well as analyzing how carriage design and 
the proliferation of new objects like smartphones have shaped rail sociality in suzhi-laden 
ways. I then examine how these practices are depicted in media and signage within rail 
space. In closing, I contextualize these transformations of rail space suzhi within China’s 
intensifying governance of citizenship and behavioral norms. 
Skill and habit on the train 
Cultural geographers have radically rethought skill in the last decade: debates 
over the death of craft skill in the face of industrial process have given way to an 
understanding of skill as practical, processual, technical, ecological and political practices 
found in every realm of human endeavor.32 Anthropologist Tim Ingold draws on 
                                               
32 M.Patchett and J.Mann, ‘Five advantages of skill’, cultural geographies XXV (2018), pp.23–
29 
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developmental biology, ecological psychology and phenomenological philosophy to 
develop what he calls the ‘dwelling perspective’, an approach ‘founded on the premise 
that the forms humans build, whether in the imagination or on the ground, arise within 
the currents of their involved activity.’33 Here I examine how Ingold’s emphasis on 
process and situated-ness illuminates the cultural and placed character of rail travel 
practices. The study of rail travel as a skilled practice is an outlier in a literature that tends 
to focus on expert practitioners of unique crafts such as angling, taxidermy, or 
beekeeping.34 Such crafts are where skill is most visible, involving tools and 
environments distinct from those encountered in everyday life. Yet skill is not absent 
simply because it is not visible.35 Skilled practice often lurks under the appearance of 
mundane habit; as Goffman showed, even walking down a crowded street demands 
sophisticated maneuvering.36  
The skills of rail travel—from how to navigate the station, how to socialize 
onboard, how to pass the time, even how to look out the window—are emblematic of 
how the skillfulness of everyday practices becomes naturalized into invisibility. In rail’s 
early days, its arrival triggered anxiety: how to safely navigate this half-industrial space? 
How to behave in this novel social environment? In Europe and in China, guidebooks and 
etiquette manuals were published to educate passengers on the ‘hidden skills and 
                                               
33 Ingold, Being Alive, p.10 
34 S.Eden and C.Bear, ‘Reading the River Through “Watercraft”: Environmental Engagement 
Through Knowledge and Practice in Freshwater Angling’, cultural geographies XVIII (2011), 
pp.297–314; M.Patchett, ‘The Taxidermist’s Apprentice: Stitching Together the Past and 
Present of a Craft Practice’, cultural geographies XXIII (2016), pp.401–419; E.C.Adams, ‘How 
to Become a Beekeeper: Learning and Skill in Managing Honeybees’, cultural geographies 
XXV (2018), pp.31–47 
35 Patchett and Mann, ‘Five advantages of skill’, p.24 
36 E.Goffman, Relations in Public (Transaction Publishers, 2009) 
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established cultural practices that [we]re needed to handle a train journey, wait in line or 
interact with strangers.’37 One handbook noted that reading works as an ‘excellent 
weapon of defence against bores;’ rail station bookstalls and even lending libraries 
quickly proliferated.38 
Yet these skills rapidly became second nature, rendering guidebooks unnecessary: 
skill was evident only in its absence, in the awkward bodies of ‘country bumpkins’ fresh 
off the four o’clock train.39 Even today, however, being-with-others on the move requires 
skilled maneuvering of physical and social space, even if the skill remains sub-conscious. 
Alongside the subtleties of managing luggage in rail space,40 the temporary society of the 
compartment requires a careful navigation of containment and intimacy. Passengers 
employ ‘strategies of enclosure’ to create private spaces in intimate confines, or make 
‘gestures of responsibility’ to non-verbally communicate transient senses of 
community.41 A deliberate disengagement is a key skill for enduring long stretches of 
non-action; what Bissel describes as ‘forms of passivity that are actively called upon.’42 
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Rail travel troubles distinctions between skill and habit, visible and invisible, and also the 
distinction between action and inaction. 43  
Ingold’s work has probed at the ambiguities of skill, arguing skilled practice plays 
a central role in the relation between people and their environment. Ingold’s notion of 
skill highlights process and situated-ness. In foregrounding the processual dimension of 
skill, Ingold challenges a Taylorist definition of skill as the disciplined application of a 
predetermined series of discrete steps. Ingold’s attention to the situated-ness of skill also 
lends itself admirably to human geography: the practitioner is always already situated in 
an object-filled, richly structured environment with which they are actively engaged.44 
This framework emphasizes relationality: ‘To describe a thing as a tool is to place it in 
relation to other things within a field of activity in which it can exert a certain effect.’45 
This logic applies to environments and users as well as tools: all three are defined in 
relation with each other. Consequently, skill is always specific to particular spatial and 
material arrangements. 
Ingold coins the term ‘taskscape’ to draw attention to the phenomenological way 
that environments disclose themselves to those within them. Ingold argues that people 
come to know their environment the same way walkers learn a landscape—as an ongoing 
interaction oriented towards a purpose.46 Every environment is made, by human and 
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nonhuman actors, through the process of being inhabited, and the meanings thereby 
disclosed are not secondary to or separate from that practical material engagement.47 This 
perspective escapes an analytic divide between a real ‘natural’ landscape and secondary 
‘cultural’ meanings layered onto it.48 Applied to the built environment, this analytic 
directs attention away from the question of what its builders intended and towards the 
question of what meanings are disclosed for its inhabitants through skillful engagement. 
Rail offers many examples of how novel built environments, particularly 
transportation infrastructures, can transform perceptions in quite unanticipated ways. 
Schivelbusch details how the sheer speed of rail travel challenged, revolutionized, and 
fatigued travelers accustomed to slower modes.49 A wholly new ‘panoramic’ landscape 
was revealed: vast and ever-changing, scant with detail but sweeping in scope.50 This 
transformed the relationship between travelers and landscape in two ways. First, it 
brought distant locales into intimate contact: as the network expanded ‘the whole 
population of the country would, speaking metaphorically, at once advance en masse, and 
place their chairs nearer to the fireside of their metropolis’, condensing an entire country 
into ‘one immense city’.51 Even as it brought regions together, however, rail 
infrastructure interposed itself between traveler and landscape: ‘[the traveler] hardly 
knows the names of the principal cities through which he passes’, each reduced to 
stations which ‘contain the essence of its personality just as upon their signboards they 
                                               
47 Ingold, Perception, pp.178–79, 186 
48 Op. cit., p.208 
49 Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey 
50 Op. cit., p.60 
51 quoted in Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey, p.34 
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bear its painted name.’52 Rail travel abstracts away from the particularities of any given 
place in order to create region at the scale of the nation. 
Ingold argues for an understanding of spatial knowledge that is neither a ‘bird’s-
eye view’ that presents the world from a perspective of imagined omniscience, nor one 
that confines knowing to a series of snapshots from fixed points of observation. Rather, 
environmental knowledge emerges from ‘journeying from place to place along a way of 
life,’ as a network of circulations which integrate knowledge not from a series of 
locations but across:  
One can no more know in places than travel in them. Rather, knowledge is 
regional: it is to be cultivated by moving along paths that lead around, towards or 
away from places, from or to places elsewhere.53 
Moving and knowing are inextricably entwined, and the new landscapes produced 
through rail travel are not merely perceptual. Rail gives rise to region at a novel scale, 
produced through the same processual, situated engagement which weaves together every 
landscape—but an engagement both broader and more attenuated. I argue it gives rise to 
a novel pair of regions: an exterior region of the territories newly integrated by the 
railroad, and an interior region constituted within the stations and carriages of the rail 
system—rail space. Rail space requires the cultivation of a whole new suite of skills, but 
once acquired they unlock circulation within a new region whose contours are described 
by the geographical extent of the rail network. Rail travel forges of a sense of knowing 
and belonging to a vast new region, and to a new community of practice within it.  
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Counter to a simplistic technological determinism, the problems posed by rail 
technology were perceived and managed in different ways by different classes and in 
different places. In Europe, the bourgeois debate over how to design closed 
compartments reflected and manifested dual anxieties of isolation and overexposure; yet 
in third and fourth class carriages, lower class passengers socialized freely and ‘merry 
conversation and laughter rang.’54 On American railways, an open ‘saloon’ design 
modeled after river boats, where rich and poor moved freely within was the norm until a 
first class came into being with the Pullman car.55  
Euro-American railways developed at a distance from the state; in China, as in 
Belgium and Italy, rail was explicitly a nation-building project from early on. The early 
Republican state sought to shape a new kind of Chinese citizen, instilled with ‘modern,’ 
civilized qualities;56 rail was a site where these abstract qualities took on a concrete form: 
The railroads’ amalgamation of railroad-related time and body discipline 
with other Western ‘civilizing’ aspects of social engineering aimed at broader 
concepts, such as courtesy or hygienic awareness in public space.57 
In the 1930s, state textbooks for school children had chapters devoted to proper 
behavior at rail stations, including orderly queueing.58 The community within the 
compartment became a microcosm for society, where the norms of social intercourse, 
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56 Sigley, ‘Technoscientific Reasoning’; S.H.Lei, ‘Moral Community of Weisheng: Contesting 
Hygiene in Republican China’, East Asian Science, Technology and Society: an International 
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including gender relations, were worked out anew.59 In learning to find their way through 
rail space, passengers were also learning how to be members of a nascent Chinese nation. 
Quality and civilized-ness as skill 
As us Chinese people’s national quality (suzhi) has improved, as people’s 
quality has improved, a lot of uncivilized (bu wenming) behavior is less common. 
Before, sitting on those slow trains, food trash was littered all over, people were 
taking off their shoes with their smelly socks, a lot of that kind of thing. But now 
people like that are rarer, and suzhi is much higher. Suzhi keeps going up, doesn’t 
it?60 
In contemporary China, one dominant strand within the debate of ‘proper’ 
citizenship centers around the concept of suzhi. Difficult to define precisely, suzhi refers 
to ‘a combination of material and ethical substances’ including both ‘the physical and 
quantifiable features of the body’ as well as ‘forms of human conduct that are measured 
in terms of ethical, moral, and cultural value.’61 Suzhi is marked by and marks a 
bewildering array of bodily qualities—height, skin color or hygiene—and personal 
comportment—accent, table manners or clothes—and marks difference across such 
divides as urban and rural,62 modern and backwards,63 rich and poor,64 Han and 
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minority,65 and center and periphery. Suzhi is often most clearly apprehended in its 
absence: its lack can be seen in the figures of ‘rural migrants, litterbugs, the short, the 
nearsighted and the poorly dressed.’66 Uneasily situated between innate and nurtured, 
suzhi can in theory be improved by public intervention in the form of education, or 
through individual consumption of nutritional supplements or etiquette guides.67 Suzhi 
education (suzhi jiaoyu) has been posited as a corrective for China’s test-centric 
educational system,68 and the peasantry’s lack of it is blamed for the failure of rural 
development.69 In practice however, the suzhi of the lacking—the rural, the poor, the 
uneducated—exists in a realm that appears unbridgeably distant from that of the urban, 
the rich, the educated.70 
The notion of suzhi dates to the reform period of the late seventies, rising to 
prominence by the mid-2000s. The term ‘civilized-ness’ (wenming), on the other hand, 
has long been central to debates over modernity, development and bodily comportment in 
China.71 As China struggled with foreign encroachment in the late Qing, modernizers and 
nationalists argued China’s woes were due to a pervasive lack of ‘quality’ among its 
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people.72 The primarily quantitative approach to population—the more, the better—of the 
Qing court gave way to an increasingly qualitative analysis of individualized 
development; technologies of statistical measurement which rendered bodily qualities 
visible emerged alongside technologies of discipline which aimed to improve those 
qualities. This tradition of Chinese governmentality draws on globally circulating 
discourses of neoliberal population governance, but has a distinct lineage.73  
In the reform period, suzhi and civilized-ness have both circulated through official 
and popular discourse of modernity and development. Jiang Zemin’s push for ‘spiritual 
civilization’ in the 1990s gave way to suzhi in the oughts. In the last decade civilization 
has made a comeback in the guise of ‘ecological civilization’ and also as one of the 
twelve Core Socialist Values.74 
As a form of human ‘quality’, suzhi is conceptualized in the academic and popular 
Chinese discourse as a corporeal thing. This conceptualization has facilitated the analysis 
of suzhi as ‘human capital’, labor in its congealed form.75 Here I approach suzhi as value 
in motion: how does suzhi realize value through an ongoing production process? Markers 
like accent, clothing, and other forms of bodily comportment may appear innate but are 
actively performed; highlighting the processual nature of these manifestations of suzhi 
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draws attention to the contingent and actively produced character of what seems 
inescapably ‘natural.’76  
The lens of skill troubles the assumption, implicit in the language of ‘lacking’ 
suzhi, that ‘low’ suzhi practices are less demanding than those of ‘high’ suzhi. I found in 
my research that practices that are, from one perspective, representative of low suzhi are 
from another perspective skillful strategies for surviving arduous rail journeys. Keeping 
each other entertained—sane, even77—over marathon multi-day train journeys is not 
easier than disappearing into one’s phone to shop or chat. I therefore adopt a 
methodological agnosticism as to whether ‘high’ or ‘low’ suzhi translates into ‘high’ or 
‘low’ levels of skill. 
Second, situating suzhi in space shows how suzhi (and the behaviors through 
which it is enacted) are woven into the material environment. The question of spatiality 
lurks in the background of the suzhi literature: Anagnost writes that suzhi’s non-relation 
of lack and plenitude ‘is stunningly concretized by the construction of new gated 
communities far away from the pinmin ku (the Chinese translation of what Marx called 
“ghettos of the poor” in Capital).’78 Yan juxtaposes the hot, cramped stairway filled with 
rural women hoping to become housemaids waiting outside and the air-conditioned, 
gleaming office of the employment agency, indexing a stark spatialization.79 Suzhi is 
instantiated not only in the bodies of rural migrants and urban professionals, but in an 
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increasingly bifurcated built environment. The corollary of the taskscape is that the 
environment also shapes skilled practice: certain environments offer different 
‘affordances,’ or potential actions and perceptions.80 The possibilities for action the build 
environment provides enable and constrain what sort of suzhi can be manifested. 
Attending to the situated-ness of suzhi illuminates how rail space shapes space not 
just inside the compartment but in China as a whole. The deep divides between rural and 
urban, backwards and developed which are central to suzhi discourse only become 
viscerally apparent when they collide: the rural nanny’s lacking suzhi is made manifest in 
Beijing,81 and the refined suzhi of the well-educated civil servant becomes tangibly 
present in rural, poverty-stricken Anhui.82 Rail is a central mechanism for this collision, 
the integument which knits together the once-isolated regions of metropole and 
countryside into an integrated, albeit highly uneven, national space.  
Rail also produces a wholly novel taskscape within: inside its stations and 
carriages, migrant laborers and educated urbanites rub elbows in the most literal way. 
This makes rail space a site where discourses of quality and civilized-ness take on 
concrete forms: suzhi is measured by the quiet circumspection of one’s seatmate, in the 
cleanliness of the restrooms. In assessing rail space, passengers do not distinguish clearly 
between the suzhi of the space and the suzhi of the passengers. Suzhi is environmental as 
much as it is corporeal. 
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For decades, rail space and passenger practices evolved in parallel, 
complementing each other so closely their interdependence was difficult to see. The rise 
of high-speed passenger-dedicated rail lines (HSR) has created a rupture in the 
homogeneity of rail space. HSR carriages offer a different set of affordances than 
conventional carriages, and enable a different suite of traveling practices; a new set of 
responsibilities to other traveling bodies. As passengers move between HSR and 
conventional rail spaces, certain practices become noticeable, suddenly out of harmony 
with their environment. This mismatch renders visible the ways in which suzhi infuses 
both rail spaces and rail practices—and how the development of HSR works to transform 
the suzhi of rail space and the suzhi of rail travelers. 
Methods 
This article draws on findings from seven months of fieldwork conducted in 2016 
and 2017. Building on ethnographic approaches centering questions of corporeality, 
affect and practice,83 I used participant observation, photography, and interviews to 
investigate the bodies, things, and infrastructures of Chinese rail space. My positionality 
as a non-Chinese passenger gave me partial access to rail space: the purchase of a ticket 
granted me entry, but certain dimensions of rail practice were inaccessible due to 
citizenship or cultural background. As a novice passenger in Chinese rail space, I had to 
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Non-Representational, and Affect-Based Research: Seven Injunctions’, in D.DeLyser, 
S.Herbert, S.Aitken, M.Crang and L.McDowell, eds., The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Geography (SAGE Publications, 2010), pp.321–334; R.Longhurst, E.Ho and L.Johnston, 
‘Using “the Body” as an “Instrument of Research”: Kimch’i and Pavlova’, Area XL (2008), 
pp.208–217; J.Ash, ‘Visceral Methodologies, Bodily Style and the Non-human’, Geoforum 
LXXXII (2017), pp.206–207 
269 
learn how to navigate at the same time I was investigating its social character; I used this 
position as learner to make the practices of rail travel visible. 
Drawing on infrastructural methodologies and the materialist turn, I conceptualize 
rail space as a more-than-human assemblage composed of both the technical 
infrastructure of track and station, and the community of practice comprising its 
passengers.84 The larger research project seeks to investigate the materiality of nation and 
state in the form of rail infrastructure.85 
The participant observation portion of the research took the form of riding the 
train. Routes encompassed both high-speed (HSR) and conventional trains, and 
geographically spanned from Manzhouli on the Russian border to Sanya on the South 
China Sea; from Khorgos on the border with Kazakhstan to Mudanjiang, above North 
Korea. Despite this broad scope, a concentration of routes around places of residence in 
Guangzhou and Beijing was unavoidable. Observations were documented in the form of 
fieldnotes and photographs. Interviews were conducted in Chinese with rail passengers of 
a range of ages, education levels and socio-economic classes, though demographically 
skewed towards younger, better educated and middle class. Interviewees were recruited 
by convenience sampling on board the train, and via snowball sampling. 
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Practicing suzhi on the rail 
In order to examine how suzhi manifests through the skillful and situated practices 
of rail travel, this section examines how practices of rail sociality shifts over space and 
time. I found a double movement: respondents reported that socializing on the train had 
changed between ‘before’ and ‘now’ and between conventional and HSR carriages. 
‘Before’ or on conventional trains, rail travel involved a greater degree of social 
interaction, while ‘now’ or on HSR trains, the atmosphere of the carriage encourages 
self-containment and enclosure. These differences are on the one hand, pragmatic 
adaptations to the distinct travelling conditions, and on the other, are woven into larger 
social narratives of modernity and backwardness, wealth and poverty, urbanity and 
rurality: in a word, of suzhi.  
Suzhi and ‘civilized-ness were used interchangeably to describe—and criticize the 
conditions of rail space. Rail space, where carefully maintained distance between 
civilized and uncivilized bodies is collapsed, cast suzhi in sharp relief. Analyzing suzhi in 
this moment of concrete manifestation reveals how it is produced not as a passive quality 
to be ‘built into’ bodies, but how it is actively embodied through skillful engagement 
with a richly structured environment. As process, suzhi manifests in rail space through 
interpersonal interaction, ways of dressing, and methods for passing time and staying fed 
that are simultaneously pragmatic strategies for dealing with the material realities of rail 
travel and are also markers of social distinction. 
In addition to judgements from passengers regarding the suzhi of rail spaces, I 
also find that HSR in particular exhibited efforts to inhibit or discourage practices seen as 
emblematic of low suzhi. I examine the means by which rail space attempts to educate 
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passengers of HSR trains in ‘proper’ behavior on the train, how to behave, how to speak 
and how to eat while on board, and what that tells us about the role of suzhi in the 
political economy of the rail system. 
While presented here as dichotomies, I do not intend to argue there are only two 
ways to travel by train in China. While certain suites of travel practices tended to cluster, 
distinctions were far from absolute. The practices I discuss are mixed and matched 
differently by individual passengers, and the ridership of conventional and HSR trains 
overlap. 
Conversation, near and far 
Because I’m relatively extroverted, on board it’s no big deal to chat with 
my tablemates. By and large I chat—or these days, maybe everyone is playing with 
their cellphones, doing their own thing, listening to music.86 
Respondents invariably described the trains of previous decades as chaotic and 
slow, too full of people, their food and their smell. One of the few things that was 
remembered with any fondness was the social atmosphere—an exciting mix of new 
people to get to know over the long hours or days of travel. Facing each other across the 
small tables in the hard seat carriages, passengers told stories, played cards, and shared 
sunflower seeds as the miles rolled by. Food was both a necessity on long journeys, and 
also a way to pass time and to socialize. Small fruits and seeds keep hands busy and are 
easy to share with fellow travelers. ‘Before’ rail carriages were much more convivial 
conversational spaces, and ‘now’ people tended to keep to themselves. Passengers 
accustomed to longer trips on slower trains were more open to social intercourse with the 
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temporary society of the carriage than those whose experiences of rail travel came from 
shorter trips on newer trains. Older passengers, whose expectations of rail travel were 
formed in the old ‘greenskin’ carriages tended to prefer socializing. Yet similar trains 
also remain the norm for poorer passengers and in more isolated areas. Outside the well-
traveled inter-city routes, or for migrant workers returning home as cheaply as possible, 
those modes of travel and the social atmosphere that goes along with it still remain. 
Other passengers, however, prefer to erect clear boundaries between themselves 
and their seatmates. Conversation is only proper if there is a sufficient degree of 
similarity of age, of education—of suzhi.87 In the new rail space etiquette, the suitability 
of conversation is not assumed. A number of respondents highlighted the role of mobile 
communications as a driver of this shift. Smart phones have radically expanded the 
options available to rail passengers, allowing them access to streaming video and music 
as well as staying in contact with friends and family via WeChat, China’s ubiquitous 
messaging app. 
Before we didn’t have anything to speak of. Before, when we didn’t have 
these toys, we’d sit down with people we didn’t know to play cards because getting 
online with cellphones to watch movies, to watch TV wasn’t this convenient. Just 
getting the news was amazing. Any sort of chatting [via app] wasn’t convenient—it 
was all by SM, as expensive as one penny per text. There was no Wechat, or even 
QQ. Most people would play cards with strangers. But now that’s rare, now 
basically everyone on the train if they aren’t sleeping then they’re playing on their 
phones.88   
Smartphones’ outsized role in contemporary Chinese rail practice parallels the 
role newspapers and paperback novels played on early European trains, allowing 
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passengers to opt out of the awkward social space generated by new temporalities of 
travel. While mobility studies has examined how smartphones have reshaped traveling 
practices in Western contexts,89 the combination of HSR’s tighter temporalities and the 
sudden ubiquity of smartphones in China has created a particularly sharp break between 
travel practice “before” and “now.”  
 
In general, short trips don’t work. Short trips, it’s just one moment and then 
you’re there, you still haven’t gotten into the right state of mind by the time you 
arrive. On long trips though, on truly long trips you can get to know one another.90 
Multiple shifts in China’s transportation system have conspired to reduce the 
length of the average train trip in the past decades. Train travel as a whole has gotten 
much faster in China: between 1990 and 2007, a series of network-wide ‘speed-ups’ 
increased the average train speed for conventional passenger trains by 40%, to 69 kmh.91 
The introduction of HSR in the 2000s reduced travel time by another order of magnitude: 
some lines operate at average speeds as high as 289 km/h, three or four times faster than 
conventional lines. For trips longer than 1000 km (about four hours on HSR), air travel is 
an increasingly competitive alternative.92 Consequently, train trips of a day or more are a 
once-common experience now endured only by the economically and geographically 
marginal. 
While the distinction between conventional and HSR carriages does not strictly 
reflect travel time—one may spend minutes on a slow train or the better part of a day on a 
                                               
89 Bissell, Transit Life 
90 Interview 8. 
91 Bullock et al., Tracks, p.37 
92 Zhou et al., High-speed, pp.3–7 
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high-speed train—the arrangement of the carriages further contributes to shaping distinct 
social spaces. HSR introduced a different compartment design:  
 
D: It’s only on conventional trains you can chat? 
I8: Yeah, face to face. On HSR, the seats are in rows and on conventional 
trains there are two seats facing each other. Chatting like that is better…. You 
could say [HSR] is an environment where it’s just not very convenient to chat: 
craning around behind you to talk, it feels a bit improper. On the high-speed trains, 
people definitely chat less.93 
HSR carriages are much quieter than conventional carriages: not only is there less 
conversation, the relative quiet of the train itself makes raised voices stand out all the 
more. HSR also integrates smart phone usage more smoothly than conventional trains. 
The scarcity of outlets on conventional trains limits the utility of smartphones, even for 
passengers carrying external batteries. Onboard the newer HSR trainsets, however, 
electrical sockets are easy to find.  
While respondents narrated this shift in terms of ‘before’ and ‘now,’ my 
fieldwork showed this distinction to be less temporal and more spatial. China’s convivial 
train culture endures among those whose journeys are still days-long, without access to 
electricity or signal. With the rise of HSR, this distinction is sharply drawn: HSR tickets 
cost three to five times more than equivalent conventional tickets. The HSR network 
describes an uneven spatiality: HSR began by connecting major cities like Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou, and despite rapid expansion these metropoles remain 
disproportionately well-connected. The distinction between conventional rail and HSR 
                                               
93 Interview 4. 
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comes to coincide not only with suzhi-laden dichotomies like modern and backward, rich 
and poor, but also urban and rural, central and peripheral. 
Transforming passengers into citizens 
Constructing rail space as a civilized, high suzhi environment is a site of active 
intervention by rail management—particularly on HSR. New norms of self-contained 
bodily comportment are communicated through ubiquitous videos, posters and signage in 
stations and carriages. Figure 7.1 shows a selection of stills from what I term rail practice 
public service announcements (or PSAs): short films which communicate to passengers 
how to comport themselves in rail space, including how to navigate stations, how to read 
tickets, what dangerous items are forbidden, how to use hot water taps, but most 
crucially, how to behave. These films play on large video screens facing station plazas 
and inside waiting rooms, while HSR carriages are typically equipped with monitors in 
every compartment. Intercut with advertisements for products like movies, amusement 
parks or whiskey, descriptions of the train’s technical features, and announcements of 
new line openings, the pervasive nature of these films suggests the central importance of 
passenger behavior in shaping the social character of rail space.  
These guides to proper behavior are notable in two ways: first, they frame proper 
behavior in terms of civilized-ness (See Figure 7.2). Civilized-ness, moreso than suzhi, 
figures prominently in the discourses in and about rail space. Rail practice PSAs connect 
larger state campaigns concerning ‘civilized-ness’ and the other eleven Core Socialist 
Values to the concrete practices of everyday rail travel. Second, the target of rail practice 
PSAs are kinds of behaviors that inconvenience other passengers. Passengers who take 
up too much space, eat foul smelling foods, throw garbage on the floors of carriages, 
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Figure 7.1. Left: a placard beside a set of automatic ticketing machines in Wuhan reads: 
‘Observe morality and respect order; travel safely; yield in a civilized (wenming) way.’ 
Right: A poster in Hechuan reads: ‘Together let’s make the whole country a civilized 
(wenming) region; let’s cooperate to make Hechuan a beautiful garden.’ All photos by 
author. 
 
quarrel over seats, smoke in carriages, and otherwise make rail travel unpleasant for other 
are depicted as unshaven, clueless brutes (see Figure 7.3). Despite over a century of use, 
rail space remains a site where the state seeks to instill with ‘modern,’ civilized qualities 
of punctuality, discipline and proper bodily comportment. However, reshaping passenger 
comportment is not solely a pro-active form of state citizen-making—in the case of 
Chinese HSR rail, it is also a reaction to passenger’s rising expectations of comfort and 
service. The same set of behaviors targeted by rail practice PSAs—making noise, making 
messes—were repeatedly highlighted by my respondents as the most consistently 
unpleasant aspects of rail travel.  
Yet the low suzhi ridership whose traveling practices render rail travel intolerable 
to high suzhi passenger remains, and remains dependent on the conventional rail network. 
The spatiality of suzhi is thus a pressing dilemma for the rail system: spaces suited to the 
needs and preferences of the low suzhi passengers who rely on the rail system must be 
maintained, even as spaces catering to the high suzhi passengers who the rail system 
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needs to remain profitable must be engineered. The system is caught between the 
incompatible requirements of the passengers who need the rail system, and the 
passengers the rail system needs. In order to serve both these incompatible riderships, the 
Chinese rail network has developed into a bifurcated network, divided by cost, speed and 
traveling practices. Yet this strategic move can only partially and unevenly resolve the 
tension between low- and high-suzhi riderships: the HSR and conventional rail still 
intersect, as do their riderships. While many HSR stations are wholly separate from 
conventional stations, in stations serving both networks, waiting rooms are often arranged 
in such a way to achieve de facto segregation—often literally cordoned off. The 
contradictions of suzhi have been concretized into the very infrastructure. 
 
Figure 7.2. A rail practice PSA plays above the line to enter Chengdu Station. The 
subtitle reads, ‘Please yield in a civilized (wenming) manner to allow old, young, sick 
and disabled passengers enter first.’ 
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Figure 7.3. Descending, from left to right: an oaf hogs the waiting room bench, an 
inconsiderate passenger eats a durian, and two men quarrel during boarding (on a train 
from Shenzhen to Xiamen); passengers talking to seatmates and on the phone disturb a 
baby (between Shangrao and Nanchang); a banana peel in the aisle causes an accident, 
and, finally: ‘Journey in a civilized way: please keep the carriage neat and tidy’ (between 
Wuhan and Guangzhou). 
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Conclusion 
Applying Ingold’s dwelling perspective to the build environment of rail illustrates 
the central role played by skill in articulating together culture and place. Transportation 
infrastructures like rail create new regions within and outside their walls, expanding 
communities of practice beyond the local. This brings the question of the national 
community to the fore; how skill knits it together, but also how skill propagates fractures 
within it.94 This article’s findings suggest that the geography of skill is a productive and 
illuminating site for the investigation of cultural production at the national scale.  
This article’s examination of suzhi as skill builds on existing scholarship 
concerning its discursive and corporeal qualities to show how it is actively produced and 
situated in place. Steeped in distinctively Chinese discourses of civilization and 
development, suzhi is materially embodied by travelers and embedded within rail space. 
Rail travel collapses the distance between rural and urban, poor and wealthy between 
regions in China; moreover, the material situatedness of suzhi in rail space has significant 
consequences for the development of the Chinese rail network, forcing a bifurcation of 
rail space that materially manifests the widening wealth gap in China. Even as the rural, 
the poor and the uneducated scramble to improve their social standing, the gap between 
the haves and the have-nots continues to widen. 
The ways in which skill and social quality are concretized into the infrastructure 
of the Chinese rail system takes on a deeper resonance when considered in light of the 
Chinese state’s use of the rail system to shape passengers as citizen-subjects. The nascent 
                                               
94 see also Edensor, National Identity 
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“social credit” system now punishes those with poor credit by banning them from 
purchasing rail and plane tickets, turning rail space from a site of education to an 
apparatus of enforcement.95 If, as Ingold argues, moving through space is how people 
come to know their world, then engineering infrastructure is a means of shaping 
perception at a core, phenomenological level. Yet this article suggests that the 
determination of what responsibilities passengers are obligated to fulfil is not a simple 
function of state power, but a complex horizontal and even bottom-up negotiation: 
passenger preferences and ingrained practices also exert a tangible pressure on what is 
acceptable. Despite the power such infrastructural assemblages afford the state, the 
agency of passengers remains. 
Bridge 
This chapter examines how rail space has become a laboratory for the 
construction of class in contemporary China. Suzhi becomes a central criteria by which 
people and places are judged. Passengers use suzhi to discern the quality of their fellow 
travelers and their accommodations, and state officials and rail administrators use 
‘civilization’ to discipline passengers to enhance rail space quality and maximize the 
system’s value. The emergence of suzhi as a central criteria is not due to bottom-up or 
top-down forces, but to their convergence. The following chapter examines the tension 
between population and government from a different vantage, that of citizenship and 
legibility. In the next chapter, I argue that the real name ticketing system and the 
proliferation of the shenfenzheng national identification card combine to give rail 
                                               
95 ‘China to bar people with bad ‘social credit’ from planes, trains’ (Reuters 2018) 
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infrastructure a substantive role in shaping citizenship in everyday life, making it into a 
‘circulatory panopticon.’ As with suzhi, the contours of citizenship are not wholly 
determined by a top-down disciplinary process, but through mobilizing passengers to 
actively render themselves legible. By conceptualizing the rail ridership as a ‘natural 
phenomenon,’ the state is able to bring passengers to regulate themselves; yet as with 
every other state action, it produces unintended fractures, or diffractions, as well. 
 
282 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE CIRCULATORY PANOPTICON:  
RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE AS CITIZENSHIP-REALIZING AND  
-DIFFRACTING APPARATUS AND FOUCAULT’S REALIST TURN 
Introduction 
In 2011, China Railway introduced 12306.cn, its brand-new, $52 million online 
ticketing system (Wertime, 2012). After a rocky few years, purchasing tickets online—
and complaining about its shortcomings—has become an integral part of the rail travel 
experience. In 2014, a terrorist attack on Kunming rail station triggered an intensification 
of station security across China: the relatively unfettered flow of passengers, well-
wishers, hawkers and criminals in and out of stations came to a halt. At the center of both 
of these shifts is the “real name system”, a novel sociotechnology which connects the 
ticket bought online to the person entering the station via the shenfenzheng—the state 
identification card issued to citizens of the People’s Republic of China.  
Both domestically and abroad, the ever-evolving efficiency and safety of rail 
travel has become symbolic of China’s economic and technological rise. Yet these 
technological transformations have social ramifications: in joining rail travel to 
citizenship status, the state has made the rail system into technology of citizenship (von 
Schnitzler, 2008), a site where indeterminate and conflicting conceptions of what 
citizenship means and who can claim it are concretely realized with every trip (Barad, 
2007). By inserting state identification into rail travel, the real name system has turned 
the built environment of the rail system’s stations and carriages from a site opaque to the 
state to one where the identity and movements of individual passengers are fully legible 
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(Scott, 1998). Rail travel has become what I term a circulatory panopticon: a Foucauldian 
“apparatus of security” which functions not through discipline but through bringing the 
population to regulate itself (Foucault, 2009). With the term “circulatory panopticon,” I 
signal two transformations in the function of the classic Benthamite panopticon. First, at 
a very obvious level, Chinese rail infrastructure does not serve to render people legible by 
fixing them in place: rather, people become visible to the state apparatus through 
mobility. Second, the design of the circulatory panopticon operates by a different 
mechanism which conceived of the population as an altogether different sort of thing: not 
as a fixed collection of definite individuals to be disciplined, but as a natural, aleatory 
phenomenon to be regulated through its inherent inclinations. Travelers produce 
themselves as legible state subjects, turning their agency to the purposes of the state. 
The function of the railway real name system is to create determinate boundaries, 
filtering legible citizens into standardized spaces, yet the cuts enacted by the rail system 
do not always neatly coincide. Even as the rail system determines boundaries between 
citizen and non-citizen, between legible and legitimate subjects of the state and the rest, it 
also produces a variety of not-quite subjects scattered across that new-drawn line of 
difference—what Barad (2007) terms “diffraction.” The theoretically seamless join 
between citizenship and rail travel produced by the real name system is for some people 
in some places quite marked: non-citizens behave at times like citizens, and some citizens 
find themselves excluded. This diffraction cuts across populations and also territories: rail 
space also exhibits diffraction within and outside its boundaries. In practice, neither those 
populations nor those spaces are as clear cut as they seem. 
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In emphasizing these diffractions this article is not making the claim that the 
Chinese rail system only appears to integrate populations and territories, concealing a 
messier underlying reality. On the contrary: both the integration and the diffraction of 
citizenship and territory are fully real. Rail can function as a citizen-making apparatus 
only because it is already a passenger- and space-making apparatus (Schivelbusch, 1986). 
Rail infrastructure enables a certain population circulation within a certain region, 
realizing a homogenized interior within a determinate boundary in both material and 
discursive reality. The question this article asks is not whether rail acts as a centrifugal or 
centripetal force in China, but rather how mobilizing rail travel as an apparatus of citizen-
making, weaving state definitions of citizenship into everyday life, transforms citizenship 
in ways that are not wholly what the state intended.  
To better understand how the introduction of the real name system has 
transformed rail infrastructure into a citizen-making apparatus, I synthesize Barad’s 
account of agential realism (2007) with Foucault’s work on governmentality (2008, 
2009). The keystone of this synthesis is their shared notion of the “apparatus,” a practice 
or technology which does not merely operate on pre-existing entities, but which is 
essentially productive—of things, of concepts, of realities. The two theorize the apparatus 
from very different exemplars, however: for Barad the quintessential apparatus is that of 
quantum experimentation, and for Foucault it is the apparatus of government. Considered 
as an apparatus, rail infrastructure brings together Barad’s interest in the apparatus as 
productive of a diffracted reality and Foucault’s interest in “the problem of circulation” in 
the emergence of governmentality (Foucault, 2009, p. 64). Synthesizing a hybrid 
Baradian/Foucauldian apparatus combines Foucault’s analysis of the state and Barad’s 
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theory of diffraction to better understand how paper tickets and plastic identification 
cards, steel railways and concrete station buildings, can both lend reality to governmental 
rationalities while also manifesting real discontinuities—how power is both instantiated 
and compromised in the same moment. 
This synthesis moreover produces a novel insight into the status of “reality” in 
Foucault’s thinking. Following Lemke (2015), I read Foucault’s Collège de France 
lectures as presenting not just an elaboration or extension of his earlier work on juridical 
and disciplinary forms of power, but a subtle reworking of his object of analysis: no 
longer primarily concerned with the construction of governmentality, his analytic is also 
concerned with the construction of reality. This realist turn allows Foucault to be read 
back into Barad’s forthright realism, producing a conception of governmentality as 
produced through intra-action between human and non-human agents. 
The first section of this article examines the role of the apparatus in Barad and 
Foucault’s writing, with a particular attention to their discussion of reality as emergent. I 
then introduce the Chinese rail system, situating it within the historical development of 
the Chinese state. The following two sections examine how the real name system has 
been woven into the online ticketing system and the control of rail space. A final section 
offers some conclusions concerning how the hybrid, realist account of the apparatus 
presented here can be applied to further investigate the citizen-making dimensions of 
large scale infrastructure. 
Methodology 
This account of the Chinese rail system draws on data collected through 
participant observation within the rail system as well as interviews with rail passengers. 
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Fieldwork was conducted over seven months in 2016 and 2017. Drawing on materialist 
and affective ethnographic methodologies (Dewsbury, 2010; Fox & Alldred, 2015; 
Militz, 2017; Whatmore, 2006), I conducted a traveling ethnography of rail infrastructure 
(Marcus, 1995; Star, 1999) by riding as a passenger on trains throughout China: east to 
near the North Korean border, east to the China-Kazakhstan border, south to the shore of 
the South China Sea,* and north to China’s border with Russia. In addition to covering 
the extent of the rail network, traveling by both conventional and high-speed rail, I also 
traveled a selection of routes multiple times over many days to develop a sense of 
normality and variation along a single stretch of track. I used this participant observation 
to gather data, on the variation and standardization of architectural forms and spatial 
affordances offered by rail space, the management of rail space and the practices 
employed by passengers during their time within rail space.   
I conducted twenty interviews with rail passengers, recruited onboard and via 
snowball sampling. I interviewed passengers of a variety of genders, ages, educational 
and regional backgrounds, but with noticeable tendencies towards higher educational 
attainment and younger ages. Interviews focused on passengers’ practices and 
preferences concerning rail travel, their history with rail travel and, particularly with 
older respondents, their memories of the system’s development over time. 
This project employs this data on the spaces of the rail system and the passengers 
that navigate them to investigate the rail system as a citizen-making apparatus. In 
Baradian terms, I examine the diffraction patterns evident within rail spaces in order to 
                                               
* This route was also entirely by rail: a ferry takes rail carriages from the mainland to Hainan; 
then along the HSR route to Sanya on the southern tip of the island. 
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understand the nature of the apparatus that produces them (Barad, 2007, p. 73; Hollin, 
Forsyth, Giraud, & Potts, 2017, p. 927). As shall become clear below, a great deal turns 
upon the “I” in the previous sentence, and on the position of the researcher within the 
research apparatus.  
The account of the Chinese rail system in this article is the rail system that exists 
in relation to the particular research apparatus with which it was measured (Fox & 
Alldred, 2015). As Barad demonstrates in her account of the Stern-Gerlach experiment, 
even quantum physics materially engages questions of gender, class, and national 
background (Barad, 2007, pp. 161–168). The particular patterns of significance that made 
themselves evident are without question shaped by my particular relation to the rail 
system. For example, my sustained interest in how citizenship and passenger legibility 
are entangled is deeply shaped by my position as a passenger traveling with a foreign 
passport. More pressingly, my position relative to the Chinese rail system surely rendered 
other, equally real, patterns of significance invisible. My interviews made clear that 
perceptions and practices varied considerably with age, for example. As a consequence, 
the citizen-making apparatus described here is definite but not definitive, open to 
alternate diffractions through which other patterns of difference are made real. 
Theorizing the Apparatus with Barad and Foucault 
Barad’s theory of agential realism synthesizes feminist materialisms and quantum 
physics to produce an account of reality that emphasizes its continual re-realization 
through the material and discursive practices of multiple human and non-human agencies 
(2007, 2014). Characterized by a rigorous attention to the specificities of quantum 
experimentation, Barad shows how to integrate a series of classic dichotomies—material 
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and discursive, science and society, nature and culture—within a single analytic. By the 
same token, however, the application of this analytic to the social world is less clear. 
Within a larger re-orientation towards material reality (Anderson, Kearnes, McFarlane, & 
Swanton, 2012; Whatmore, 2006), geographers have drawn on Barad to grapple with the 
role of the material and the non-human in geopolitical discourse (Darling, 2014; Squire, 
2015) and the regulation of borders (Squire, 2014). Squire draws on Barad to examine 
how the very category of “human” is constituted through “struggles to de/value people, 
places and things” without “assuming either the supremacy or the powerlessness of 
people” (2014, p. 12).  
Where Barad is a new addition to geographic theory, Foucault has long been a 
touchstone for critical analyses of spatial discourses and practices (Gregory, 1994; Soja, 
1989). His notion of governmentality, the political rationalities through which concepts 
and practices become thinkable and doable, has been influential within political 
geography (Crampton & Elden, 2007; Garmany, 2009; Jessop, 2007). In the past decade, 
this engagement has been re-invigorated by the publication in English of his 1977-1979 
lectures at the Collège de France (2008, 2009). These pivotal lectures present many 
familiar Foucauldian concepts in a subtly but profoundly new light: more contingent, 
more relational, and more than human (Collier, 2009; Elden, 2007a; Lemke, 2015). 
Anglophone political geography has drawn on concepts such as the “aleatory” (Clarke-
Sather, 2017; Elden, 2007b) and the “milieu” (Campbell, 2019; McNeill, 2017) to extend 
Foucauldian theory beyond the oft-cited panopticon.  
Rail systems constitute an enlightening case for relating Barad and Foucault’s 
divergent conceptions of apparatus. Considered as a Baradian apparatus, rail shows how 
289 
apparatuses produce a determinate materialdiscursive reality, cutting new entities out of 
heretofore indeterminate phenomena through the intra-action of human and nonhuman 
agencies. Rail also illustrates Barad’s notion of diffraction: how apparatuses generate 
imbrications of difference along the apparently-homogenizing cuts they enact. 
Considered from a Foucauldian vantage, rail illustrates how the apparatus (dispositif) 
functions as governing mechanism—the ensemble of techniques, discourses, architectural 
forms and so forth through which power takes form. Rail, as transportation infrastructure, 
is inseparable from the problem of circulation which Foucault identifies as the core 
problematic of governmentality (2009, pp. 48–49). Yet it is also the solution: by getting 
ahold of the reality of rail, the state can intervene in these circulations to constrain the 
bad and facilitate the good, producing a space suitable to the application of political and 
economic calculation (Brenner & Elden, 2009; Elden, 2007a). Synthesizing Barad and 
Foucault through the lens of rail infrastructure shows how the contingent intra-action of 
human and nonhuman produces novel realities, realities upon which apparatuses of state 
power can gain purchase. This approach allows us to trace how the diffractions of rail 
space consequently introduce diffraction into state determinations of citizenship as well. 
Quantum Physics and the Baradian Apparatus 
Barad’s central concern is ontology: she argues that both social constructivists 
and positivist scientists have misunderstood what it means to exist, and that a radical 
rethinking of reality is needed (2007). Central to this rethinking is Barad’s conception of 
the apparatus, which emerges from a Foucauldian analysis of the laboratory experiments 
of classic quantum physics. Yet this conception of apparatus is not limited to the realm of 
the scientific, nor to the scale of the laboratory. In Barad’s hands, the apparatus morphs 
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from a particular experimental set-up to the core building block of reality itself. Barad’s 
account of the apparatus as a materially and discursive process of becoming sheds light 
on how the development of rail transformed society. Barad’s framework provides a set of 
questions: what realities does rail infrastructure produce, materially and discursively? 
What agencies and boundaries are cut into that reality? What diffractions are evident 
along those cuts? Three aspects of Barad’s thinking are salient here: that the apparatus 
produces a determinate reality, that it produces multiple agencies and that it produces 
diffraction. 
Quantum experimentation is famously peculiar: it demonstrates that photons do 
not have determinate physical properties outside the particular experimental apparatuses 
which measure them. A photon is a particle in one apparatus, but a wave in another. 
Barad argues that this ontological peculiarity is not peculiar at all, but an insight into the 
nature of reality: while it may appear as if definite entities interact according to their 
predetermined properties in a Newtonian clockwork, reality is precisely the other way 
around. Individual entities and their properties are mutually determined through their 
collision, and different collisions produce different determinations of the same 
phenomena. The “apparatus” is the particular arrangement which delineates the 
parameters of the collision: an “open-ended practice” that “enacts an agential cut between 
determinately bounded and propertied entities within a phenomena” (2007, pp. 170, 176). 
The “cut” produces boundaries within phenomena, realizing individual entities with 
determinate properties. “Phenomena” are what there is before intra-action: “ontologically 
primitive relations—relations without preexisting relata” (Barad, 2007, p. 139). A 
Baradian lens illuminates how the development of rail does more than just speed the 
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circulation of people and things, but produced new determinate realities. As Schivelbusch 
documents, becoming a rail passenger was a process potentially both shocking and 
fatiguing, in which the passenger “saw and felt [their] own body being transformed into 
an object of production” (1986, p. 122). While it borrowed from prior modes, rail space 
was a novel environment that produced novel subjectivities. 
Barad argues that, as with quantum theory, agential realism is applicable at every 
scale from the atomic to the galactic. Barad understands apparatuses themselves as 
phenomena: cut into a determinate form only by another, auxiliary, apparatus (Barad, 
2007, pp. 161, 230). The line between what is an apparatus and what is a phenomenon is 
therefore itself a situated determination, one that describes a position within the apparatus 
(Haraway, 1988). Barad takes these principles of situated knowing and interlocking 
scales to argue that space is no more absolute than individuality—spatial relations also 
emerge through agential intra-action. Barad’s spatiality is topological rather than 
Cartesian: building on the thinking of Neil Smith (1992), she argues for scale as produced 
and nested (Barad, 2007, pp. 244–246). Rail networks offer a clear example of how space 
is produced through material apparatuses, as well as how that infrastructure realizes new 
spatial discourses.  
Barad argues that this ontology describes wave/particle duality and also the social 
construction of gender: outside of the particular apparatus that determines it, neither are 
real. Yet given that apparatus, both are entirely real: “once a cut is made (i.e., a particular 
practice is being enacted), the identification is not arbitrary but in fact materially 
specified and determinate for a given practice” (Barad, 2007, p. 155). The apparatus 
produces realities that are both physical and conceptual, both material and discursive: 
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“Bohr's argument for the indeterminable nature of measurement interactions 
is based on his insight that concepts are defined by the circumstances required for 
their measurement. That is, theoretical concepts are not ideational in character; 
they are specific physical arrangements.” (Barad, 2007, p. 109, emphasis in 
original) 
The concept of photon as particle is itself entangled with specific material 
arrangements; concepts of gender, class and nation are entangled with specific 
materialities as well. Nor are science and society wholly separate, as the curious example 
of the Stern-Gerlach experiment illustrates. Only because one of the scientists smoked 
cheap cigars that he was afforded by his gender and class were the experimental results 
rendered visible. As Barad write, “the cigar is a ‘condensation’—a ‘nodal point,’ as it 
were—of the workings of other apparatuses, including class, nationalism, economics, and 
gender, all of which are a part of this Stern-Gerlach apparatus” (2007, p. 167). 
Barad’s apparatus enacts a cut within an indeterminate phenomenon, precipitating 
out a multiplicity of human and non-human agencies, all of whom play a role in the 
determination. Barad uses the term “intra-action” to emphasize the mutually constitutive 
nature of these multiple, emergent agencies. The resulting entities are distinct, but their 
distinction is a relation of “exteriority within” (Barad, 2007, p. 135). Barad’s emphasis on 
the multiplicity and materiality of these agencies pushes back against the tendency to 
essentialize power at the level of the apparatus. As a close examination of the practice of 
rail travel shows, the action of individuals remains crucial to the realization of the 
apparatus. Despite talk of travelers reduced to living parcels, human agency does not 
vanish within the rail, or any other transportation system (Watts & Urry, 2008). A simple 
thought-experiment—what would happen if passengers truly behaved as living 
parcels?—illustrates immediately how dependent the rail apparatus is on the active, even 
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skillful, agency of passengers (Bissell, 2018; Watts, 2008). Passengers must deliver 
themselves to the right platform at the correct time, having produced themselves and their 
luggage as movable bodies (Bissell, 2009, 2013). Even enduring the boredom of travel 
requires the active application of self-discipline and mental fortitude (Schivelbusch, 
1986). Realizing determinate agents is not a matter of constraining existing agency, but 
of creating agents whose are capable of realizing the apparatus as a functioning system.  
These agents are realized as part of the apparatus, but Barad is keen to examine 
how they always exceed the apparatus in crucial ways. As the Stern-Gerlach experiment 
shows, agents are entangled in multiple apparatuses, and their interaction is impossible to 
predict. Barad examines the “fine detail” of these entanglements of agencies and 
apparatuses through the notion of diffraction. Another concept borrowed from quantum 
physics, diffraction was the phenomenon that disproved Newtonian physics. Where 
Newtonian light theory predicts that light passing through a grating will produce clean 
geometric discontinuities, a single sharp divide between light and dark, the experimental 
apparatus instead shows a complex imbrication of light and shadow along the cut. “There 
is no sharp boundary separating the light from the darkness: light appears within the 
darkness within the light within…” (Barad, 2014, p. 170).  
In addition to examining the marks left on bodies in order to understand the 
material specificities of the apparatuses that produced them, Barad uses diffraction to 
explore fine detail of exclusionary cuts within any given apparatus. The diffraction of 
light demonstrates the determinate, yet highly complex interpenetration of opposites that 
results from the agential cut. The cut enacted by the apparatus produces difference, but 
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also unites across that boundary—what Barad terms “cutting together-apart” (2014). As 
she writes on disability: 
 “…the very nature of being able-bodied is to live with/in and as part of the 
phenomenon that includes the cut and what it excludes, and therefore, that what is 
excluded is never really other, not in an absolute sense, and that in an important 
sense, then, being able-bodied means being in a prosthetic relationship with the 
‘disabled.’” (Barad, 2007, p. 158) 
Diffraction makes it impossible to produce absolute boundaries between light and 
dark, male and female, white and indigenous, self and other (Barad, 2014). This 
complicated imbrication of opposites that inevitably results from any determinate 
realization is evident in the form of the rail passenger, the geography of rail space, and in 
how both diffract other apparatuses of race, gender and class. Separating out rail 
passengers from the population produced a boundary in both practice and in space. 
Repeated rail travel was accompanied by a new set of practices, an iterative citationality 
that marked out the uninitiated as a figure of scorn (Löfgren, 2008, pp. 339–340). The 
rapid circulations within rail space marked the territory beyond the scope of the rail 
network as marginal and impenetrably distant, even as they remained unchanged. 
Existing apparatuses of class, race and gender all take on new and concrete 
configurations among rail passengers. “First-class” tickets mark out class structure in 
literal, material form; a divide also marked by distinct modes of socialization. In colonial 
India, the railways enacted a double move: carriages and waiting rooms materialized a 
divide between European and native but, to the indignation of upper-caste Indians, did 
not enact a divide between genders (Goswami, 2004, Chapter 3). 
Rail as a Baradian apparatus shows how it produces new communities and new 
spaces—new realities of the sort Cronon described as “second nature” (1991, pp. 56, 72). 
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It also shows how rail is always already entangled in questions of governance. In China, 
the relation has been empirical fact for over a century, as the state has owned and 
operated China’s railway system under both the Nationalist and the Communist 
governments. Yet across the globe, even in laissez-faire nineteenth century England, 
railways repeatedly demanded the intervention of the state, from granting monopoly 
rights to operators to enforcing uniform gauges (Hugill, 1995; Vance, 1986). Rail is one 
component of the industrialization of transportation, a development which transformed 
what Foucault terms “the problem of circulation” epitomized by the town, scarcity and 
epidemic from a perpetual irritant for the sovereign monarch to the central concern of the 
modern state. As second nature, rail is part of the “reality” which the art of government 
attempts to grasp hold of—and is also part of the apparatus with which it grasps. 
The Problem of Circulation and the Foucauldian Apparatus 
The real name system has turned the Chinese rail system into an apparatus of 
surveillance; yet the essential logic by which it does so it strikingly different from that of 
Bentham’s Panopticon. The panopticon often serves as synecdoche for Foucauldian 
theory writ large, the archetypal apparatus of state power. Its role in materialist critiques 
is particularly striking: Mukerji faults Foucault for underplaying the role of  “power 
derived from controlling and shaping the natural world,” employing material things and 
the built environment to shape the conditions of collective life (2010, p. 402). She 
continues: “[t]raditions of wall design do not enter into discussions of the panopticon, and 
the same is true for the skills of masons” (Mukerji, 2010, p. 403). The panopticon plays a 
similar role in Barad’s critique of Foucault. While the Foucauldian notion of “practice” 
plays a pivotal role in Barad’s thinking, in her eyes Foucault nonetheless overly 
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privileges the social, limiting agency to humans and leaving the relationship between 
matter and discourse ambiguous (2007; cf. Lemke, 2015, pp. 6–7). Citing Discipline and 
Punish (1979), Barad writes that while “Foucault claims that the specific material 
configuration of the prison (e.g., the Panopticon form) supports and enacts particular 
discursive practices of punishment”, ultimately he still treats these material forms as mere 
means, rather than meaningful or agential in their own right (Barad, 2007, p. 63). 
It is questionable how well the panopticon captures the scope of Foucault’s 
thinking. In the first instance, the panopticon was never anything more than a thought 
experiment—the skill of masons does not enter into the panopticon in part because bricks 
never did. Foucault’s other examples of discipline, drawn from actual educational and 
military spaces may lack the panopticon’s crisp imagery but provide some measure of 
material engagement. Significantly, however, the panopticon makes a poor shorthand for 
Foucauldian theory because it exemplifies precisely the conception of power that his 
investigation of “security” or “governmentality” moves beyond. While Discipline and 
Punish (1979) concerns the historical transition from rule by law to rule by discipline, in 
the 1977-9 Collège du France lectures, Foucault examines how states innovate a new 
mode of governance not through the perfection of control but by “letting things happen” 
(2009, p. 45). Power is not exercised via “an exhaustive surveillance of individuals so 
that they are all constantly under the eyes of the sovereign in everything they do” 
(Foucault, 2009, p. 66), but rather via a conception of a whole—a “population” or 
“milieu”—that allows the state to act through the phenomenon in such a way that it 
comes to regulate itself. 
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What is most distinctive about security is not the apparatuses it employs but how 
it understands the reality that it seeks to act upon. The outlines of this reality first impinge 
upon the state as problems of circulation. Circulations, “indefinite series of mobile 
elements” (Foucault, 2009, p. 20) subject to chance and crisis, lack the definite features 
that allow individual subjects to be judged or disciplined. Much like photons, it is only 
when taken as a whole that this aleatory reality stabilizes, exhibiting predictable means, 
probabilities, normal curves, and other regularities (Foucault, 2009, p. 74). Coming to 
grips with this reality requires new apparatuses, not least among which is a new branch of 
mathematics: statistics, etymologically the “knowledge of the things that comprise the 
very reality of the state” (Foucault, 2009, p. 274). Statistics, themselves gathered by 
novel bureaucratic regimes, reveal to the state a reality characterized by its indifference to 
law, and resistance to reductive discipline. Governing this reality can only be 
accomplished by:  
 “…allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good 
and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving 
around, continually going from one point to another, but in such a way that the 
inherent dangers of this circulation are canceled out” (Foucault, 2009, p. 65).  
This, in turn, necessitated a rethinking of the relation between the apparatuses of 
governance and the phenomenon being governed. Instead of imposing control over a 
malleable subject, the state must graft onto a natural and unyielding reality:  
“…an apparatus (dispositif) for arranging things so that, by connecting up 
with the very reality of these fluctuations, and by establishing a series of 
connections with other elements of reality, the phenomenon is gradually 
compensated for, checked, finally limited, and, in the final degree, canceled out, 
without it being prevented or losing any of its reality.” (Foucault, 2009, p. 37) 
Foucault’s analysis of security is thus, contra Mukerji and other materialist critics, 
very much concerned with the shaping of the natural world. It is through a historical 
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process of grappling with persistent problems of circulation, in the form of grain scarcity, 
market towns, and contagion that this particular understanding of governance is 
conceived. Vaccination, in particular, struck the state as “a pure matter of fact, of the 
most naked empiricism,” its efficacy both undeniable yet “unthinkable” long before it 
was theorized as part of an art of government (Foucault, 2009, p. 58).  
Along similar lines, the “milieu” emerges as a “pragmatic structure” in the work 
of town planners before it exists as a concept: “the apparatuses of security work, 
fabricate, organize, and plan a milieu even before the notion was formed and isolated” 
(Foucault, 2009, p. 21). The milieu is “a set of natural givens—rivers, marshes, hills—
and a set of artificial givens—an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera” which 
collectively describe the medium of action and the element in which it circulates 
(Foucault, 2009, p. 21). The milieu marks the emergence of a new subject of state action: 
not territory nor individual people, but of “things” (Foucault, 2009, p. 96; Lemke, 2015, 
p. 9). This is an intrinsically more-than-human conception of reality that recognizes the 
poly-functionality of material things: streets circulate merchandise and rioters, grain and 
smallpox. 
More than milieu, however, the pre-eminent target of the apparatuses of security 
is the population. In place of a collection of individual subjects under sovereign’s rule, 
the populations presents itself as a set of processes, “a kind of thick natural phenomenon” 
(Foucault, 2009, p. 71) that is “everything that extends from biological rootedness 
through the species up to the surface that gives one a hold provided by the public” 
(Foucault, 2009, p. 75). The state gets a hold on the population through desire: by getting 
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a hold of the variables upon which the public’s desire depends and manipulating them so 
that the pursuit of their “natural desire” leads towards the state’s ends. 
The population is a definite entity, but not an entity that exists independently of or 
prior to the apparatuses which mark it—“A constant interplay between techniques of 
power and their object gradually carves out in reality, as a field of reality, population and 
its specific phenomena” (Foucault, 2009, p. 79). At the same time, however, the 
population is something outside of the state—it is the external surface of a nature upon 
which the state can graft its apparatuses (Foucault, 2009, p. 75).  
In accounting for the emergence of security as a novel form of government, 
Foucault produces an account of reality strikingly similar to Barad’s. It theorizes reality 
as a process of becoming: “by what conjunctions a whole set of practices—from the 
moment they become coordinated with a regime of truth—was able to make what does 
not exist (madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, etcetera), nonetheless become 
something” (Foucault, 2008, p. 19, emphasis mine). It also opens a space for agency for 
both humans and non-humans: rather than a matter of disciplinary determination, 
Foucault here conceives of governance as “a practice which is not imposed by those who 
govern on those who are governed” but through “transaction, in the very broad sense of 
the word, that is to say, ‘action between,’ that is to say, by a series of conflicts, 
agreements, discussions, and reciprocal concessions” (Foucault, 2008, p. 12, emphasis 
mine). Coupled with the rooted-ness of milieu and population in the natural world, these 
“transactions” between multiple agents can be understood as between not just humans, 
but non-human agents as well. In grappling with the realist turn of governmentality, 
Foucault’s conception of governance becomes more realist as well. 
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Concepts of milieu and population illustrate how the state confronts the problem 
of circulation, producing new apparatuses and a new reality through which natural 
processes can be governed and brought in line with the intentions of the state. Circulation 
was not, however a novel problem: the free town, with its troublesome circulations of 
commerce and plague was long been a known, but contained exception to sovereign rule. 
The process by which circulation exceeded the town and became the primary problem for 
the state is, I argue, precisely the expansion of circulation through the development of 
global trade and industrial transportation (Hugill, 1995; van der Vleuten, 2004; Vance, 
1986). Accordingly, considering rail infrastructure as milieu and passengers as population 
allows us not only to investigate how industrial transportation realizes community and 
territory at a novel scale, but also how the state works to get hold of these novel realities. 
In the following section, I employ this toolkit to analyze the development of the Chinese 
rail system. Since its earliest days, the Chinese state has attempted, with partial success, 
to get hold of the rail system in order to regulate its circulation in order to realize realities 
conducive to state ends. The introduction of the real name system into the rail system 
works to turn the force of rail travel towards the goal of rendering passengers as legible 
state subjects; in appropriating the rail apparatus towards this purpose, however, the real 
name system diffracts the determination of citizenship through the material infrastructure 
of rail in ways the state does not intend. 
Realizing and Diffracting Chinese Citizens through the Apparatus of Rail  
The development of rail in China was caught, from its first moment, in a struggle 
over what sort of reality it would enact. Foreign powers sought to punch rail lines deep 
into the interior to pump in manufactured goods and extract mineral resources; the Qing 
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court sought to develop rail under its own authority to counter foreign encroachment and 
modernize its economy; provincial elites sought to use rail to raise capital and nationalist 
consciousness (Leung, 1980). Rail’s potential to realize new discursive and material 
structures was most fully manifest in the northeast, where Japan’s South Manchuria 
Railway was the central mechanism for a wholesale effort to rebuild society, from 
marketization and industrialization to education and sanitation; the SMR formed the 
nucleus of the Manchukuo puppet-state (Duara, 2003; Elleman & Kotkin, 2010). In the 
Republican era, the railways constituted a bureaucratized, professionalized core during a 
period riven by cliques and warlords (Köll, 2019; Morgan, 2001).  
These competing intentions realized an incoherent rail network in the first half of 
the nineteenth century that rendered travel within China’s borders more difficult than 
travel across them (Dong, 2011, p. 214; Duara, 2003, pp. 188–189). After 1949, the 
People’s Republic made rebuilding and revitalizing the war-torn and inchoate rail 
network a priority, deploying special army units to assist with the construction (Comtois, 
1990; Köll, 2019). The Ministry of Railways guided the integration and extended the 
network into the interior (Naughton, 1988). The construction of new lines functioned to 
pull populations and territories long isolated in hinterlands into national circulations 
(Meyskens, 2015).  
If the absence of circulation posed certain problems to the realization of the 
Chinese state, so too did its presence. In the early 1950s, refugees from the countryside 
flocked to cities, straining urban resources, particularly food (Köll, 2019, pp. 257–259). 
To manage this crisis, the state took the hukou or household registration system, meant to 
ensure public security, and transformed it into a disciplinary apparatus fixing each family 
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in place (J. Brown, 2012; Solinger, 1999). Grain flowed into cities, but people did not. 
Rural-urban population movements happened at the whim of the state; most notably 
during the Cultural Revolution, when Mao opened the rail network to the Red Guards 
(Köll, 2019, p. 268). During the period of opening and reform, the hukou system 
remained law but was no longer used to restrict movement. This allowed rural migrants 
from the interior to pour through the rail system to the urbanized coast, transforming the 
Pearl River Delta in Guangdong into the “world’s factory.” Yet without legal right of 
residence, migrants are cut off from social welfare provision, essentially becoming illegal 
immigrants to their own country, (Chan, 2009, p. 204).  
Even as domestic air (Fallows, 2012; Jiaoe Wang, Mo, & Wang, 2014) and 
automobile (Si-ming Li & Shum, 2001) transportation infrastructure has expanded at a 
rapid pace, rail has remained a pillar of Chinese mobility. Rising demand has kept the rail 
system in a constant state of reform and expansion since the early nineties (Bullock, 
Sondhi, & Amos, 2009). A dramatic series of speed increases in the late nineties, which 
saw average speeds increase by over 40% by 2005 (Bullock et al., 2009, pp. 37–38), was 
qualitatively eclipsed by the advent of HSR since the mid-aughts (Zhou, Ollivier, 
Bullock, & Jin, 2014). HSR plays a central role in the governance of economic and urban 
development (Chen, Haynes, Zhou, & Dai, 2019; Salzberg, Bullock, Jin, & Fang, 2013).  
Even as it serves as an instrument of state power, however, rail continues to 
enable circulations inimical to the state. At the turn of the millennium, rail space was 
doubly opaque: not only were the flows of passengers unmanageable, the powerful 
Ministry of Railways functioned as a “state within a state,” planning and executing 
construction projects with little input from the central government (Köll, 2019, p. 289; 
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Osnos, 2012). Sustained high demand has kept trains crowded, and upgrades to comfort 
and cleanliness have not kept pace with rising expectations: if HSR is symbolic of 
China’s rise, then conventional rail represents its continued backwardness. Rail travel has 
long been associated with chaos and crime; Guangzhou Railway Station was for decades 
a particularly notorious gathering place for drug addicts (Liang, Li, & Li, 2013). The 
annual Spring Festival, when rural migrants return home en masse, has become a crisis 
point that tests the state’s resources. Huangniu, or scalpers, take advantage of travelers 
desperate to get home and their inside connections to drive ticket prices to outrageous 
highs (Gao & Cui, 2011). The tight association between rail travel and the PRC state 
works both ways: complaints about scalping can segue seamlessly into complaints about 
governmental corruption in general. Rail safety is another flashpoint: the Wenzhou 
collision in 2011 became a lightning rod for criticisms of the government’s prioritization 
of economic development over safety (Bondes & Schucher, 2014). In the last decade, rail 
has also become a target for those who wish to attack the state: in 2014, a terrorist attack 
attributed to Uyghur separatists on the Kunming rail station left 31 dead, the most lethal 
of a series of attacks on railway stations in 2014 and 2015 (Purbrick, 2017). 
These problems demonstrate the stakes of railway governance for the Chinese 
state: the rail system is simultaneously a potent apparatus for regulating the economic and 
political conditions of the Chinese population, but also serves as a pressure point through 
which the state can be destabilized. The state has responded to these crises in a variety of 
ways. The Wenzhou collision led to a reduction in maximum speeds lasting until 2018, 
the arrest of the once-untouchable Minister of Railways, and ultimately to the dissolution 
of the Ministry of Railways into the governmental Ministry of Transport and a state-
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owned enterprise, the China Railway Corporation. The development of HSR is, arguably, 
a response to rising discontent with the overcrowded, chaotic traveling conditions of 
conventional rail.   
The introduction of the real name system into rail spaces in the past decade can be 
seen as another such response. The real name system enabled two major transformations 
of rail space, the online ticketing system and the enclosure of stations. Online ticketing 
has considerably smoothed the ticket purchasing process and reduced the power of 
scalpers to manipulate ticket prices. The enclosure of rail space has reinforced public 
safety and made stations into visible outposts of the state. With these changes, the real 
name system has sharpened the boundaries the rail apparatus enacts between passenger 
and non-passenger, rail space and non-rail space. The real name system incorporates 
another apparatus of the state—the national identification system realized in the form of 
the shenfenzheng card.  
For the vast majority of Chinese citizens, the “real name” in the real name system 
is the name on their shenfenzheng, or national identity card. The shenfenzheng attaches a 
name, face, and biometric data to a unique, life-long 18 digit number stored in a nation-
wide computerized database, enabling the government to track, monitor, and curtail 
movement and behavior deemed a risk (C. L. Brown, 2008; Sapio, 2014). The second 
generation shenfenzheng, was rolled out starting in 2003. It was designed in coordination 
with China’s Golden Shield Project, an effort in the late nineties to enhance the state’s 
surveillance and public security apparatuses with modern information and 
communications technology; better known today as the “Great Firewall” (C. L. Brown, 
2008, pp. 63–64).  
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Unlike the bulky, hukou booklet shared by the entire family unit, the 
shenfenzheng is personal in concept and practice: it identifies individuals and takes the 
form of a wallet-sized card. These cards are the most common and convenient form of 
everyday identification for Chinese citizens, used to obtain education, open bank 
accounts, rent an apartment, mail packages and purchase tickets for bus, plane or train. 
The sudden centrality of the shenfenzheng to the most banal elements of rail travel—
buying tickets, entering the station—has transformed rail space into an apparatus for the 
realization of citizenship, a site where difficult questions of belonging and identity are not 
an abstract problematic but a matter of practical, pressing concern. Today, to enter rail 
space passengers must be able to produce themselves as legible consumer-citizens, 
utilizing their desire to travel to power a circulatory panopticon. 
Ticketing and the Legible Subject 
It is easy to underplay how revolutionary online ticketing has been for the 
experience of rail travel in China. The first step of travel is planning: the imaginary, 
social and material work of shaping the future journey (Watts, 2008, p. 713). For 
decades, buying a rail ticket in China was an arduous journey all its own: prospective 
passengers had to travel to the station of departure weeks ahead of time and wait in line at 
the ticket office, hoping that scalpers had not already bought out the whole train. Almost 
everyone I spoke to had a story of waiting in line all day, only to discover there were no 
tickets and having to come back again. More recently, services emerged allowing 
passengers to send someone to the station on their behalf, or, in some cities, go to a 
neighborhood ticket agency and pay a small additional fee. Tickets weren’t sold more 
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than two weeks in advance, making planning ahead deeply uncertain: particularly during 
Spring Festival, the stress and uncertainty was enormous. 
The introduction of the online ticketing system on 12306.cn, rolled out nation-
wide in 2012, has completely transformed this experience. China Rail started using a 
computerized ticketing system in 1996, but assigned seats to region according to fixed 
quotas as late as 2008 (Bullock et al., 2009, p. 54). Despite a rough rollout, plagued by 
technical glitches (Wertime, 2012), the ability to purchase tickets online, from anywhere, 
has rendered the cavernous ticket offices superfluous. Passengers can pull up the China 
Rail website or open the smartphone app, and browse every train route in China leaving 
as soon as the next half-hour to as far off as 60 days. Third-party apps such as Ctrip 
(Xiecheng) offer additional perks like allowing passengers to specify which level berth 
they prefer on sleepers. 
Tickets bought online with a shenfenzheng can be picked up from automated 
ticket machines simply by swiping the card, circumventing wholly the tedious lines of the 
station ticket office. On some high-speed routes, passengers can swipe their shenfenzheng 
instead of a paper ticket at the boarding gate; this e-ticket plan is scheduled to be rolled 
out nationally in 2019 (Junwei Wang, 2018). The entire country of China has become a 
ticket office, reworking both the practices of rail travel and the conceptions of space they 
presuppose. The combination of quick and convenient ticket purchase from anywhere and 
the high frequency of trains between major cities has led some passengers produced a 
habit of delaying ticket purchase until literally on their way into the station. Others wait 
until the last minute in order to see if airfare, always volatile, dips below the fixed rail 
ticket price. 
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The shenfenzheng seamlessly coordinates across multiple dimensions of rail 
travel, reinforcing the role of the Chinese rail system in enacting a citizen cut. This free 
and easy circulation is nonetheless bounded in terms of who can access it. Without a 
shenfenzheng, rail travel becomes considerably bumpier, diffracting a spectrum of not-
quite citizen subjectivities across different scales. For me, traveling under a foreign 
passport, I discovered that while some aspects of the online ticketing treated a passport as 
an acceptable proxy for a shenfenzheng, others did not. When combined with a Chinese 
bank account, my passport enabled me to register on 12306.cn and buy tickets, but did 
not allow me to collect those tickets at an automated machine—along a single line, in 
Dongguan, was I able to use my passport to get a ticket from machine. Everywhere else, I 
had to wait in line in the ticket offices.  
Ticket offices have yet to wither away. A handful of alternate forms of ID, such 
as a hukou family registration booklet or a domestic passport, can be used to purchase 
tickets online. Like my passport, they cannot be used with the automated ticket machines. 
Those who simply forgot to bring their shenfenzheng must wait in line at the temporary 
ID window in the ticket office, then wait in line to get their ticket. Waiting in line at the 
ticket office and looking over at the much longer line to get a temporary ID, I had a 
curious feeling: as a foreign citizen I could move through rail space less fluidly than most 
Chinese citizens, but more fluidly than some. Along one line, in Dongguan, I found 
automated ticketing machines did accept foreign passports.  
There is one place where the apparatus of the shenfenzheng and the real name 
system demarcate citizenship in a way that is sharply at odds with the state’s own official 
definition of Chinese identity. Or rather, there are three: Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. 
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Residents of these places are, officially, Chinese “compatriots” and therefore China does 
not recognize their foreign citizenship or the passports which document this. The 
practical workaround has taken the form of home return or travel permits. Up until the 
mid-2000s, these permits resembled passports; in 2013 and 2015, the permits were 
revised in the form of wallet-sized cards for, respectively, Hong Kong/Macau and Taiwan 
residents. In 2017, the Taiwan Mainland Travel Permit can be used not only to purchase 
tickets online, but to collect tickets from the automated ticketing machines in some cities 
(Jiahui, 2017); the same is now possible for holders of the Macau and Hong Kong travel 
permit holders traveling along the new line connecting Hong Kong (Zheng, 2019). These 
permits increasingly function as almost-shenfenzheng, enabling non-mainland Chinese to 
circulate as if they are PRC citizens while also marking them definitively as non-citizens 
(cf. Cho, 2017). 
The real name system inconveniences those without a shenfenzheng; it presents a 
nigh-unsurmountable barrier to those without a legible state identity. An estimated 13 
million “invisible children” were not registered at birth because of the constraints of the 
one-child policy, the shame associated with single motherhood, or rural inaccessibility; as 
a consequence they cannot obtain a shenfenzheng (Shuzhuo Li, Zhang, & Feldman, 
2010). This sub-population has long struggled to access education, healthcare and other 
social infrastructure; the introduction of the real name system to rail adds freedom of 
movement to that list (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2016). 
I encountered these fine differentiations of access, what I term diffracted 
citizenship, during interviews with rail travelers as well. When talking with older people 
in particular, I encountered an interesting pattern: when asked about how the new online 
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ticketing system had impacted their experience, they extolled its convenience. Then, 
when pushed to describe how they use it in more detail, they admitted they did not use it 
at all—rather, their adult children bought tickets for them. Online ticketing is a 
transparent and convenient medium for planning rail travel only for those with the 
technological skill to make it convenient. For older, or poorer passengers, whose internet 
proficiency or even literacy is lacking, the proliferation of online ticketing presents a new 
barrier to railway travel (Huo & Wei, 2013).  
The computerized ticketing system offers passengers novel and convenient ways 
of buying tickets and marginalizes scalpers. Through the mechanism of the real name 
system, it makes the shenfenzheng—and the corresponding apparatus of surveillance and 
control it entails—a vital part of the practice of rail travel. This re-inscribes and also 
diffracts concepts of citizenship, differentiating between citizens and non-citizens as well 
as between citizens with unproblematic citizenship and those without. The cuts enacted 
by the apparatus of the real name system vary not just by group, but across space as well. 
The more wide-spread and systematic spatial patterns of citizenship can be seen in the 
enclosure of rail stations. 
Station Security and the Regulation of Flows 
Complementing shifts in ticketing practices, the spatial management of rail spaces 
has undergone dramatic change in the past decade. Rail stations, once notorious for 
offering free and anonymous circulation to passengers, drifters, peddlers and thieves 
alike, have been enclosed: transformed into a tightly bounded and regulated space 
allowing only authenticated and authorized individuals to flow through the network. This 
has cut rail stations off from their local surroundings while knitting the network together 
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into a single contiguous space of secure circulation. Passengers disembarking in Beijing 
South Station have already been patted down and their luggage run through x-ray 
machines, regardless of whether they arrive from Guangzhou, Baoding, or Urumqi. Yet 
in practice, the legibility and secured interiority of rail space does not always enclose 
precisely the same space, manifesting a distinctive pattern of diffractions along the 
boundaries it enacts. 
Kunming Station is the origin for the enclosure of station space, as can be clearly 
seen in the rearrangement of rail space since the 2014 terror attack. Figure 8.1 illustrates 
the shift: the once open plaza around the golden bull statue has been completely enclosed. 
The entrance is flanked on one side by a two-story police building, and on the other by a 
tower (not pictured), from which several rifle-carrying soldiers look out over the crowd. 
One interviewee, a long-time resident of Kunming, said of the stringent security:  
“Before, it wasn’t like that…. After the incident, then it became much 
stricter. Now—before at Kunming Station people who weren’t taking a train could 
freely come and go in the station plaza, now you can’t. Now if you want to get 
close to the station, you have to have bought a ticket, only people who are taking a 
train can enter. There are two security checks now: when you first enter they check 
your luggage, and at the second one they check your name, look at your 
shenfenzheng and ticket, then you can enter the station waiting area.†  
Kunming Station is an extreme example, but not uniquely so: it was not 
uncommon to see armed soldiers on duty or patrolling around stations, and every station 
had a visible public security presence. The incident was brought up by multiple 
interviewees as the most significant inflection point in the securitization of rail space 
across China.  
                                               
† Interview with rail traveler in February 2017, in Mandarin, translated by author. 
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Figure 8.1. Kunming Station plaza. Above: in 2012. Source: CEphoto 2012. Below: in 
2017. Source: author.  
 
The real name system is central to the new regime: to enter rail space, passengers 
must present their ticket, their identification, and themselves all together at the station 
entrance. Only if all three match can the passenger enter the station proper. This requires, 
of course, that passengers must have their ticket before passing through security. Even if 
their ticket was purchased online, passengers must still fetch their ticket in person. As 
fortune would have it, because the previous ticketing system required people to travel to 
stations days or weeks prior to travel to get tickets, most stations already have detached 
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ticket offices with separate entrances. This infrastructural legacy enabled the Chinese rail 
system to put into practice a novel level of regulation across the whole network with 
relatively few modifications. 
Traces of an alternate imaginary of unfettered circulation are still evident in the 
designs of the earliest HSR stations. Newly built HSR station follow a standard three 
level structure: a concourse open to the general public, with shopping and ticket offices at 
the bottom, a second floor with the train tracks and boarding platforms, and a third floor 
with an open plan waiting area with gates leading down to the trains below. This allows 
for the waiting and boarding areas to be cut off from the rest of the station while still 
allowing free circulation of traffic from one side of the station to the other. Beijing South 
Station, opened in 2008, and Shanghai Hongqiao Station, opened in 2011, were designed 
around the principle that the entire station, including the main waiting area, would be 
open the general public. This principle is most evident in the placement of the ticket 
offices, which are located within the waiting area (see Figure 7.2). This makes checking 
the person, identification, and ticket simultaneously at the station entrance impossible. 
Instead, the station security checks identification and scans bodies and luggage at the 
entrance, and then rail conductors check tickets against identification at the station gate. 
The security checks at Beijing South’s multiple entrances—from the street and metro—
are notably makeshift, awkward interruptions of the station’s designed flow. At the 
boarding gates, conductors stand beside automated ticket gates, using the venerable 
technology of ticket punch to mark tickets as they check identification and allow 
passengers down to the boarding platform.  
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Figure 8.2. Top left, one of the ticket offices on the main waiting area of Shanghai 
Hongqiao Station; and top right, a map of Shanghai Hongqiao Station inside the station. 
Bottom left: one of the ticket offices on the main waiting area of Beijing South Station; 
and bottom right, a map of the station layout provided in the station. Red triangles in 
right-hand images indicate the approximate viewshed of the left-hand images.  
 
The waiting areas of these stations constitute a liminal zone between the fully 
enclosed and secured space of the rail system and the exterior, not fully one or the other. 
Some stations built with internal ticket offices, such as Shenzhen North, were able to 
renovated in a way that separated the ticket windows from the main floor. However, the 
majority of HSR stations I passed through, particularly the more recently built, follow the 
design of Guangzhou South Station, opened in 2011. These stations are similar to Beijing 
South in many ways, but re-introduce one feature from the previous generation of 
stations: their ticket offices are directly accessible from the exterior of the station, once 
again spatially separating ticket purchase from entry into rail space (see Figure 8.3). The 
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same design now serves a different logic: separate ticket offices now function to enable 
the three interlocking entities of ticket, identification, and the body of the passenger to 
arrive simultaneously at the station entrance. 
 
Figure 8.3. A map outside one of the ticket offices at Guangzhou South Station. 
Guangzhou South typifies the three layer “sandwich” design of new HSR stations, with a 
concourse open to the general public below the tracks and a shared waiting and 
boarding area above the tracks. Green boxes indicate the location of the ticket offices; 
that they are accessible from outside the station proper. Note that only ticket offices No. 2 
and No. 3 are in service: the other two ticket offices, on the other end of the station, have 
been decommissioned.  
 
I draw attention to two ways in which differences are marked within the rail 
system: the segregation between high-speed rail and conventional rail in the distribution 
of stations and waiting areas, and in the differential intensities with which the security 
procedures at stations in different regions are practiced. In a number of ways, China’s 
new passenger-dedicated high-speed rail network is an entirely distinct system from the 
pre-existing network. It runs on different carriages, with different amenities, staffed by 
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different personnel wearing different uniforms. Most importantly for the purposes of this 
article, it primarily serves different stations. The vast majority of the stops made by HSR 
trains are at new stations built specifically to serve the HSR network. These new stations 
co-exist with older stations in the same city, often separated by dozens of kilometers. As 
a result, the passengers traveling by HSR and those traveling by conventional rail are 
spatially separated. This is not accidental: HSR caters to a different, and wealthier, 
ridership than conventional rail (Zhou et al., 2014). Separate stations are a way of serving 
both of these two incompatible riderships. The spatial management of stations that do 
serve both these groups makes clear the deliberate effort to segregate the two. In Beijing 
West Station, built in 1996, the HSR trains are boarded from the east side of the station, 
with station personnel checking tickets at the waiting room entrances. In Chongqing 
North, the north side of the station, which handles HSR trains, and the south side of the 
station, which handles long-distance conventional trains, are physically separated, 
connected only by bus. At Tianjin Station, renovated in 2008, has a single open waiting 
and boarding area much like Guangzhou South. Within the open concourse, however, a 
space around the boarding gates for the HSR train to Beijing is fenced off, with a 
secondary security check separating it from the rest (see Figure 8.4). Cumulatively, these 
various strategies of station management make it so that the HSR and conventional train 
ridership rarely if ever share the same space. The tools which are used to realize this 
segregation are the same apparatuses of security that separate rail stations from their 
surroundings, here enacting a cut within rail space. 
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Figure 8.4. The waiting room within the waiting room at Tianjin Station. The secondary 
ticket check here serves to segregate the spaces of HSR and conventional rail passengers.  
 
The intensity and rigor with which those apparatuses that regulate circulations 
into rail space also exhibit distinctive patterns of variation.  which reveal different 
relationships between rail space and different regions of China. In Beijing South and 
Shanghai Hongqiao, the double enclosure of safety and legibility is broken into two 
distinct steps, creating a liminal in-between that is within security but not yet legible. If 
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this case demonstrates an ambiguous cut between rail space and its exterior, the cut 
between inside and outside in Xinjiang is sharply marked. When entering the “normal” 
railway station in China, the metal detector, pat-down and x-ray scan are relatively 
perfunctory: the pressure of moving people through as quickly as possible takes 
precedence. In Xinjiang, however, the security procedures at station entrances are 
meticulous. Not only are the pat downs are distinctly more thorough than elsewhere, in 
Xinjiang, and nowhere else, I was repeatedly asked to open my luggage so that they 
could inspect the small pair of scissors I traveled with. Women wearing headscarves—
ethnic Uighurs and practicing Muslims—were made to remove them before passing 
through the security check. While the security apparatus enacts a singular cut between 
unsecured and secured space and individuals, there are nonetheless diffractions along that 
boundary. The apparatus also realizes gendered and ethnic fracture as well, as Uighur 
women are both marked as different and allowed to circulate through rail space, 
simultaneously part and not part of the Chinese citizenry. The jarring fracture between 
securitized rail space and the rest of Xinjiang stands in stark contrast to the more 
permeable boundary found in the heart of Shanghai or Beijing. The internal coherence of 
rail space exposes interregional fractures.  
Conclusion 
While rail has a long history as a site for state-making in China, the introduction 
of the real name system has integrated rail travel into the state’s production of citizenship 
and state territory to a novel extent. Computerized ticketing realizes a radically different 
spatiality: tickets to destinations across China are always at the fingertips of would-be 
travelers. The real name system is also instrumental to the realization of rail space as an 
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enclosed interior secured by the force of the state against thieves and terrorists alike. 
These apparatuses lend a pragmatic relevance to the shenfenzheng identification system, 
turning mobility into a de facto right of citizenship. Yet integrating rail travel and 
citizenship produces complications for state conceptions of citizenship—the old and the 
technically inept are marginalized, non-citizen residents of Hong Kong and Macau are 
reminded of their exclusion every time they buy tickets to the mainland, and the millions 
of unregistered Chinese are rendered yet more invisible. 
As a Baradian apparatus, the rail system doesn’t compel passengers’ actions, but 
creates a physical arrangement that realizes them as agents whose actions contribute to 
the production of the whole. Their legibility to the Chinese state is produced not through 
the application of discipline and control, but by taking a hold of their “natural” desire to 
travel and acting on it in such a way as to bring its fluctuations in line with the intentions 
of the state. Insofar as the rail system is a panopticon, it is premised not upon 
mechanisms of discipline but of security.  
This article synthesizes Barad and Foucault together to open up not the discourse 
of the rail system but its reality: the ways in which rail reshapes China’s geography and 
society both conceptually and in practice. At issue with the unequal access to rail 
mobility is not simply a perception of discrimination or the production of discourses of 
racial and class hierarchies. These concepts emerge from the pure naked empiricism of 
the reality that some are discriminated against within rail travel, it does cater to some 
passengers over others, and that hierarchies of ethnicity and class really shape who can 
move through which places both within rail space and through the country as a whole. 
This is the context within which more overt manifestations of state power within rail 
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space must be analyzed. When the Chinese government forbids petitioners, debtors, and 
others with “bad social credit” from the rail system, this is the field of power within 
which they are acting (“China to bar people with bad ‘social credit’ from planes, trains,” 
2018). This vantage illuminates the profound role of a range of banal social practices in 
shaping social reality.  
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation I outline an approach to nation that is more-than-human, that 
foregrounds how everyday, affective encounters between people and non-human things 
cohere into larger assemblages of culture and community at the national scale. While 
infrastructures of media or education may play a more prominent role in shaping national 
identity, transportation infrastructure is directly involved in the production of national 
space. I investigate the contemporary rail network in China to take a narrow but broad 
cross-section of this more-than-human nation’s spatial extent. While mindful of the 
impacts of rail development on the nature of the national geo-body, my principal research 
interest is in the interiority of rail space. I examine how the practices of passengers are 
shaped by and come to depend on a certain suite of infrastructures, standardized at the 
national scale; at the same time, I attend to the emergent fractures between different 
practices and spaces within rail space.  
In the introductory chapter, I develop the concept of more-than-human nation as 
employed in this project, situating it relative to the scholarship of more-than-human 
ontologies, state theory and nationalism studies. In Chapter II, I situate this study of the 
contemporary Chinese rail system as a more-than-human assemblage within the scholarly 
context of Chinese studies. I show how this conception builds on previous studies of the 
Chinese state and nation, offering novel insight into China’s complex internal tensions. 
Chapter III presents the methodology from which this project emerges. I draw together 
methodological innovations from geography, anthropology, and science and technology 
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studies to conduct my research into the affective, embodied and material dimensions of 
nation-ness within Chinese rail space. 
Chapter IV takes the theoretical framework of more-than-human nation 
assembled in the previous chapters and examines how it is encountered in the everyday 
practice of rail travel. This chapter traces the passenger’s journey through the rail system, 
from the moment the journey is imagined to the moment of arrival. Synthesizing 
empirical observations of rail space from my fieldwork, this chapter also situates the rail 
assemblage vis a vis other assemblages that structure China’s contemporary society such 
as the shenfenzheng and WeChat. This chapter illustrates how many elements of rail 
space and the complementary skills trail passengers home, subtly articulating them into 
the rail system—and situating them within a national space—even after the journey is 
complete. 
Chapter V situates the rail network as an instrument of the state, a tool for shaping 
space and imaginaries of space. This chapter’s analysis of the discourses around the XRL 
project between Guangzhou and Hong Kong shows that not every mainland discourse of 
rail infrastructure is identical: Guangdong portrayals of the XRL’s impact differ from 
Beijing’s view in subtle but important ways. For the purposes of this dissertation, the 
most significant of these differences is the role of things: the concrete specificities of 
border control, travel documents, and carriage design loom larger and play a more 
complex role in the pages of regional newspapers. This chapter shows how material 
infrastructure is mobilized in service of state discourses, but rather than serving as a 
transparent medium, it always introduces novel and contingent complications. 
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Chapter VI identifies and critiques a distinctive tension in how scholars 
conceptualize nation and state as social abstractions and suggest how a greater attention 
to infrastructure can resolve that tension. Nation and state are regularly taken for granted 
as units of analysis for social science, yet elsewhere—particularly among theorists of 
nation or state—they are understood as essentially figmentary: as reifications rather than 
actually existing structures. While critiques of simplistic conceptions of nation and state 
have made substantial contributions to our understanding, I argue that an overemphasis 
on the ways nation and state fail to explain social phenomena conceals the real though 
limited ways in which nation and state integrate society and space. I draw on the concept 
of boundary object from the work of Susan Leigh Star (Star 2010; Star and Griesemer 
1989) to put forward a framework capable of theorizing both the coherence of and the 
fractures within nation and state—and also to examine how the two are linked. I draw on 
empirical data from my fieldwork concerning the historical development and 
contemporary social character of the hot water taps omnipresent within rail space to 
demonstrate how this framework can be applied. 
In Chapter VII, I situate the skills of rail travel within the larger conversation 
about culture and social class in China. Rail space is a microcosm of Chinese society as a 
whole, with passengers from a broad range of regional backgrounds, ages, genders and 
socioeconomic classes brought into intimate contact. It is therefore a site where debates 
over social quality, as captured in terms such as suzhi (quality) and wenming 
(civilization) are made concrete. I argue these qualities are not simply passively 
embodied, but actively, skillfully practiced; moreover, I argue become entangled with the 
spaces in which they are practiced. In rail space, civilized-ness is practiced through how 
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they pass the time, what and how they eat and drink, and stations and carriages are full of 
educational media intended to actively shape how people behave in rail space. I use this 
analysis of social quality to reframe the advent of HSR in the early 2000s as a response to 
a crisis driven by the long-standing association between conventional rail and low 
income, low “quality” passengers. The advent of HSR helped retain the higher-income, 
high suzhi passengers who were transitioning to air and car transportation not only 
through increasing speed, but creating a rail space of greater “quality.” 
In Chapter VIII, I examine how the apparatuses of ticketing and security realize 
state conceptions of citizenship in the everyday lives of passengers. I critically re-read the 
theory of Karen Barad (2007) against the later work of Michel Foucault (2008; 2009) to 
the rail system as a “circulatory panopticon,” a socio-technical, material-discursive 
apparatus of security driven by population flows. I show how the apparatus of the 
contemporary Chinese rail system realizes certain conceptions of citizenship, through two 
dramatic shifts in the regulation of rail passengers and spaces in the past decade: the 
computerization of ticketing and the securitization of stations. The real name ticketing 
system requires that passengers actively produce themselves as legible citizens before 
purchasing tickets. Securitization further requires passengers to produce themselves as 
legible and safe, producing the interiority of the rail system as a bounded, secured space. 
Barad’s notion of diffraction, however, enables a productive examination of how these 
boundary-making apparatuses also produce a range of not-quite citizens, and not-quite 
secured spaces inside and outside of the rail network. Synthesizing Barad and Foucault 
makes clear the ontological stakes of new materialist theories: it is not a question of 
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prioritizing material over discourse, but of theorizing how both come together in the 
production of reality.  
Each of these articles leverages the concept of the more-than-human nation to 
shed light on the relation between humans and non-humans in the production of social 
space. Hot water taps show how state projects give rise to national habits; cellphones and 
instant noodles become battlegrounds for struggles over class; apparatuses of ticketing 
and security enact exclusionary cuts between citizen and non-citizen in everyday life. 
Together, these articles demonstrate the power of more-than-human methodologies to 
produce nuanced accounts of the interplay between coherence and fracture in politics and 
culture. 
Towards a More-Than-Human Nation 
This dissertation comes at a moment of transition in the study of the nation. Long 
dominated by the study of discourse and subjectivities, in recent years scholar of 
nationalism have turned towards the investigation of the nation’s affective, material and 
more-than-human dimensions. Moving from banality to the everyday, scholars have 
inquired into how nation-ness shapes atmospheres and bodily comportment at a visceral 
level far removed from the self-conscious articulations of nationalism. This new 
conceptual vantage research has been facilitated by the concurrent development of new 
qualitative methodologies geared towards capturing the fleeting traces of performance, 
affect and atmosphere. This dissertation advances this research agenda by integrating 
theoretical and methodological insights from science and technology studies, 
anthropology and geography. Centering questions of mobility and infrastructure expands 
the scale of inquiry into nation-ness from the body and neighborhood to the national 
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scale; attending to non-human infrastructure situates the everyday and affective within 
the richly populated materiality of the built and natural environment. The greater 
attention to materiality brought by a more-than-human conception can be a useful 
corrective for the tendency of affective methodologies to emphasize the felt at the 
expense of the real. As Haraway (1988) and Barad (2007) make clear, qualitative 
research grounded in situated, bodily knowledges do not have a lesser claim on reality 
than seemingly objective, quantitative research. Affective and material methodologies 
typically remain distinct within human geography; bringing them together will allow 
geographers to investigate human and non-human side by side. 
The concept of more-than-human nation presents researchers with an object of 
study encompassing the entirety of the Ingoldian relation between person, things, and 
place (Ingold 2002; 2011). Bringing the built environment into the nation, rather than as 
backdrop, can serve to re-invigorate historical studies of how infrastructural development 
acted to build nations at their origin, and pushes contemporary research to uncover how 
infrastructures of mobility (Edensor 2004; Merriman and Jones 2016), media (Edensor 
2015), education and employment continue to constitute vitally important terrains of 
struggle for different conceptions of the national community. 
This dissertation draws extensively on science and technology studies literature 
on the ontology of a more-than-human world. I aim to contribute back to STS a greater 
attention to the importance of nations in the production of science and technology. 
Nations are taken for granted in STS: they bound the unit of analysis, but are not 
themselves analyzed (i.e. Hecht 2009; Latour 1999). This dissertation contributes to the 
argument that science and technology are central mechanisms for nation-building 
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(Jasanoff 2004; Jasanoff and Kim 2015; Van der Vleuten 2003). Investigating how 
technological change shapes society sheds invaluable light on how scientific knowledge 
circulates within and shapes publics at the national scale. 
Of course, the national scale is only one space within which flows of people and 
things constitute more-than-human assemblage. A more-than-human lens guides research 
to the points of entanglement between infrastructure and communities that both integrate 
and fracture society. As Chapter V’s examination of the XRL shows, the more-than-
human analytical framework presented in this dissertation can also be used to investigate 
how infrastructure constitutes and is constituted by culture at urban, regional and even 
global scales, examining spaces of mobility from urban metro systems to the global 
networks of air travel.  
Chinese Rail Space Going Forward 
This dissertation argues that the rail network is a site where Chinese-ness is both 
enacted and transformed. I show how the advent of HSR has split in two what was once a 
single shared social space, reproducing in microcosm the broader political economic 
trajectory of contemporary China. Yet my research also finds that the Chinese rail system 
is in a period of rapid transformation: will these divisions endure or fade with time? 
This dissertation shows that major components of contemporary rail space that 
dramatically rework the experience of rail travel have their origins less than a decade in 
the past. Yet the particular more-than-human assemblage I encountered in my fieldwork 
and describe in this dissertation has already begun to transform in significant ways. By 
the end of 2019, pilot projects allowing passengers to use their cellphones and 
shenfenzheng identification cards in place of physical tickets passing through security and 
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boarding were rolled out nation-wide (Junwei Wang 2018). In 2018 people accused of 
certain crimes were officially forbidden from rail and air travel, putting the real name 
ticketing system to work in a novel way (Reuters 2018). This new policy foreshadows the 
ways that China’s nascent social credit system, currently being piloted in a number of 
cities, might be combined with the apparatuses of the rail system to develop new state 
capacities to intervene in the everyday lives of citizens in unexpected ways.  
This dissertation also contributes to discussions regarding the impacts of rail 
development on China’s national and regional economic geography (Chen et al. 2019; 
Wang et al. 2016; X. Jiang 2017). Studies of the current network show that HSR has 
contributed to increased disparities in accessibility (Jiao et al. 2014), though also 
suggesting that future construction directed towards densification rather than expansion 
will somewhat alleviate regional and urban disparities (Jiao et al. 2014; L. Wang et al. 
2016). This dissertation contextualizes these quantitative analyses at the ground level, 
showing that increased intra-national disparity has a meaningful impact on the 
experiences of passengers. Concretely: my fieldwork suggests that beyond the question of 
access, frequency of departures greatly affects how passengers use and think about the 
rail network. Quantitative analysis of stops per station per day would reveal a different 
pattern of integration and exclusion, one highlighting gaps between hubs and mid-line 
stations. 
The city-wide 2019 protests in Hong Kong mark a dramatic turn in the narrative 
of Chinese rail. The opening of the XRL, while hailed as a unifier both locally and 
nationally, was greeted quite differenty on the other side of the boundary. It is hard to 
imagine that the XRL’s grand opening in 2018 is wholly unrelated to the 2019 protests: 
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as Xia (2016) shows, the anti-XRL movement was a formative moment for distrust of the 
Hong Kong government and the political mobilization of a Hong Kong identity. The joint 
checkpoint agreement was hard fought by pro-democracy activists and politicians (Lum 
2018). During the protests, the infrastructure of the MTR, dubbed “Party Rail” (党铁 
Dang Tie) by protesters for its apparent mainland loyalties, became a frequent target of 
attack (BBC News 2019-09-18). In one instance, a China Railway train passing through a 
station in Hong Kong was physically attacked by protesters (Yau 2019). If the link 
between citizenship, national identity, and rail travel is mutually reinforcing within the 
mainland, the Hong Kong example suggests that the relation does not necessarily hold 
outside of the Chinese legal and political context: that in some cases, the nation-building 
force of rail can be dramatically inverted.  
This question concerning the social character of Chinese rail infrastructure is also 
especially timely in light of the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese rail has gone global, 
with Chinese-built—and it seems Chinese-operated—railways opening in Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Djibouti. A line from Kunming into Laos is currently under construction, and 
numerous other rail lines are in various stages of planning. The Belt and Road Initiative is 
not the first time rail development has figured in Chinese foreign relations: in the 
seventies, Chinese railway engineers built the “Freedom Railway” in Tanzania as a show 
of international solidarity and Chinese national might (Gao 1997; Monson 2009). My 
dissertation suggests that the particular character of Chinese rail space is deeply 
interconnected with Chinese-ness writ large; how will these practices manifest when the 
infrastructures they are embedded in travel abroad? Research on the social dimensions of 
Chinese infrastructure abroad, not just railways but roads, dams and mines, can shed light 
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on one of the central debates over China’s global infrastructure push: are Chinese 
investments a new form of South-South cooperation or neo-imperialism with Chinese 
characteristics (Carmody 2013; C. K. Lee 2017; Shambaugh 2013)? Moreover, it can 
shed further light on Chinese-ness, constituting another site where the invisible 
interdependence between infrastructure and its communities of practice are disrupted. As 
Ching Kwan Lee (2017) argues, studying “China beyond China” sheds as much light on 
China’s domestic situation as it does on Chinese investments abroad. BRI infrastructure 
provides a new point of entry to the investigation of the ways the Chinese built 
environment assumes a certain kind of subject, a certain geographic context, and a certain 
relationship with the state.  
This dissertation aims to trace the outlines of a new kind of entity: a nation of 
both people and things, infrastructures and communities. In doing so it pulls together 
intellectual threads from across the social sciences, fostering new dialogue between fields 
that have long been siloed away from each other. My hope is that this dissertation, and 
the notion of the more-than-human nation, functions as a connecting node in a fractured 
scholarly network, enabling ideas to flow and bringing distant intellectual territories into 
more intimate contact. 
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Xinhua. 2019-02-03. “Spring Festival Memories: Nostalgia Was Once a Train Ticket.” 春运记
忆：乡愁曾是一张火车票. 
Xinhua. 2019-03-26. “No Need to Return to Official Residence! Next Week, One-Stop Travel 
Documents ‘Go National.’” 不用回户籍地了！下周一起出入境证件“全国通办.”  
Xinkuai Bao. 2002-03-27. “The Cost May Be High, But the Convenience Is Great: Guangzhou 
Pushes a Guangzhou-Hong Kong Maglev Train.” 造价虽高但十分方便 广州力推穗港
磁悬浮列车.  
 
338 
APPENDIX B 
PROJECT APPROVAL FROM HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTECTION PROGRAM, 
UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, 2017-2019 
  
 
 COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS ● RESEARCH COMPLIANCE SERVICES 
 677 E. 12th Ave., Suite 500, 5237 University of Oregon, Eugene OR 97401-5237 
 T 541-346-2510  F 541-346-5138  http://rcs.uoregon.edu 
 
 An equal-opportunity, affirmative-action institution committed to cultural diversity and compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act 
 
 
DATE:  May 25, 2016 IRB Protocol Number:  05122016.025 
 
TO:     Dylan Brady, Principal Investigator 
 Department of Geography 
 
RE: Protocol entitled, “An Infrastructural Approach Towards the Emergence of Chinese 
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Notice of IRB Review and Exempt Determination 
as per Title 45 CFR Part 46.101 (b)(2) 
 
The above protocol has been reviewed by the University of Oregon Institutional Review Board and 
Research Compliance Services. This is a minimal risk research protocol that qualifies for an 
exemption from IRB review under 45 CFR 46.101(b)(2) for research involving the use of educational 
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must submit any changes to the protocol to Research Compliance Services for assessment to verify 
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Your responsibility as a Principal Investigator also includes: 
• Obtaining written documentation of the appropriate permissions from public school districts, 
institutions, agencies, or other organizations, etc., prior to conducting your research 
• Notifying Research Compliance Services of any change in Principal Investigator 
• Notifying Research Compliance Services of any changes to or supplemental funding 
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for five years after conclusion of your study or the closure of your sponsored research, whichever 
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Sincerely, 
 
Kalindi Allen 
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339 
 
 
 
 COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS ● RESEARCH COMPLIANCE SERVICES 
 677 E. 12th Ave., Suite 500, 5237 University of Oregon, Eugene OR 97401-5237 
 T 541-346-2510  F 541-346-5138  http://rcs.uoregon.edu 
 
 An equal-opportunity, affirmative-action institution committed to cultural diversity and compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act 
 
DATE:  March 14, 2017 IRB Protocol Number:  05122016.025 
 
TO:     Dylan Brady, Principal Investigator 
 Department of Geography  
 
RE: Protocol entitled, “An Infrastructural Approach Towards the Emergence of 
Chinese National Territory” 
 
Notice of IRB Review and Exempt Determination-Amendment 
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Sincerely, 
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APPENDIX C 
JOURNAL STYLE REQUEST FORM  
 
In the following chapters of my dissertation, I intend to include chapters 
formatted in journal style. I request permission to use the style of the journals listed.  
 
CHAPTER VI: Between Nation and State: Boundary Objects, 
Infrastructures and Communities of Practice in the Chinese Rail System 
Journal: Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 
Style:  SAGE Harvard reference style 
 
CHAPTER VII: Being a Chinese Passenger: Practicing Quality and 
Civilization on the Rail 
Journal: cultural geographies 
Attached:   “Humane” reference style 
 
CHAPTER VIII: The Circulatory Panopticon: Rail Infrastructure as 
Citizenship-Realizing and -Diffracting Apparatus and Foucault’s Realist Turn 
Journal: Political Geography 
Attached: Political Geography reference style 
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